


# Marine Corps Gazette




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# Marine Corps 1961

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest  
of news of interest  
to our members

Volume 45, Number 8

Marine Corps Gazette

August, 1961

## Congress & the Corps

## Coming: Brand-New Look At Your Service Career

The patchwork quilt of laws affecting your career—promotion, retirement, pay and allowances, retention on active duty—is due for overhaul. Will you be helped or hurt? The odds are: helped. Here's why:

Not this year, but next, Congress will probably consider bills in these major areas:

- New career guidelines, based on Bolte committee studies.
- New retirement guidelines, based on a study by the University of Michigan.
- New regulations to encourage retired officers to work for the government.
- A new approach to pay (or allowances) increases to keep up with the cost of living.

What this all adds up to is a growing understanding by Congress (and by the public it represents) of the continuing need for strong armed forces—and strong leaders. The trend of recent years to whittle away career benefits may well be reversed.

The Bolte study would provide for a peacetime officer structure with orderly promotion. It's based mainly on the present Navy-Marine Corps system. Big gain might be more Marine slots for LtCol and up (569). It also seeks to clarify retirement as a right, not a fringe benefit. To do this, the plan would let retired officers be called to active duty without their consent.

But from the University of Michigan study (requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee) comes a new approach: retirement should be liberalized because the services need 5, 10, 15 and 20-year types—and few 30-year types. Here are key questions posed by the Senators with answers found by the study:

*Q. How about the increasing cost of military retirements?*

A. It's going up. By 1970 it may cost \$1.8 billion a year to pay 717,000 retired servicemen. But these are deferred costs of WWII, Korea, and the cold war, not new costs.

*Q. Should 20-year retirements be allowed?*

A. Yes, and there should be some system to get officers to serve for 3-14 years. The whole promotion system forces most officers and SNCOs out before they get 30 in; we need to recognize we're asking service people to have two careers. And, says the study, a second career after 40 doesn't pay too well in the average case.

*Q. How about setting up a retirement system where the serviceman contributes?*

A. A bad idea. There'd be no major saving. It might cost more in the end (pay raise for all, administrative costs) and most would go to non-career people. Would hurt morale. Even private retirement systems are getting away from contributory types.

*Q. How does military retirement compare with other retirement systems, such as Civil Service?*

A. It's entirely different, but not particularly liberal. It lets you retire earlier, but gives you little if you leave before 20.

*Q. How should retired pay be increased to adjust for cost of living?*

A. By a flat percentage increase, not by relation to active duty pay. The

(See Service Career next page)

## Enlisted Promotions

First duties for BGen J. O. Butcher after pinning on single stars: Head up first enlisted promotion board, FY '62.

SgtMaj/MGySgt and 1stSgt/MSgt board began sifting SRBs of eligible Marines 10 July, can select from these quotas (for contrast, FY '61 quotas appear in right hand column):

|        | Eligible | FY '61 |
|--------|----------|--------|
| SgtMaj | 74       | 559    |
| MGySgt | 96       | 198    |
| 1stSgt | 446      | 251    |
| MSgt   | 300      | 707    |

Difference between 1stSgt/MSgt quotas is striking. First, combined 1stSgt/MSgt quota is smaller this year (746 vs 958). Why? An obvious reason is that there are fewer to pick from. Until this year, two-year time-in-grade requirement was waived. Now, only Marines with at least two years in grade are being considered. It narrows the field.

Second, why more 1stSgts than MSgts (446 vs 300)? There's a bigger need for 1stSgts: 1) SgtMaj/1stSgt program is six years old; a bigger percentage have retired (prior to 1960, 1stSgt selectees were not required to sign 3-year service agreements) and 2) existing billets for 1stSgts are more easily defined, i.e. most company-size units, including ship's detachment, rate one (MCO 1400.3C). Planners recommend that MGySgt/MSgt billets be allowed to develop gradually through experience and by Billet Evaluation System (Newsletter: Jul '60).

## New Number

FMF Potomac's 2/8 is now 2/22 since being redesignated 17Jul61 at MCS, Quantico. LtCol W. A. Leitner, Bn CO, accepted colors of 22d Marines, born during WWII expansion and on shelf since 1945; in turn, turned over colors of 8th Marines to LtCol C. S. Robertson who will serve as new 2/8 CO at CamLej. At Quantico, 2/8 consisted of a HqCo, three RifCos from MCS, one RifCo from MB, 8th & Eye. Rifle companies for CamLej-based 2/8 have not been announced.

### Schedule of Officer Selection Boards, FY '62

| Selection for Grade of:  | Convenes          | Zone/<br>Selections | Zone Includes   |
|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| MajGen                   | 10 Jul            | 8/6                 | BGen H. Nickerson   |
| BGen                     | 10 Jul            | 42/6                | Col J. F. Dunlap  |
| Col                      | (To be announced) | 127/76              | LtCol G. W. McCombs   |
| LtCol                    |                   | 89*/271             | Maj J. C. Camp, Jr.   |
|                          |                   |                     | *Maj J. B. Sims   |
| Maj                      | 28 Aug            | LDO: 10<br>____/490 | Maj J. L. McGuire<br>Capt F. R. Harper, Jr.   |
| Capt                     | 18 Sep            | LDO: 22<br>____/507 | Capt E. J. Arceneaux<br>1stLt J. C. Sullivan  |
| Women Officers           | 25 Sep            | LDO: 7              | 1stLt A. C. Katen<br>Maj & Capt w/4 yrs svc,<br>1stLt w/2 yrs as of 30<br>June 1962 |
| CWO                      | 2 Oct             |                     | CWO-3 w/6 yrs svc,<br>CWO-2 w/6 yrs svc<br>WO-1 w/3 yrs svc, as of<br>31 Dec 62     |
| Col & LtCol Continuation | 11 Sep            |                     |   |

\* (Zone of consideration applies)

## Service Career Cont'd

study group pointed out that those now retired draw pay based on an entirely different set of rules and conditions than present pay scales—and that future scales may need similar adjustment. However, the group felt that adjustment of retired pay to meet cost of living increases is required.

The group report hit hard at two basic points:

- 1) The "up or out" selection system requires continuing career adjustment for those forced out, if service careers are to be attractive.
- 2) Use of Reserves to fill out in periods of expansion prevents "humps," but requires a better deal for the Reserves.

Specific proposals by the study group:

- For those Reserves or regulars forced out between 10 and 20 years service, provide a choice of a "lump sum" or some retirement pay.
- For reserves forced out under 10 years, give same pay as for regulars in a lump sum. (Now two months pay for each year of active duty after 8 years service; maximum 24 mo. pay).
- For all retirements, offer an option of getting a lump sum in return for a reduced retirement check.
- Modify the Dual Compensation Act to encourage retired officers to work in government jobs.
- Count enlisted reserve service towards retirement.
- Hold E-8 and E-9 grades to encourage service beyond 20 years.
- Set up a new system of disability pay which would consider years served and grade achieved as well as percentage of disability.
- Emphasize the "second career" concept by counseling, educating private industry to recognize a growing source of skills.

Also in the works is a proposal for a bill to revise the Dual Compensation Act, which forbids retired regular officers (but not reserves, enlisted or warrants) to draw more than \$10,000 total pay from a government job. Current version would ask Congress to exempt the first \$2,000 of retired pay and one-half the remainder.

Pay raise? Pressure is building up to catch up with the cost of living, possibly by an increase in quarters allowance.

*Summary:* It's a complex subject. There'll be many hearings, statements, rumors, conflicting reports before there's any real action. Meanwhile, Marine Corps personnel planners have the decks cleared for action within the frame of existing laws to get and keep an efficient, fair system. Congress may well bear a hand next year. Two good reasons: the law of supply and demand and N. S. Khrushchev.

### Officer Promotions

Are you up for promotion this summer? If so, big question is how rough will the boards be. For officers, your chances look like this:

- 1stLt to Capt—95% make it.
- Capt to Maj—90%
- Maj to LtCol—60%–65% (see below).
- LtCol to Col—60%
- Col to BGen—14.3%
- BGen to MajGen—75%

These odds could be reduced if your board decides to dip much below the zone. In the case of Maj to LtCol, the zone of consideration applies, but the basic group being considered is Majors of Year Group 1943.

### Permanent Warrants

Results of the HQMC board to screen records of temporary warrant officers should be published by the time you read this. About 100 are affected. Ref: MCBul 1400 of 6 Jul 61.

What's the big idea? Simply to make the warrant structure permanent. Nearly all temporaries will get permanent status. Just a handful were expected to be screened out—for cause.

Program marks another step in firming up new officer permanent structure, relying on Reserve 20-year careers for expansion.

### Marines at Work

In June, Col R. E. Carey's 8th Marine Expeditionary Unit landed in Vieques for deployment and field exercises. An up-to-date report:

**SPECIAL TO GAZETTE**—Using hilly Vieques to advantage, LtCol E. J. Redic's 1/8 held extensive anti-guerrilla training, featuring company-size 4-day exercises, ending with 3-day battalion size operation against guerrillas. Rifle platoons also got riot control training, took part in a 3-hour riot control exercise.

Speed and mobility was paramount as ground Marines called on Maj J. A. Dorsey's Light Helicopter Transport Squadron-263 for night ship-to-shore movement from Boxer.

LtCol J. H. Berge's VMA-242 (attack squadron) flew CAS for ground units, sharpened its eye with live ordnance strikes on Vieques and nearby Culebra, treated ground Marines to a special CAS demonstration.

# Space Age Marines

Marines are versatile. Take for example job now assigned HMR(L)-262 stationed at New River, N. C. Besides normal tasks of a HUS-1 helicopter squadron, this outfit provides Mercury Space Capsule recovery crews for downed astronauts, e.g. Ham, Cdr. Alan B. Shepard (and at press time were standing by aboard USS *Randolph* to pick up USAF Capt Virgil Grissom).

HMR(L)-262 got in space work two years ago with a simple request, filtered down through chain of command: "Can a helicopter lift a Mercury Space Capsule from the water?" Since then HMR(L)-262 has provided recovery crews for almost every major live firing Mercury test.

A squadron Mercury Recovery Unit for three HUS-1 helicopters usually consists of six to seven helicopter pilots and eleven to twelve aircraft maintenance specialists. No two missions are identical. Operations are conducted from ships of different types and each mission is not usually in the same geographical location. Typical mission generally follows this pattern:

- When Space Capsule is expected to land in vicinity of recovery force, helicopters are launched from LSD or carrier. When Capsule is sighted, helicopters go to probable impact point. Recovery crew consists of pilot and co-pilot due to weight factors. When Capsule is spotted co-pilot leaves his seat in cockpit, goes below to cabin. Pilot flies near Capsule, makes pre-pickup inspection. Certain conditions won't allow a helicopter recovery, e.g., parachute still attached to space craft. Inspection over, the helicopter is positioned close to and above the top of the Capsule.

- Co-pilot, strapped in a gunner's belt leans out main cabin door. He holds a long-handled cutter. Cutter is activated by co-pilot pressing a switch, firing an explosive cartridge. Cutter is necessary to cut the long whip antenna protruding from Capsule's top. Not done there's a chance of the antenna damaging some portion of the helicopter during recovery. Next: fasten hook and cable assembly to lifting loop of Capsule.

- The recovery helicopter pilot is now in radio contact with the astronaut and at the same time is receiving hovering instructions from co-pilot on intercom. Now the pilot starts his lift, "Easy, now . . . Easy," raises Capsule slightly in water. Water begins to drain from impact bag below Capsule. Astronaut fires off the side port, slips out of his space craft. Meanwhile, co-pilot has lowered regular rescue sling for the astronaut.

- The pilot continues to apply almost maximum lifting power to keep water draining from impact bag. As water drains out, the space craft lightens. Gentle lifting continues until space craft is light enough to clear water for return flight to awaiting recovery ship.

This report is simplified. Weather, sea state, weight of Capsule, operations from different type ships, delivery of Capsule to a small recovery pad, all offer unusual techniques of piloting not normally encountered by helicopter pilots. Well trained recovery crews make it look easy.

## Marines at Work

Opening parachutes opened new horizons for ANGLICO (Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) Marines of 3d TACP (Tactical Air Control Party) after jump training with Army's 2d Airborne on Okinawa. Capt G. F. Boemeran, 1stLt W. O. Grubbs, eight enlisted Marines made their jumps from USAF C-130, USA "Beaver" scout plane, and USA H-21 helicopter.

- More shroud lines: Maj J. S. McAlister's 1stForReconCo made first parachute jump by Marine tactical unit from GV-1. Forty-three Marines jumped free-fall style from 3,500 feet over El Centro, Calif., desert, brought jump log for year up to 136 free-falls. Unit has nearly 5,000 static line jumps.

- Lawmakers of NATO countries visiting CamPen 11 July, saw a full-scale beach assault via helicopter by LtCol F. R. Young's 2/7.

- MSgt C. W. Tippie, (VMGR-352) one of a vanishing breed of NAPs (Naval Aviation Pilot), is first enlisted pilot to qualify in GV-1.

- At LFTU, Coronado, Calif., reservists for first time are making helicopter assaults (on San Clemente Island) from deck of a carrier. 1stMarDiv aggressors (3d AmTracBn), going all out to supply realism, are wearing crossed bandoliers, sombreros (the Tijuana touch), ala guerrilla style. 27 reserve units from 14 states—Michigan to California—will get helicopter assault training at Coronado.

## Reserve Careers

Why take a SWAG (Standard Written Agreement) to stay on active duty for a set time as a Reserve officer? Several reasons:

As stated last month, new Marine Corps program offers real opportunity for a 20-year career. Benefits could be significantly increased if University of Michigan study (p. 1) becomes basis of new retirement law.

If not, there's a "hidden benefit" young officers may not realize. Reserve retirement provides a monthly check beginning at age 60 for those who complete 20 years Reserve service. You get 2½ percent of your base pay for each year of active duty or 360 Reserve points. Actually, if inactive it's hard to get much over 50 points a year. For example, an officer might spend four years obligated service on active duty, then 16 years in the Reserve (getting 800 points). If he retired as a reserve LtCol, he'd get \$115.48 per month at age 60.

On the other hand, taking a two-year SWAG now would raise this to \$141.55 a month, equivalent to an expensive insurance policy. Also to consider, of course, is the growing possibility of reserves being mobilized this year, or in the future.

## A Second Career?

University of Michigan study (see p. 1) polled retired officers, those due to retire, found they expected bigger civilian salaries than they got. Many industries and businesses have appropriate jobs, but prefer to fill them from their own ranks.

One exception: teaching. There's a shortage. DoD has gotten together with American Council on Education and National Education Association. Result: a pamphlet on how to prepare for college, secondary, or elementary teaching. It's MMO P1800.5 (DoD PAM 7-10).

If you want a personal copy, order from Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Send 30¢. Title is *Teaching: A Second Career*.

## GMST Problems

Look for a change to MCO 1510.2B on GMST. Planners last summer took two actions: allowed all grades to enroll in MCI and fitted test subjects to required training.

There's still a problem in making references available to Marines scattered in more than 1,000 units. There's a project underway to simplify the list of over 25 study references. Revised *Landing Party Manual* will help a lot.

What subject gives the most trouble? IG says map reading—in all ranks. And it's not that complicated, since all that's needed is to understand about what's covered in the *Guidebook for Marines*.

# Organized Reserve: A Growing Concern

Enlisted strength of Organized Reserve will be stronger by 500 Marines come end of FY '62. Increase is reflected in breakdown of authorized 48-drill pay quotas for ground officers and enlisted. Goal by next July (not including six-month trainees) is to have 3,567 officers, 38,610 enlisted. Officer grade distribution is included in below table:

|              | <b>Lt Col</b> | <b>Maj</b> | <b>Capt/Lt/WO</b> | <b>WM</b> | <b>Total</b> | <b>Enlisted</b> |
|--------------|---------------|------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1st MCRRD    | 5             | 15         | 251               | 2         | 273          | 4943            |
| 4th MCRRD    | 6             | 12         | 241               | 2         | 261          | 4810            |
| 5th MCRRD    | 3             | 6          | 105               | 2         | 116          | 2315            |
| 6th MCRRD    | 4             | 7          | 214               | 1         | 226          | 4107            |
| 8th MCRRD    | 5             | 11         | 193               | 1         | 210          | 4332            |
| 9th MCRRD    | 4             | 12         | 262               | 2         | 280          | 6153            |
| 12th MCRRD   | 4             | 14         | 285               | 2         | 305          | 6404            |
| 14th MCRRD   | 0             | 1          | 7                 | 0         | 8            | 136             |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>31</b>     | <b>78</b>  | <b>1558</b>       | <b>12</b> | <b>1679</b>  | <b>33200</b>    |

In addition to above 48-drill ground quotas are 1,600 officers, 5,270 enlisted for MARTCOM.

24-drill quotas: MARTCOM—200 officers, 0 enlisted; MCRRD—88 officers, 140 enlisted.

Quotas for field grade officers are about 80 percent of T/O requirements. But this doesn't mean any CO will lose his command as a result. A temporary excess is okay. This also insures having authorized complement of LtCols and Majs other than those commanding units.

How about six-month reserve program? It's growing, too, but biggest expansion will be in communications, engineers, field artillery where big shortages exist. Biggest quotas have been assigned to these occupational fields. MARTCOM will send 575 six-month trainees to bootcamp this FY, get back about half before year's end. Input of ground Marines will be 6,584, again about half returning to home unit by 30 June 1962. Until January, monthly quotas can be exceeded to pick up any slippages. But don't slip too far. Why? Training activities use monthly quotas as planning figures. If you do slip, recoup fast.

Better yet, build up a pool to help out during slow months. It's now okay to enlist trainees up to 120 days before sending them to bootcamp. See MCO 1540R.18A.

## Sand Box Statistics

Leaving 29 Palms after final phase of Operation GREEN LIGHT BGen F. E. Leek, CG, 1stMarDiv, said "Thanks for the privilege of playing in your sand box."

"You're welcome," said BGen L. J. Fields, CG, MCB, 29 Palms. "Please come back."

This exchange closed out biggest Fleet Marine Force display of fire power ever massed on a single target: combat readiness. In words of MajGen S. S. Jack, CG, 5th MEF (since retired): "... first time, other than during hostilities, that a Marine firex of this nature and scope has ever been conducted."

How big? Statistics tell the story:

98,500 rations (assault, MIC, 5-in-1), 432,000 gal water, 102,000 lbs ice, 28,200 loaves bread, 4,620 gal ice cream, 211,000 gal gas.

• Water in the desert? Here's how:

After six tries 7th Eng brought in 400-ft well, gushing 7,000 gal per day. Water for bathing, washing, cooling systems was hauled in 18 DUKWs found ideal for this type desert work.

• Ice? Many health and comfort uses. Most noteworthy: temperature control of yeast for baking bread.

• Fuel went mostly for making motor march from CamPen, completed in six days; 95 serials (25 vehicles each) made move, averaged five hours, 10 minutes for 150-mile trip. Only one vehicle failed making return trip. Heavy engineer equipment used 21,000 gal diesel fuel.

Firex lasted three days, more than a million and a half rounds of ammo

(See Sand Box next page)

## How it Seams to Be

Ever wonder why PUC ribbons fray sooner than others? It's because they lack selvage—the edge of a woven fabric, so formed as to prevent raveling. One way to get selvage is with a seam. Outer edges of most ribbons are seamed; why not PUC?

PUC ribbon is turned out on same loom as other kinds. But because its stripes are horizontal, outer edges can't be seamed (see for yourself). One solution would be special looms. Too expensive.

Another would be to redesign. Problem is that Navy PUC reflects deeds of sailors and Marines by combining official colors of the two services (blue and gold, Navy; scarlet and gold, Marines). Same color combination w/vertical stripes is used for Navy and Marine Corps Medal.

Best solution: Paint edges of PUC ribbon with clear nail polish.

## Loophole Plugged

Here's why Marines wives will be getting a new ID card:

A review of Medicare operations showed some instances where Uncle Sam picked up tab for civilian medical/hospital care of dependents before they became eligible, e.g., a service wife uses her Medicare benefits to satisfy an overdue bill for an operation performed prior to her marriage. Doctor puts in his claim for payment on the strength of her ID card which doesn't show date of marriage.

New Uniformed Services ID and Privilege cards will include such information.

Until new application forms (DD 1172 Rev 1Mar61) and ID cards (DD 1173 Rev 1Mar61) become available (about 15 Aug), effective date for civilian medical care must be entered on the old forms.

## Inter-Service Transfers

A revised MCO covering inter-service transfers of officers, regular and reserve, on and off active duty, is in the mill. Specific change:

Requests concerning officers on inactive duty bypass SecDef, go directly (via MarCor channels) to SecNav. If request is from other than the officer himself, route is via Secretary of gaining service to SecNav. SecDef will resolve disagreements.

## Red Underwear

Soviet soldiers in hot climates will wear short sleeve open neck shirts, skivvies, ankle-gripping pants, pith helmet. Present summer uniform has baggy blouses, long johns, breeches tucked into heavy boots (**The Red Rifleman Today, GAZETTE: Jun '60**).

# Reserve Summer School

Until late fall, Marines of Organized Reserve across the nation, ground and air, are getting in their licks at major training bases and air stations, taking part in Annual Field Training.

What about other reservists, particularly field grade officers of C1 III Reserve who in event of mobilization will fill top command and staff billets? Resting on their WWII laurels? Content that come another fracas they can always rely on past experience? Hardly.

Every year several hundred reserve officers, mostly field grade, spend summer vacations at MCS, Quantico boning up on new concepts, weapons and techniques that have passed them by. To take care of them MCEC (Marine Corps Education Center) has set up condensed Junior and Senior School courses. This summer (June and July) 120 reserve officers attended two phases of Senior Course; 246 attended two phases of Junior Course.

Mission of both courses is the same, differs only in level of training: To help reserve officers maintain mobilization potential.

- In scope, Phase I, Senior Course teaches combat at regimental and above level; Phase II teaches amphibious planning on division/wing level.
- Phase I, Junior Course teaches combat at battalion/squadron level; Phase II emphasizes helicopter borne (vertical assault) operations.

Students are volunteers, usually attend Phase I one year, Phase II the next (normally, Class III reservists are restricted to two weeks active duty for training each year).

MCEC also holds summer school for reserve comm officers. Fifteen are enrolled in RCOOC 7-18 August. Two-week course is geared to keep reserve comm officers up on current use of comm equipment in FMF and how FMF-1965 plans to use it. School includes two-day CPX.

Quantico's summer school for reserves is not all chalk talk. Nor is it confined to officers already holding reserve commissions. Training and Test Regiment (not a MCEC function) ran 1,320 PLCs over its obstacle course during June and July. Another 1,600 are huffing and puffing right now getting in shape for some future Basic School along with 310 NROTC Marine option students.

All told, come September MCS, Quantico will have made a big contribution to mobilization—3,500 Marine Reserve officers and candidates who will carry home a little bit more than they brought.

Then it's right back to the old blackboard for MCEC's instructor crew. Gen D. M. Shoup opens MCS, Quantico's 41st academic year 28 Aug in Ellis Hall by addressing 370 (Marine, Army, Navy, Air Force and Allied) officer students of FY '62 Junior, Senior and Comm Schools.

Scattered throughout the school year are other courses, e.g. AOOC, MW, SIC, WOCS, COOC, WOTC, and more. To find out what these abbreviations mean read *Special Report: Schools for Officers*, in next month Marine Corps GAZETTE.

## Sand Box, Cont'd

fired. Breakdown (expressed in rounds):

|                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1,570,464 small arms | 820 90mm tank        |
| 780 81mm mortar      | 425 120mm tank       |
| 1,560 4.2-in mortar  | 1,393 105mm howitzer |
| 960 3.5-in rocket    | 962 106mm rifle      |
|                      | 1,843 pyrotechnics   |

The visitors left 29 Palms in better shape than they found it. Sixty miles of roads in maneuver area were improved, 97 miles of new roads built, all routes marked with signposts, giving mileage to next intersection, exact grid coordinate of sign. Result: a 157-mile road network for permanent use.

Desert airstrip was refinished and lengthened by 1,000 feet.

- Tanks, Ontos, LVTs went by rail (84 flat cars); big engineering gear was commercially trucked (35 trucks, 25 semi-trailers, 58 six-ton bridge trailers).

## Realistic Training

Progress report on first MarCorps combat environment range:

What: a live-firing range that will let a company maneuver and at least one full platoon fire at advanced pop-up and moving targets. They'll be helped along by all types of simulators.

Who: 2d ITR and Navy Special Devices Center are working out final plans, under interested supervision of G-3, HQMC.

Where: San Onofre Canyon, CamPen.

When: This prototype should be completed by December.

Why: To develop an off-the-shelf range from standardized parts that can be built wherever Marines train. Estimate is that CamPen range, when completed, will absorb five million rounds a year.

## SATS Progress

DivAv has asked for nominees (Maj/LtCol), one each from 2dMAW, 3d MAW, MCS, Quantico, for assignment to 18-month tour as SATS project officer at their home base. A complete short airfield will be set up on each coast for pilot training. Quantico strip will function mostly as a test and evaluation vehicle. (See *Looking Ahead*, GAZETTE: May '61.)

## Ammo Color Code

DoD is expected to standardize ammo color codes this summer. Some 19 NATO countries have already agreed on such markings as a yellow band for HE. EOD Marines had best hang onto their old references: existing stocks won't be repainted.

## Reserve Training

Director, MCR, reminds commanders not to slight officer and NCO schooling. Also, he wants more "Technique of Rifle Fire," less "M-1 Rifle, Nomenclature and Functioning" brand of training.

Also, besides annual field training, Organized Reserves can request formal schools. Get them while they're hot.

## Older

Sharing a birthday 10 Jul 61:  
Second Marine Aircraft Wing (CherPt, N. C.), its 20th; and Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, SgtMaj F. D. Rauber who was two years old when Wright Bros. flew the first airplane.

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NUMBER 8

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Advertising Representative: Thomas O. Woolf & Son, Inc., 225 Park Ave., New York 17, N.Y.; 266 S. Alexandria Ave., Los Angeles 4, Calif.; 151 Fleet St., London E.C. 4, England. Printed at 32d Street and Elm Ave., Baltimore, Md.

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# Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association (unofficial, non-profit) Box 1844, Quantico, Va.

Rates: Members, 1-yr \$5; 2-yr \$9.50; 3-yr \$13. Subscribers, 1-yr \$6; 2-yr \$11; 3-yr \$15. Foreign postage: Add \$1 per year to above prices. Reduced Member's Rate to enlisted and officer candidates, 1-yr \$4; 2-yr \$8; 3-yr \$12.

Free Writers Guide on request.

POSTMASTER: Forward to U.S. servicemen when address changed by military orders (except to FPO) per section 157.4 Postal Manual. Send Form 3579 to Marine Corps Gazette, PO Box 1844, Quantico, Va.


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# BOEING VERTOL 107'S STEEL SPAR ROTOR BLADES

## BUILT TO TAKE PUNISHMENT IN ANY ENVIRONMENT

The broad usefulness of the Boeing Vertol 107, world's only "mission module" helicopter, is augmented by rotor blades designed for dependable service in even the most unfavorable environments. With heat-treated steel D-spar forming the leading edge, Boeing Vertol rotor blades have good fatigue strength and great resistance to surface scratching and nicking. Steel loses little weight due to normal sand and rain erosion, thus Boeing Vertol rotor blades with hundreds of hours difference in service time can be used on the same rotor.

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**VERTOL** DIVISION  
MORTON V PENNSYLVANIA BOEING



# MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to \$25.

## Riot Duty

► May I say that your June 1961 issue represents, to me, what approximates the ideal in a publication of its sort. What I mean is that it contains, in proper proportion, various articles which are themselves in balanced quantity, and appropriate to the purpose which the *GAZETTE* should serve, with a minimum of rehashed training manuals in the form of articles which should be already in the hands of instructors of troops in training areas. The issue I refer to contains, instead, a scholarly discussion of leadership in the article on Rommel; a valuable contribution to officers' knowledge in the translation and condensation of Guevara's book, a valuable study on mob weapons and defense against mobs (which I think should be an important part of Marine training; used to be and is no more), and even the little piece on how to tie a sword knot was valuable.

I for one believe that some of the old "riot duty" training which we had years ago should be brought up to date and revived. Both Mr Burnham and Maj Peterson, in their articles, seem to argue so.

LtCol F. W. Hopkins

5306 Monte Verde Drive  
Santa Rosa, Calif.

## Spreading the Word

► You asked, in March 1961, "How in 1961 can the *GAZETTE* get (and deserve) more support?"

Spread the word—and PUSH!

In July 1959, BG Gen F. E. Leek (then Commander, Marine Air Reserve Training) expressed his and the Commandant's wishes that all Organized Reserve Officers join the Marine Corps Association. Here at NAS, South Weymouth, Massachusetts, all regular, reserve, active and organized reserve officers joined, a total of almost 150.

Prior to his detachment to the 1st Marine Division in December 1960, Gen Leek again expressed such a desire. Again all active and organized reserve officers at South Weymouth joined. In addition 20 out of 29 regular Staff NCOs joined.

Urging these officers, plus the *GAZETTE*'s "NEW LOOK" did it.

Col H. W. Taylor

CO, MARTD  
South Weymouth, Mass.

## On Merger

► The "Looking Ahead" section of the March issue of the *GAZETTE* cited several proposals for merger of the operations and intelligence sections. Such convictions recall the admonition of BG Gen J. D. Hittle in his book *The Military Staff*:

"A principal deficiency of the German General Staff was this emphasis of the primacy of operational considerations. . . . Such dominance of the operational functions could result only in the subordination of intelligence. . . . Consequently intelli-

gence was relegated to a secondary status. It was inevitable that, since the intelligence officer was under the operations officer, production of combat intelligence would be subordinated. . . . This inadequate performance of the intelligence function was clearly demonstrated—for it was the failure to evaluate accurately Allied war-waging capabilities that allowed the German High Command to place such faith in their reliance on the blitz method. . . ."

Maj J. C. Scharfen

NROTC Unit  
University of Missouri

## Tank Trailer

► Every Marine is well aware of the importance of logistical support in combat. The rifleman is faced with this problem, not only as he looks around for another clip of ammo or a can of charlie rations, but also when he sees his supporting arms leave the combat area for resupply. This is an especially critical problem for mobile support weapons such as the tank.

Tanks often have less than desired cruising range because of the distance required for the approach to contact and the return for resupply. The solution: Let each tank pull a special trailer carrying fuel and ammunition. The tank could make its movement to contact, stop to refuel and detach its trailer just before commitment; then return to it for resupply later.

Maneuverability would probably be best realized by using a one-wheel trailer, attached by two bars. In the event of surprise encounter, it might be desirable to design the assembly in such a way as to allow detachment from within.

2d Lt E. R. Babbie

MCSS, MCB  
Camp Lejeune, N.C.

## Trouble Lifting?

► Are Marines having trouble lifting an "unconscious" casualty?

I refer to change in physical readiness test which permits assistance by casualty (NEWSLETTER: Jun '61). Here's a way to lift a heavyweight with no help:

Roll casualty face down, arms extended above head. Grasp him at armpits, lift and walk forward. This action should bring casualty to his knees (skeleton will support an unconscious person in this position provided you keep him from toppling over). Next, bend your knees and encircle with your arms the upper torso of casualty (bear-hug). Stand up. Casualty is now upright. Bend slightly and let him fall over your shoulder into fireman carry position.

This way an unconscious person gets some chance of rescue as one capable of helping the rescuer.

WO W. C. Schlondrop

158 Nevada St.  
Huntsville, Ala.

## Homes, Sweet Homes

► Housing for married Marines has been an item termed critical in current armed services planning; the Marine Corps has regarded it as an issue of some importance. Too much importance, I think, because spokesmen for more and better "brownbagger quarters" are in high places. I quickly add that I don't object to more housing for dependents, and favor development of dependent's housing to meet the needs of the services. However, efforts to shelter families have been pushed forward at a pace far quicker than those to improve the lot of Marines who live in barracks.

Great attention at inspections is rightfully given to cleanliness of barracks but none, it seems, is given to the adequacy. Have you ever wondered where a couple of hundred people living in one building go to write a letter?

If we could not do better I would have no complaints, but most of our bases have reached a fairly permanent state and the money to build clubs, post exchanges, theatres and chapels—gigantic gestures to improve the lot of the young Marine—comes from some place. We also have found money for a great many dependents quarters of the finest type. But troop quarters are the same as they have been for a half century. Perhaps next year they'll be noticed.

1st Lt J. M. Gratto

H&S Co 1/8  
Camp Lejeune, N.C.

## Short Term Recruiters

► In March MESSAGE CENTER, Capt Mayberry asked why six-month training quotas aren't assigned to recruiting stations. For one thing, I understand that the Reserve unit CO is responsible for his unit's manning level. Who then would know better than he what his input requirements are from month to month? Who, for example, would figure out what our monthly six-month trainee quota would be for each of the six units in this area? For another thing, I should think the best salesmen for a reserve unit are the members of that unit, whose civilian friends and associates are all potential prospects, and who know exactly what their unit does.

Maj A. T. Whitehead

MCRS  
Nashville, Tenn.

► All I&I Staffs are perfectly capable of recruiting their yearly quotas for the six month's program. Most units would welcome authorization to increase their reserve enlistments.

Capt G. V. Ruos, Jr.


I&I  
66th RifCo, Aberdeen, Wash.

► It is my opinion that the Inspector-Instructor should teach the Regular recruiter the difference between the two programs. Once this is taught and explained to the Regular recruiter it will be found that competition will end and that each will aid the other because a different type of man is attracted to each program offered by the Marine Corps.

Capt O. J. Butler

I&I  
40th RifCo  
Lubbock, Texas

(Continued on page 10)




## RCA AIRBORNE SINGLE SIDEBAND

***Performance proven in Operation "Deep Freeze"***

RCA's single sideband modification of the 618S-1 high frequency communication equipment has demonstrated proven capability under actual flight operations during Operation "DEEP FREEZE," now being conducted by the U. S. Navy with the support of the U. S. Air Force and MATS.

The RCA concept of modifying proven, existing equipments, such as the AN/ARC-65, has resulted in the most economical approach to the utilization of single sideband performance capabilities. The 618S-1/MC and AN/ARC-38A SSB modifications are the latest additions to the family of RCA Communications Equipments now providing extra capability to meet present and future military and civil operational communications requirements.

Several thousand RCA Airborne Single Sideband Equipments are now in flight operation.



*For further information on the 618S-1/MC, AN/ARC-38A, and other airborne communication equipments write: Marketing Dept., Airborne Systems Division, Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden 2, New Jersey.*



The Most Trusted Name in Electronics  
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA

(Continued from page 8)

## On Guerrilla Warfare

► More guerrilla warfare references (SCRAPBOOK: May '61):

Department of the Army pamphlet *The Soviet Partisan Movement* by Maj E. M. Howell.

Magazine articles: *Irregular Warfare* by Sir Robert Sandly, Military Review, 1957; *Irregular Warfare and the Soviets* by Walter D. Jacobs, Military Review, May 1958; *Ter-*

*ror in Cyprus* by Maj B. I. S. Gourlay, Marine Corps Gazette, Aug-Sep, 1959; numerous *The Old Gunny* columns, Leatherneck Magazine, 1958-59-60.

Books: *The Red Army*, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart, Harcourt, Brace, 1956 (Chapter 14, "The Partisan Forces" by Capt N. Galay); *Irregulars, Partisans, and Guerrillas* edited by I. R. Blacker, Simon Schuster, 1954.

MSgt J. W. Jaunal

IstCompRadCo  
FPO, San Francisco

► Your listing of guerrilla warfare references is a valuable aid for Marines striving to keep abreast of a field which has developed into major importance. But how could you have omitted our own *Small Wars Manual*, USMC, Washington, D. C., 1940?

Maj Harries-Clichy Peterson  
135 Brite Ave.  
Scarsdale, N. Y.

Ed: Interest in guerrilla warfare is booming. To meet it, we've planned more listings for next month's Scrapbook.

## QUESTION OF THE MONTH

We asked: "Where is the best place to teach anti-guerrilla tactics?" It appears every Marine has an idea on the subject. Response to question beat by far any previous QUESTION. Prizewinning entry and extracts from a few letters received follow. Question for August: Do we need team shots? (See page 28.) Deadline 1 Oct 61.

### \$25.00 Winner

► Where to teach anti-guerrilla tactics depends on requirements and capabilities.

Requirement is to teach Marines to fight irregulars well-acquainted with the battle area, who may have support of some or all of the local populace.

To beat them we have to fight them at close range. Higher echelon commanders and their staffs must know how to plan counter-guerrilla actions, how to control and support small units in semi-independent actions operating under adverse physical circumstances with light equipment.

Present training gives Marines and small units the training they need to fight guerrillas. We bear down hard on scouting, patrolling, security, demolitions, allied subjects. We stress aggressive action, closing with enemy, confidence, individual training. We apply these principles to all conditions of weather, terrain, visibility. We teach the importance of friendly relations with locals.

Anti-guerrilla warfare should be considered a normal assignment for any combat Marine. We need *Marines*, not a special breed of anti-guerrillas to be called in like "experts from out of town."

Units preparing for special operations do need specific indoctrination on the objective area and characteristics and techniques of enemy forces.

We need to add something for higher echelon commanders and their staffs. They need a thorough knowledge of guerrilla organization, support, techniques, weak spots. They need a large dose of combat intelligence doctrine as well as familiarity with principles of psychological and unconventional warfare.

These things can and should be added to curriculum of Basic, Junior, Senior Schools, NCO schools, and should be included in training schedules of combat units.

LtCol A. R. Cason

15 Oama Place  
Aiea, Hawaii

► Everywhere! A good place to start: Self-teaching. Enroll in "Unconventional Warfare," Extension Course Program, US Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, N. C.

Enroll in MCI Course 02.3, "Com-

munist Guerrilla Warfare."

Get a copy of MCS 3-2, "Tactical Appreciation of Weather and Terrain." Eat it, paragraph by paragraph, digest it, then live it.

SSgt H. B. Love

935 Albacore St.  
Laurel Bay, S. C.

► Anti-guerrilla tactics should be taught by NCOs within platoon/company of all Marine Corps units, with material prepared by MCI.

MCI, more than any other agency, is in a position to gather, plan, prepare and disseminate material. Courses offered by MCI in almost all OFs are concise, interesting, informative, complete and easy to understand.

Sgt J. A. Murphy

American Embassy  
Jidda, Saudi Arabia

► In division, by company grade officers schooled on the subject. Set up a special school within each division. For this we might well turn for guidance to the British and French, with their extensive anti-guerrilla experience.

Capt W. G. Leftwich, Jr.

9 East Bayshore Blvd.  
Jacksonville, N. C.

► Let me answer because I am veteran of unconventional warfare, eight years in Indo-China, five years in Algeria, all with special native "commandos."

I think so: anti-guerrilla warfare is more a state of spirit than a bulk of knowledge. Consequently, in USMC, teaching of anti-guerrilla warfare must be done at all levels: boot camp, ITR, division and in special schools.

Cdt J. L. Delayen

French Marine Corps  
Villa Pirate Rue  
Cannes, France

► Three methods, many places: a special school for officers/SNCOs at FMF HQ level, training at battalion level by graduates of this school, schools conducted by traveling instructors from FMF school for BLTs shipping out as part of balanced fleet.

GySgt D. J. McManus

138 Tarawa Blvd.  
Tarawa Terrace, N. C.

► Introduce anti-guerrilla training in bootcamp via films and lectures. Follow with practical training at ITR. Continue with special schools in division.

Sgt F. G. Gleason

HqCo, I&I Sect  
MCRD, Parris Island

► If you have to ask the price you can't afford it.

SSgt E. C. Manuel

MCS, Quantico, Va.

► In a special school patterned somewhat after Escape, Evasion and Survival Course at Cold Weather Training Center, Bridgeport, Calif.

Capt N. H. Smith

MB, Navy #1506  
FPO, San Francisco

► Problem is tactical. Solve it in a tactical unit, from platoon level through regiment.

GySgt R. J. Shovar

CommElect Bn  
MCRD, San Diego, Calif.

► The only good solution is to teach such training either in bootcamp or ITR, before a Marine is assigned to work in his OF and finds himself tied to a desk or radio bench. Either he learns this kind of combat early and learns it well or he may never have another chance.

IstLt C. A. Fleming

HqBn, 1stMarDiv  
CamPen, Calif.

► Training is highly specialized and of interest mostly to line combat Marines. A special school.

L. H. Riley

NAD, Concord, Calif.

► Three steps in fighting guerrillas: isolate, organize and control locals; show physical evidence of correcting cause of discontent; detect, locate and annihilate guerrillas.

Teach it all along the line, boot camp, ITR, division, Basic, Junior, Senior Schools, every other school where a few hours of instruction can be added.

Maj P. L. Hirt, USMC

Ft. Bragg, N. C.

## Extension School CHALLENGE

### BASIC

- 1** Dispersion is a characteristic of field artillery which is a:  
a. Limitation.  
b. Capability.  
c. Capability when firing at point targets and a limitation when firing at area targets.  
d. Capability when firing at area targets and a limitation when firing at point targets.

- 2** The most effective tactic used to completely destroy a guerrilla force is:  
a. The infiltration method.  
b. The encircling method.  
c. A turning movement.  
d. A flanking attack.



- 3** The evacuation function of the helicopter support team (HST) is usually performed by the evacuation section of the:  
a. Landing zone platoon.  
b. Advance party.  
c. Helicopter control element.  
d. HST headquarters.

### JUNIOR

- 4** The determination of how close to friendly troops close air support strikes may be conducted is the responsibility of the:  
a. Direct air support center.  
b. Commander of the supported unit.  
c. Regimental commander.  
d. Tactical air control party.

- 5** Battalions and regiments submit requests for preplanned close air support:  
a. Over the TAR (Tactical Air Request) net direct to the DASC (Direct Air Support Center).  
b. To parent organizations for coordination and consolidation.  
c. To the FSCC (Fire Support Coordination Center) for coordination.  
d. Direct to the senior aviation headquarters.

**6** The EEI constitute the primary intelligence mission of the command, therefore, it is considered best to:

- Prepare the EEI in the form of a directive.
- Require the intelligence officer to formulate the EEI.
- Wait until the collection plan is completed before formulating EEI.
- Submit your EEI to next higher tactical headquarters for approval.

### SENIOR

**7** Within the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency's (NSA) primary responsibility is in regard to:


- Airborne intelligence.
- Security clearance of all DOD personnel.
- Communications/electronic security.
- Maintaining an espionage net.

- 8** The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for:  
a. All matters regarding their departments.  
b. All matters other than operational employment.  
c. Administrative matters.  
d. Operational matters.

**9** A Marine aircraft group (VF), located in the vicinity of the 1st MAW command post, will generally receive its cryptographic service from the wing communications.

- True.
- False.

### WHAT IS IT?



(Answers on page 12)



Career Marines prefer Extension School Courses!

"No better source of professional material anywhere," says a 1st Lt. Get on the band-wagon and further your career standing. Enroll NOW!



## THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 11)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material, and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

### BASIC

**1** d. Reference: TIP (ARM)2, paragraph 5d. The dispersion pattern is an advantage in neutralizing area targets to the extent that shells achieve effective area distribution without changes in piece laying. However, in attacking small area or point targets, such a dispersion pattern is a disadvantage since multiple rounds usually must be expended for each round achieving any effect on the target.

**2** b. Reference: SM-3, "Special Operations," paragraph 54b. The tactic of encirclement is the most effective way to completely destroy a guerrilla force. Unlike normal operations, the capture of ground during anti-guerrilla operations contributes little to the attainment of the objective, since, upon the departure of our forces, the guerrillas will infiltrate back into the same area. It must also be remembered that guerrillas will not stand and fight a pitched battle if they can avoid it in any way. To drive the guerrillas off is not enough. The guerrilla bands, which are attacked, must either be destroyed or taken prisoner.

**3** d. Reference: TIP (EC)2, figure 7. Since the HST is a task organization, it is possible that it could be organized so that the evacuation section was part of any of the answers given. The question asks for the "usual" organization, which is discussed in the reference material. This discussion and the figure cited indicate that the most logical and usual organization is for the evacuation section to be a part of the HST headquarters.

### JUNIOR

**4** (b) Reference: LFM-25, paragraph 102. The responsibility for determining how close to friendly troops close air support strikes will be conducted rests with the commander of the supported unit.

**5** (b) Reference: TIP (AVN)3, paragraph 29. Requests for pre-planned missions are submitted during the planning phase. These requests are usually forwarded through command channels for coordination and consoli-

dation and, upon approval, are included within the air schedules for execution at the time requested.

**6** (a) Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 402b. The EEI constitute the commander's priority intelligence requirements and therefore prescribe the intelligence mission for the command. The commander is responsible for formulating EEI. All EEI are phrased in the form of directives and stated in concise, simple language.

### SENIOR

**7** c. Reference: MCS 1-6, 140. The National Security Agency, including the Army Security Agency and similar organizations in the three services, has the primary mission of communications/electronic security.

**8** b. Reference: MCS 1-6, 152. The Secretary of a Military De-

partment (Army, Navy, Air Force), is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the efficient operation of his department. The chain of command for purposes other than operational direction of Unified and Specified Commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

**9** a. Reference: TIP (COS)4, 16a (1). The wing communication center includes a message center, a cryptocenter, a messenger section, and a transmitting and receiving section. The cryptocenter, in addition to providing cryptographic service to the wing headquarters, also provides this service to all units of the wing located nearby.

### WHAT IT IS

It is an area being prepared for passive defense against an airborne attack. The pattern of light-toned spots, from which narrow dark lines extend, are locations of sturdy poles about the size of telephone poles. (Black lines are shadows.) They are used to impale parachutists, gliders, and imperil helicopter landings.

(The WHAT IS IT section is not originated by Extension School. Questions pertaining to this section should be directed to the Managing Editor, Marine Corps Gazette.)



## The First National Bank of QUANTICO, Va.

Marines at home and abroad keep their accounts at the First National Bank of Quantico. They know that for over 36 years the First National has been serving the men of the Corps faithfully . . . keeping their accounts straight and giving them fast, efficient service wherever they may be stationed.

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For the first time in 36 years the United States, competing against 35 nations, won a gold medal for pistol accuracy at the Olympic Games. With tensions at the peak, a U. S. Marine Corps Captain calmly shot a tie score with two of his opponents, a Russian and a Finn. In the shoot-off to decide the champion, the U. S. Marine again came through with a 147 (out of 150 possibles on 4-second targets) to win the 33rd Gold Medal of the 1960 Olympics.

## **brings in 33rd gold medal for U.S. in Rome**

The pistol used by the 33rd gold medal winner was the Hi-Standard "Olympic." Every "Olympic" . . . production models, all . . . offers the same built-in accuracy, the identical handling ease and dependability. "ISU Olympic" (pictured) meets all specifications of the International Shooting Union. "Trophy Grade" offers wide target-trigger in rich gold finish; anti-backlash trigger-screw adjustment; adjustable trigger pull; double-acting safety; rebounding firing pin; wide rear sight with indexed positive-click adjustments; adjustable barrel weights; undercut front blade sight with serrated ramp; diamond-checkered select Walnut grips; gold safety-button and inlaid gold lettering. "Citation Grade" has all but a few of the custom extras found in the "Trophy Grade"; features same mechanical superiority and integral accuracy.

**THE HIGH STANDARD MANUFACTURING CORPORATION  
HAMDEN 14, CONNECTICUT**

# PROFESSIONAL

## SCRAPBOOK



### =Alliance of the Free World: CENTO and Strategic Forces=

GAZETTE brings you the last of a series extracted from the Communist Bloc and the Free World—The Military Balance 1960 by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, England. We have covered the Communist bloc—Mar '61, SEATO—May '61, and NATO—July '61. To complete the Alliance of the Free World, GAZETTE offers CENTO and Strategic Forces.

#### CENTO

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) is comprised of **Pakistan**, **Persia**, **Turkey**, **UK**, and the **US**, which is an associate member. The treaty is not only military, but covers cooperation over wide fields. CENTO does not have an international command structure as NATO, nor are national forces allocated to it. Coordination is exercised by a Council of military deputies, including an American representative, in Ankara. Main emphasis: development of communications and air fields. Reason: flexibility for forces in this area.

Strategic deterrent forces could rapidly be deployed by the US 6th Fleet, SAC bases in Turkey, and British bases on Cyprus.

#### Pakistan

*General*  
Population: 81,000,000  
Total Armed Forces: 103,250

*Army*  
Strength (81,000)

*Navy*  
Strength (7,250): 1 CV, 6 DD, 6 PF

*Air Force*  
Strength (15,000)

#### Iran

*General*  
Population: (19,000,000)

*Army*  
Strength (200,000): 12 Divs, 6 Brigs

*Navy*  
2 PF

*Air Force*  
Strength (5,300): 170 aircraft, 1 Wing of *F84 Thunderjets*

For a breakdown of other CENTO countries (Turkey, UK and US) see **Alliance of the Free World: SEATO—(Professional Scrapbook: May '61)**, and **(Alliance of the Free World: NATO—(Professional Scrapbook: July '61)**.

#### Strategic Forces

**Strategic Forces** remain under national command and comprise the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), RAF Bomber Command, and the US 1st and 6th Fleets. United States nuclear powered submarines, equipped with *Polaris*, will be added to Strategic Forces. In addition, 7 IRBM bases in Europe are either in operation, under construction or projected. Exceptions to nationally controlled Strategic Forces are: NATO controlled Striking Fleet Atlantic (nationally designated as US 2d Fleet), and NATO Carrier Striking Force, South (nationally designated as US 6th Fleet), operating in Mediterranean.

#### Strategic Air Command (SAC)

*SAC is divided as follows:*

- 15th Air Force: Hqs. in California
- 1st Missile Div: Hqs in California
- 2d Air Force: Hqs. in Louisiana
- 8th Air Force: Hqs. in Massachusetts

- 16th Air Force: Hqs. in Spain
- 7th Air Div: Hqs. in United Kingdom

- 3d Air Div: Hqs on Guam

Each overseas unit operates several advance bases. Total SAC bases—70 in US and overseas.

##### *SAC Power:*

- *B47*—Medium jet engine bomber; range, 3,000 miles; speed, 600 mph; available, 1,250.

- *B52*—Eight jet engine bomber; range, 6,000 miles; speed, 650mph; available, 450.

Both types use inflight refueling to extend range, which is provided by a fleet of 300 *KC135* strato-tankers capable of 550mph speed. Also available: slower *KC97*.

- *B58*—Supersonic; may partially replace *B47*, and is now entering service; speed, 1,325mph (holds six official world speed records.)

This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.

#### 1st Missile Division Power:

- *ICBM Atlas*—Range, over 6,000 miles; as of Sept '60, there were 9 operational Atlas in US—3 in Wyoming, 6 in California.

- *ICBM Titan*—Range, over 5,500 miles; operational in '61.

- *ICM Snark*—Range, 5,000 miles; based in northeastern US.

#### RAF Bomber Command

- *Vulcan, Victor, Valiant*—Bombers; capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear weapons; performance compares favorably to U. S. and Soviet aircraft; inflight refueling capability.

- *Valiant*—Jet tanker used for inflight refueling.

- *Blue Steel*—Guided stand-off bomb; range, 400 miles; in developmental stage.

#### US 1st, 2d, 6th and 7th Fleets

- *1st Fleet*—Based on West Coast of US; deployed separately or to augment *7th Fleet*.

- *2d Fleet*—Based on East Coast of US.

- *6th Fleet*—Operates in Mediterranean.

- *7th Fleet*—Operates in western Pacific.

Each fleet is comprised of about 50 ships, including aircraft carriers as a nucleus.

#### US Nuclear Powered Submarine Fleet

Construction of 14 fleet ballistic missile subs, each equipped with 16 long-range *Polaris*, has been authorized.

#### IRBM Bases (15 missiles per base)

- *Thor*—4 bases in UK; under joint US-UK control.

- *Jupiter*—2 bases under construction in Italy; 1 base projected for Turkey. The three are to be under operational control of SACEUR, NATO.

# Encirclement Methods in Antiguerrilla Warfare

By Maj Thoung Htaik, Burma Army

Extracted from the June '61 issue, "Military Review"

Traditionally, guerrillas use ambush and hit-and-run tactics. Stalin, Kovpak, Mao, and Che Guevara all have preached their use. In fighting guerrillas the most difficult job is to locate them. Everyone who has fought them will agree that it is more difficult to locate them than to destroy them. Locating the enemy force is always Phase I of anti-guerrilla operations. Many anti-guerrilla campaigns fail in this first phase, much less ever reach the second phase of destroying them.

I have said "Let them strike" because that is the surest way to locate them. If you are hit, you are sure where the enemy is. But you must prepare extremely well to minimize your casualties. You must change your tactics constantly. There can never be any blueprint in antiguerrilla warfare; tactics always must be shifted to fit the situation.

During the fighting in Burma, we once held our casualties to nil yet destroyed a guerrilla force of 12, by the simple expedient of putting all our combat troops in the first vehicle when moving through a guerrilla infested area. We knew their usual practice of allowing the first vehicle in a column to pass through unharmed and then ambush the main column. Our other col-

umn had laid an ambush on the enemy route of withdrawal.

This incident also emphasizes the importance of keeping a mobile reserve whose sole task is to destroy guerrillas ambushing our units. Communications between the ambushed unit and the mobile reserve must be continuous and reliable. While our units fight the enemy ambush party, communications personnel notify the mobile reserve, including possible routes over which enemy troops can retreat. A few Very pistol rounds will let the reserve know that the ambush has been sprung.

If the mobile reserve could be helicopterborne, reaction time would be even quicker. The great disadvantage to the use of aircraft against guerrillas is loss of surprise, but that is not too serious a drawback because contact nearly always nullifies surprise.

Although we must change our tactics constantly, the underlying principles remain the same. Our experience in Burma brings out the following points:

- Plan and prepare thoroughly.
- Consider the use of any ingenious tactical device that will minimize casualties.
- Keep a highly mobile reserve.
- Maintain communications between

units on the move and the reserve.

- Establish and practice standing operating procedure reporting methods.
- Know the local terrain—a requisite for commanders at all levels.
- Train thoroughly to counter ambushes, to fix fire discipline, and to fight on foot.

These are the most effective ways to fight guerrillas. They worked against the Japanese in World War II and against the Communists in Burma.

It should be emphasized that encirclement tactics, especially when loosely applied, are practicable only in exceptional circumstances and are totally ineffective against guerrillas in a vast country. It should be noted that Chinese (Kuomintang) "encirclement and annihilation" tactics and German encirclement tactics were improvised methods developed during the war. We should not be content with these improvisations. Now is the time to develop our own methods. Such an approach to anti-guerrilla strategy and tactics is summarized as follows:

Strategically: cut off the enemy by the use of airborne forces, so that they cannot retreat to their bases by operating offensively behind enemy lines.

Tactically: let them hit but do not let them run.

## A Better Way

### To Maintain Aiming Stakes

By 1st Lt P. R. Gottlieb

Of all equipment repainted after an exercise, we find aiming stakes the most painstaking and time-consuming job.

A baseplate or sight box can be given the broad brush treatment. But the red and white aiming stakes require first one color, drying time, then the second color.

I suggest we use waterproof, adhesive tape in place of paint. Maintenance could be performed on the spot, and would only entail the replacing of a small strip of tape.

H&S Co, 3d BN, 8th Marines  
2d MarDiv, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

## PROBLEM

In the Western Desert we were using a stretch of track which was under observation of a distant enemy OP. The tendency was for the MT drivers to drive as fast as they could over this dangerous bit. In spite of this, we kept on losing vehicles to enemy shelling. Eventually an order was issued to the effect that all vehicles, whether alone or in convoy, would be driven slowly and steadily over this stretch. An immediate reduction in the vehicle casualty rate was noticed. What do you think was the reason for this?

The Infantry Journal, India (Answer on page 16)

## IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...

CHEER UP, MARINE, HERE'S A DOUBLE SOLUTION FOR KEEPING YOUR WEB BELT CLEAN WHEN POLISHING THE BRASS TIP....

by Sherman C. Crook



Thanks and Tip to...  
CAPT A. E. BAKER  
1/17 W.C. STRICKLAND  
CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.

# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



## Tricks of the Trade

### Shoes and Boots

... Try a little Simoniz car wax on your shoe after you attain the desired lustre. It keeps shoes shined, and helps protect the shoe from being scratched.

Sgt J. C. Black

American Embassy, Vienna, Austria

... To avoid the stain on your finger after shining shoes, try wrapping a soft piece of Saran Wrap around the finger. Put cloth over it, and shine. Avoid stain and possible scratches on shoe.

Sgt E. J. Thomas

31 Norris Dr.  
Midway Is., Va.

... Get a better than average spit shine on your combat boot by using the bottom of a small bottle. Simply apply polish, a little water, and shine with rounded bottom of bottle instead of your finger.

SSgt N. M. Radel

H&S Co, Camp S. D. Butler  
% FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

### Brass

... Remove scratches on brass buckles and belt tips by mixing a small amount of jeweler's rouge with Brasso. Rub brass with mixture and a coarse piece of paper (rub with grain of paper.) Let it dry, and buff with soft cloth. Result: an IG shine in half the time.

GySgts B. D. Dryden and F. M. Hutchens  
110 Union St.  
Seattle 1, Washington

### Web Belts

... To prevent the end of the web belt from unraveling simply sew the end with a sewing machine, or paint end with clear nail polish.

1stLt R. R. Glaser

MCSC, Barstow, Calif.

... If nail polish or sewing doesn't work, dip the end in clear lacquer or varnish.

LCpl C. D. Overstreet

HMX-1, MCAS  
MCS, Quantico, Va.

## ANSWER

The enemy was shelling the dust clouds set up by the vehicles driving fast. If vehicles were driven slowly and steadily the dust set up was not sufficient to make the enemy OP think that a complete MT column was moving, and it was only on rare occasions that they bothered to shell an individual vehicle.

## Castro Critiques Invasion

Submitted by Maj H. C. Peterson, USMCR  
Condensed from press reports.

On 16 June Premier Castro held a special press conference at the scene of the 17 April landings by would-be Cuban liberators. He attributed his successful defense to (1) Control of air, (2) invaders' tactical errors, and (3) invaders' underestimation of opposing strength.



**Castro said the April attackers landed at Playa Giron (1) and Playa Larga (2). The invaders fanned out in directions shown by black arrows, and government troops counter-attacked as shown by light arrows.**

### Invasion Chronology

- 0000 17Apr Invaders begin landing 1500 troops at Giron and Larga Beaches, Cochinos Bay, Las Villas Province.
- Defenders dispatch tanks and artillery on flat bed trucks from Havana.
- Invaders drop 175 paratroopers.
- 1200 17Apr Invaders infantry and tanks reach Parrita (3 miles inland), paratroopers reach Yaguaramas (25 miles inland). Defenders begin counterattack.
- 18Apr Invaders begin to run out of ammo.
- 1730 19Apr Invaders cease organized resistance.

### Air Control

The invaders miscalculated that a quick attack by a few planes on three Cuban Air Force bases had destroyed aircraft on the ground. Actually, Cuban aircraft had been dispersed and escaped destruction. At the time of the landing, the Cuban Air Force consisted of two T-33 jet trainers, a small number of British-built Sea Furies, and some US-built B-26 bombers. Invasion aircraft concentrated on troop support while defenders conducted counter air operations and destroyed invasion shipping lying offshore, claiming ten invasion aircraft downed and five invasion ships sunk.

### Tactical Errors

Among the tactical errors committed by the invaders, said Castro, were dispersion of forces along too wide a beachhead (43 miles of coast), failure to interdict by air or paratroops reinforcement from Havana, concentration of all communications gear in one ship which was among the first sunk, advancing inland over a narrow swamp-lined road without freedom to deploy, and too conservative employment of paratroopers too close to the beachhead too late to cut off roads and communications.

While Castro generally expected landings to be made, he had no prior knowledge of time and place and actually was expecting simultaneous landings to be made at Pinar del Rio and Oriente provinces.

### Equipment

Castro praised invasion equipment which included 5 tanks, 18 AT guns, 30 mortars, 70 bazookas, and some armored trucks with cal 50 MG's. Defending militia battalions were supported by Soviet "light tanks," mortars, howitzers, and Czech-built heavy, rapid-fire machine guns. All infantry on both sides used automatic rifles or submachine guns.

### Lacked Guerrilla Mentality

Castro also said that the invaders "did not have a guerrilla mentality, like we do, and they acted like a conventional army. We used guerrilla tactics to infiltrate their lines, while attacking steadily from the air and on the ground. You must never let the enemy sleep."

## New Books

FAIRIES FIGHTERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR—VOL. I. By W. Green. (*Hanover House*, \$2.75.)

First in a series of handbooks containing accurate details of aircraft, operational and experimental, of WWII combatant countries. Illustrated by photographs and drawings.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN WORLD WAR II. By RAdm J. A. Furter, USN, Ret. (*US Government Printing Office*, \$6.50.)

RAdm Furter offers a study of wartime Naval Administration and an objective, fully indexed analysis of WWII Naval history.

KILL OR GET KILLED. By Col R. Applegate. (*Stackpole Co.*, \$3.05.) (Rev.)

A fine textbook, completely illustrated, for use in teaching hand-to-hand combat, mob control, and self defense.

BRAZEN CHARIOTS. By Maj R. Crisp. (*Ballantine Books*, \$50.)

The author's true account of 28 days of fighting in the North African desert during WWII. Recommended by B. H. Liddell Hart.

THE SAGA OF FLIGHT. By N. Duke and E. Lanchbery. (*John Day Co., Inc.*, \$5.95.)

This is an exciting description of flight—from the theories of Da Vinci to manned rockets.

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. By M. Hunter. (*Doubleday and Co., Inc.*, \$4.95.)

SAC—a story of its men, weapons, and strategy. Illustrated by over 225 photographs.

THE HEROES. By R. McKie. (*Harcourt, Brace and Co.*, \$4.95.)

The Japanese-held port of Singapore, 2,000 miles across enemy-controlled waters, and a handful of allied commandos in a fishing smack, are the ingredients for two of the most extraordinary exploits of WWII.

JAPAN SUBDUED. By H. Feis. (*Princeton University Press*, \$4.00.)

Mr. Feis relates the events leading to the end of WWII in the Pacific; the plans and acts during the climatic period of '45.

UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC. By L. E. Sharff. (*Federal Employees' News Digest*, \$1.00, add .25 for First Class Mail—50 via Air Mail.)

The Almanac answers questions you often ask; contains facts every service man should know. Order from: Uniformed Services Almanac, PO Box 400, Washington 4, D. C.

MILITARY LAW REVIEW. (DA Pam 27-100-11, 1 Jan 61, \$4.50.)

DA Pam 27-100-11, available from SuptDoc, US Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., provides a medium for those interested in military law—shares the product of experience and research.

MANUAL OF CELESTIAL NAVIGATION. By RAdm A. A. Agerton, USN, Ret. (*D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.*, \$4.25.)

Revised to conform to current methods of working problems of Celestial Navigation, this manual is compact, convenient, and easily understood.



SUBS AND SUBMARINERS. By A. Whitehouse. (*Doubleday and Co., Inc.*, \$4.95.)

Exploits of submariners make interesting reading, for "human courage has universal appeal."

HELL IN THE HEAVENS. By Capt J. M. Foster, USMCR. (*G. P. Putnam's Sons*, \$4.95.)

True stories of Marine aviators in the South Pacific during the fateful years of '43 and '44.

KOREA'S SYNGMAN RHEE. R. C. Allen. (*Charles E. Tuttle Co.*, \$3.75.)

Here's a revealing case study of a patriot, "corrupted by the power that came to him as a gift from his people after a lifetime of service to his country."

THE COMING OF WAR. A. Z. Carr. (*Doubleday & Co., Inc.*, \$4.95.)

An account of the events leading up to the War of 1812.

OKINAWA—THE LAST BATTLE. R. E. Appleman, J. M. Burns, R. A. Gugeler, and J. Stevens. (*Charles E. Tuttle, Co.*, \$7.00.)

An authentic record of operation ICEBERG, complete with over 200 photos and 50 maps and charts.

THE NIGHT THE WAR WAS LOST. C. L. Dufour. (*Doubleday & Co., Inc.*, \$4.95.)

The story of the fall of New Orleans during the Civil War—possibly the best-planned and best-executed Union maneuver in the entire war.

COMMODORE MOORE AND THE TEXAS NAVY. T. Henderson Wells. (*Univ. of Texas Press, Austin, Tex.*, \$4.75.)

A candid appraisal of a little known force that helped turn the tide of the Mexican War.

A PRIMER ON COMMUNISM. By G. W. Cronyn. (*E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.*, \$1.15.)

This brief asks, and answers, 200 searching questions on communism—gives information on its nature and goals.

STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL. By T. C. Schelling and M. H. Halperin. (*The Twentieth Century Fund, hard cover—\$2.50; paperbound—\$1.25.*)

An authoritative presentation of possibilities of arms control—its pitfalls and dangers.

JET TANKER. By LtCol G. Heiman, USAF. (*Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.*, \$3.50.)

This book deals not only with a man's adventurous struggle to prove himself, but an account of the Strategic Air Command as well.


A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF MODERN IRAQ. By Abid A. Al-Marayati, PhD. (*R. Speller & Sons, Inc.*, \$6.00.)

The author offers a well documented study of 40 years of Iraq's diplomacy, development, and foreign relations.

JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT. (*McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.*, \$35.00.)

References to the majority of the world's fighters, bombers, transports, helicopters, guided missiles, and aero engines.

# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



## —Revolution on the Battlefield—

Brig M. F. K. Thompson, British Army, (Ret)

Condensation from *Survival*, May-June 1960, Volume 2, Number 3

A heavy regiment of the Royal Artillery is to be equipped with Honest John rockets and stationed with the Rhine Army.

The Honest John Rocket will be the first truly tactical weapon with a nuclear capability to be manned by Britain. Having no guidance system it is cheap and cannot be jammed by electronic means. The range of the present model is about fifteen miles.

The Belgians, Dutch and Germans, who, with the Rhine Army, make up NATO's Northern Army Group, are already equipped with Honest John and 8 inch howitzers, which also have a nuclear capability. The nuclear warheads for all these weapons are under American control.

Characteristics of such weapons should be accuracy, quick response to calls for fire, mobility and simplicity. They should be easy to communicate with at Corps level and below, and resistant to enemy counter measures. In the first generation of such weapons are the 280 mm gun, 8 inch Howitzer and Honest John rocket.

There is a reluctance to recognize the revolution in tactics, which these weapons bring about, when the number available to each side for use on the battlefield rises above a certain point. In Central Europe this point has been passed. In what then does this revolution lie and where will it lead us?

Speaking to the Institute of World Affairs in California on December 6, 1959, General Norstad is quoted as saying that he saw NATO's shield forces, which included tactical nuclear weapons, as bridging "the gap in the strategic spectrum between all-out war and the conventional power that would be useful in only extremely limited situations."

It seems probable that the basis of this statement is the tactical revolution as much as the disparity between the Soviet and NATO's conventional armaments.

Even if only a few nuclear missiles are available to opposing forces for tactical use on and around the battlefield, it is necessary for the forces to seek security

in wide dispersion. When the number of these weapons rises above a certain point then tactically vital ground can no longer be denied to the enemy merely by occupation of it. It is at this point that the tactical revolution takes place.

The nuclear weapon ceases to be just a very powerful additional source of supporting fire, taking the place of the large concentrations of artillery used in the last war. It becomes the tactically dominant and supported arm. Tactical doctrine, organization and the balance of other arms are built round its use—not, as is so often announced, vice versa.

It would be wrong to overestimate the damage done to well-dispersed forces in the field or the danger from fallout, which is only considerable with a ground burst. Nuclear weapons are the dominant weapon on the battlefield but need the support of all the so-called conventional arms.

This revolution in tactics, though as yet ill digested, cannot, I believe, be reversed: it can only be transcended.

In the meantime NATO shield forces are training in the newly evolving tactical doctrines, and NATO plans based on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in quantity could not make sense without them. No front-line force can be ready for both nuclear and conventional warfare on a large scale.

There is a school of thought that argues that tactical nuclear weapons neither favor the defense nor save manpower by providing greatly increased fire-power.

It must be realized that both points are irrelevant to the question of the use of nuclear weapons in the present situation in Europe. Here, because the Russians and NATO both have available for tactical use a large number of nuclear missiles, nuclear tactics must be adopted. As General Norstad states, conventional power would be useful only in limited situations.

To point to a revolution is not to approve it. In Central Europe the nuclear missile is now the dominant battlefield weapon and there is no retreat from that position. The situation must, therefore, be lived with until either general

disarmament is accomplished or the position transcended through fresh scientific discoveries.

What is most urgently required is a new breakthrough in weapon development which will produce a controllable mass effect weapon, as tactically effective as nuclear weapons but without their objectionable features.

Such a weapon should enable defense plans based on nuclear tactics to be prosecuted without recourse to nuclear missiles. That is to say, with small, mobile and highly trained units. There is reason to believe that new developments, in more than one field, are not far off.

Complementary to the weapon of mass effect, there is a need for new and less indiscriminate weapons to strengthen the defensive power of widely dispersed forces. High in priority should be an anti-tank weapons which will put an end to the offensive role of armor. These weapons are needed particularly for forces which have to accept dispersion in the face of an enemy who might have a few nuclear missiles.

Research into and development of a new weapon of mass effect to replace the nuclear weapon on the battlefield should be given priority next to that of maintaining the strategic balance of power.

### A Better Way

## To Pass the Word



By 1stSgt R. C. Coleman

THE NEED OF BULLETIN BOARDS AND the importance of keeping them neat, readable and up to date can't be denied. However, the present method of using paper fasteners, either the round head or flat shank type, leaves much to be desired in neatness or easy maintenance. Paper fasteners tear easily when pages are flipped causing unsightly and disarranged orders and bulletins. Some outfits use heavy, hinged wooden covers. This discourages reading the board.

I have discovered A BETTER WAY of displaying a neat, orderly and readable board by using the standard clip board (File, Composition Back, Stock No. 7520-218-5918) attached with bolts in neat rows to the basic board. Clip boards hold firmly without tearing yet papers are easily taken down or replaced. There is no need for cover boards. They can also be taken down easily for movement to the field or aboard ship. For field display, clip boards can be strung on wire.

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# ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words  
by the editors  
about the magazine you  
write

S B  
T U  
R S  
I I  
C N  
T E  
L S  
Y S



We want you to get good service. In this issue (unless it's expiring) members will find another FIXOGRAM. Use it to tell us about any problem.

We process it and return it to you with a new machine-processed FIXOGRAM showing the change.

New members now get an IBM-type FIXOGRAM and a "Member's Manual" explaining our procedures. And overseas copies will now be wrapped.

All this costs money. Our aim: perfect service for Marines who move around a lot. But even with new gimmicks, we need most your understanding and cooperation. And some new blood. Nominate a prospect or two on the chit below.

Faithfully,

*Mike McCord*

To: Marine Corps GAZETTE  
PO Box 1844, Quantico, Va.  
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## WORDS & PICTURES

### • In this issue . . .

. . . are two opposing views of the value of the "big team" shooter. Bob Deveau's cover with special pink scorebook shows he had his mind on Camp Perry. But whichever side you take, join us in a salute to the Marine Rifleman.

### • In person . . .

. . . we've had several changes. On the "mast-head" you'll find a complete new Editorial Board, providing better liaison with HQMC and the Board of Governors. Regretfully, we speak sayonara to Associate Editor and Oldest Resident CWO Fred Stolley, Ret. Having denuded Lunga Reservoir of bass, Fred moves on to the Banks of the Severn and the Naval Institute. To ramrod Circulation & Promotion, we've hired J. A. Stillarty. His CID background will be handy in tracking down missing GAZETTES. He's the first of a civilian nucleus the Board of Governors has authorized in the quest of better service to you, along with new, expensive machinery.

### • In coming months . . .

. . . look for more changes. Herewith we proudly announce appointment of three Contributing Editors: Capt Robert Asprey (World Affairs), LtCol Jack Bolt (Aviation), and LtCol Bill Bates (Ground Combat.) What are they up to? Plans for 1962 we're not ready to announce. But surveys show you want material that's crisp, current, clear, and controversial. We keep working on it.

## WRITER'S CORNER

### • Each month . . .

. . . we Survey reader likes and dislikes. They really vary. If 40% vote one article as best in an issue, another 30% may think it's the worst. This calls for variety. And short articles so we can print more per issue. We were particularly interested in the results of two experimental pieces: both new approaches to military history. One was Vertical Envelopment: 1944 (Feb); the other, Rogers' Rangers (Mar). Readers liked both. Operation Arbela in July was another experiment. We'll be interested in the reaction.

### • Cleaning up . . .

. . . the monthly incentive awards, here are the winners:

May \$100 prize: Why Marine Inflight Refueling by LtCol John F. Bolt

June \$100 prize: The Case for Jet CAS by Capt J. M. Verdi

July \$100 prize: Modern Combat Logistics by Col J. A. Donovan

August \$100 prize: We Don't Need Team Shots by GySgt W. C. Hickey

Short articles nominated for the annual \$100 award were:

May: Improve NCOs by Sgt W. T. Shearer

June: Aviation Ground Training for Defense by GySgt Leon High

Next month we'll announce the grand prize winners for the year.



# **Orchids for a fighting lady . . .**

The orchids on the shoulder of the fighting lady whose portrait appears above are not intended to be merely decorative. They also mean something.

They indicate recognition of those who deserve credit for the phenomenal growth that has made your Navy Federal Credit Union the largest Federal credit union in the world. The credit is due the Navy and Marine Corps men and women, both military and civilian employee personnel, who carry on the service which the carrier symbolizes.

Bigness is not a virtue in itself, of course. Biggest does not necessarily mean best. But the growth of NFCU to its present position as the largest Federal credit

union is indication that your Navy Credit union is carrying out the mission to which it was assigned; that as a non-profit organization set up by Navy and Marine Corps personnel for just one job—service to Navy and Marine Corps personnel—it is doing an effective and satisfactory job.

The primary explanation for the effectiveness of NFCU services, as well as for the continuation of NFCU low interest charges on loans and payment of excellent dividends on savings, is easy to understand. It is, simply, the high calibre and sense of responsibility of our member-clients. This is NFCU's most valuable asset: that we have the finest clientele in the world—a Navy and Marine Corps clientele.

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For those who know the meaning of service—  
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Membership outside Washington, D. C., limited to commissioned and warrant officers, Navy and Marine Corps.



# The Communist Strategy of Time

By Dr. Maurice H. Hellner

IN LATE 1947 THE TIDE WAS TURNING AGAINST THE Communists in Czechoslovakia. Several national scandals had revealed their treacherous methods. A public opinion poll had showed that the popularity of the Communist Party was on the wane. The non-Communist leaders in the coalition government were looking forward to the spring parliamentary elections confident that the Communists would lose a significant percentage of their seats.

By January 1948, however, there was a strange uncertainty in the air. There were signs that the Communists were planning some sort of illegal activity directed toward a take-over before the spring elections. The Communist Minister of the Interior began to remove non-Communists from all important posts in the national police force and to replace them with his own men. Cases of arms were delivered secretly to Communist members of the illegal workers' militia.

As the month of February progressed evidence of Communist designs multiplied. On 17 February the Politburo in Prague called the party to a "state of alertness" and began meeting twice a day. On 20 February Valerian Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, suddenly arrived at the Prague airport without letting even the Czech ministry of Foreign Affairs know of his coming. Commencing the next day, there was an outbreak of terrorism in factories throughout the country. Men lost their jobs for opposing the policies of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor. Weapons and ammunition were distributed among party members in Prague. Non-Communist officials were arrested. Mass demonstrations were arranged in various cities.

On 24 February the headquarters of all non-Communist parties and newspapers were raided. The national radio was placed completely in the hands of the Communists. When President Benes expressed a desire to speak to the nation on the radio he was denied permission.

Finally, on 25 February, the Communist leaders demanded that President Benes accept a new slate of government ministers, all but one of whom were Communists or fellow travelers. Benes realized full well the implications of this demand, but he also knew that the Communists had the country by the throat. He told one of his close associates that as far as the West was concerned "no one will help us." With aching heart, he gave in to the Communist demands.

That day the Iron Curtain clanged down on Czechoslovakia.

#### Soviets Strike With Their Party

Had the Soviets waited until after the spring elections in Czechoslovakia the instruments of power would almost certainly have been in the hands of the democratic forces. Under such conditions it would have taken nothing less than the active intervention of the Red Army to gain control of the country. An invasion by the Red Army would have run serious risk of wider hostilities in Europe—a risk the Kremlin was unwilling to take in 1948. Hence, the Soviets struck quickly with their party and underground forces while it was still possible to conquer Czechoslovakia by non-military means.

This is but one example of the manner in which the

Attack on Warsaw • 1944

Sputnik Launching • 1957

War on Japan • 1945

Czechoslovakian Take-over • 1947

Lunik Moon Shot • 1959

Congo Intervention • 1961

Jordan Crisis • 1957



Sovfoto

Since before the end of WWII the author points out, Soviet leaders have triggered their international power plays at times precisely calculated to achieve their objectives—and place the West at maximum disadvantage. Only by using similar strategy, he says, can we hope to defeat the Red design

Soviets employ the "strategy of time" in their drive for world domination. When we analyze Soviet actions during the past two decades we find that the Kremlin counts heavily on a keen sense of timing. It is strange, therefore, that this facet of Soviet activity has received relatively little attention in western countries.

#### Importance of Timing

Before we look at the manner in which Soviet leaders employ time as a weapon we might look for a moment at the importance of timing in general. Success in anything we attempt in life depends to a great extent upon proper timing. The great hitters of baseball—the Ted Williams and the Mickey Mantles—are rightly given credit for perfect timing and coordination. Professional boxers spend endless hours in training to develop their timing. Those who play the stock market are acutely aware that there is a proper time to buy and a proper time to sell.

Similarly, the successful statesmen of history have been the political leaders who were able to discern when the time was ripe for certain types of actions. They have known as if by instinct that certain courses of action would be doomed to failure at one point in history, but possible of achievement at another point. Thus, President Monroe was able to make his famous "Doctrine" stick, not because of the inherent power of the United States in 1823, but rather because of the fortuitous timing of the announcement.

Certainly those who follow the profession of arms should be aware of the importance of proper timing.



**Lebanon, where this Marine is readying himself for action, is an example of what good timing can do for US and her allies. Another prime example: Jordan in 1957 when timely action saved King Hussein**

This concept lies behind almost everything that is done in a military operation. Again and again, the matter of timing has spelled the difference between triumph and disaster on the field of battle.

In war there is a vast difference between being first or second in the race against time to develop new weapons. What if the Soviets had been the first to produce the atomic bomb? The entire course of events during the past 15 years would undoubtedly have been quite different.

Many of our popular military concepts are directly related to the significance of time. The famous saying "too little and too late" implies poor timing. The concept of surprise attack involves striking at a time when the enemy is not expecting an attack. The term "preventive war" means hitting one's enemy before he has time to build up superior forces. The idea of "buying time" implies granting concessions in order to postpone the day of reckoning until one can build up his own strength. The expressive American slang phrase, "getting there fustest with the mostest," describes in a unique way the importance of timing.

#### **They Time it Right**

The primary reason for maintaining an intelligence organization is to obtain knowledge of an enemy's capabilities and intentions in time to permit the commander of one's own forces to take the necessary actions before the battle is joined. The heart of the problem

of military production is the decision as to when to start production of long lead-time items. Thus, the concept of timing permeates almost all of our military thinking.

Turning to the Soviets, we find that the men in the Kremlin are deeply conscious of the importance of timing in international affairs. They always think and plan in terms of time. They know that the context in which an action is taken influences the results obtained as much as the action itself. They appreciate the fact that the same action taken on two different days can have widely different results.

Soviet leaders have developed the strategy of time to a fine art. They make time work in their own behalf and against their opponents. They use it as a weapon in the power struggle. Like a skillful boxer, they try to keep the West off balance through clever timing.

This does not mean that Soviet leaders have a set time-table. In fact, it generally means just the opposite. The strategy of time consists of timing one's actions so as to take maximum advantage of the situation one faces.

It was no accident that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan just one week before the Japanese surrendered in WWII. The men in the Kremlin had ample proof that the Japanese government was about to "throw in the towel." Japanese diplomats had been sent to Moscow requesting the Soviet government to arrange an end to the war in the Pacific. The Soviets

# The Soviets raced against time—and US—to be first in space. They won with Sputnik I. And it was no accident that Lunik moon shot took place just a few days before Khrushchev arrived in DC to talk peace

could have served as intermediaries to terminate the fighting. Instead they chose to enter the war in order to share in the fruits of victory at virtually no cost to themselves.

It was no accident that the final Soviet attack on Warsaw in 1944 was delayed for over two months at the very gates of the city. As the Red Army reached the outskirts of the city, Moscow Radio sent out its appeal: "People of Warsaw, to arms!" The people of Warsaw did spring to arms and fought bravely against the Germans, gaining control of over half the city at times. The Red Army, however, sat on its hands just across the Vistula and gave absolutely no support to the people of Warsaw. Not until the Poles were crushed by the Germans after 63 days of heroic fighting did the Red Army try to enter Warsaw. The reason for this unconscionable delay is clear. The Soviets wanted to ensure that the anti-Communist Polish partisans inside Warsaw would be obliterated by the German garrison prior to the fall of the city. In that way the Kremlin could have a free hand to install its own puppets in power in the new Polish government.

It was no accident that the Soviets were able to place their *Sputnik* in orbit before the US could successfully launch its first earth satellite. The Kremlin spared no effort or expense on this project because it appreciated the tremendous political advantages of being first into space. In one bold stroke it persuaded millions of people throughout the world that the USSR had surpassed the US in science and technology.

It was no accident that the Soviets launched their *Lunik* shot to impact on the moon just a few days before Khrushchev arrived in Washington on his first visit to the US. The boasts which Khrushchev made at Andrews Field on his arrival are ample evidence that this was a carefully timed affair.

One of the reasons for tight security restrictions in

the USSR is to enable the Kremlin to time its disclosures of scientific achievements so as to gain maximum propaganda advantage. An open society such as ours cannot do this. Our scientific achievements become known as soon as they are made without reference to the world situation at the time.

The concept of timing lies at the very heart of Soviet strategy for world domination. The Soviets know we are living in a revolutionary age. Throughout the world millions of people are not satisfied with their economic and political status. They are obsessed with the desire for change. The men in the Kremlin consider this widespread desire for change as the Archimedean point on which they hope to place their lever to move the world.

## Communist Hand in Congo

In short, the Soviets believe that the time is ripe for the spread of their system. They are thus quick to exploit revolutionary situations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Their hope is to be able to direct the course of change to their own ends.

One of the means by which the Soviets try to implement this strategy is to attempt in every way possible to secure the independence of dependent peoples before they are ready for self-government. The Kremlin believes that if this can be done the Communists in those areas will have a good chance to come out on top in the ensuing chaos.

It is worthy of note that the Kremlin has paid relatively little attention to the new state of Nigeria in spite of the fact that it is the most populous country in Africa. The reason seems to be that the Nigerians were carefully groomed for self-government and were capable of achieving an orderly state of affairs when independence day arrived.

In contrast, the Communists have paid a great deal of attention to the Congo because they realized early that the Congolese people were by no means ready to run their own affairs. For months before independence day the Czech consul in Leopoldville invited various Congolese leaders to secret weekly luncheons at his residence. The rapidity with which the Soviets began to move into the Congo just before and after independence day indicates they were literally jumping at an opportunity.

The Kremlin today is counting on capturing various independence movements around the world. It knows that Communist chances are infinitely greater in those areas where the people are not yet ready to run their own affairs. This thought lies behind Khrushchev's demand at the UN General Assembly in September 1960 that complete independence be granted immediately to all colonial countries, trust territories, and other non-



**Dr. Hellner**, a LCdr in the Naval Reserve, has served as a civilian analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) since 1948. During WWII, he was a Japanese language officer with ONI. Dr. Hellner has earned a BS degree in Foreign Service at the University of Southern California, MA and PhD degrees at American University, and has graduated from the National War College. He has written "The Great Danger: War By Miscalculation," (GAZETTE: Aug '59), and was awarded an honorable mention in the '56 "US Naval Institute Proceedings" essay contest.

self-governing areas. In making this demand, Khrushchev was employing the strategy of time in a grand manner.

It is also Soviet strategy in the underdeveloped areas of the world to attempt in every way possible to deny these countries the time they need to work out their problems. In this way the Kremlin hopes to create enough dissatisfaction to make such countries receptive to the drastic methods of Communism.

When we look at the underdeveloped areas of the world we find that every one of them has severe economic, political, and social problems. In each of them poverty, illiteracy, and disease assume discouraging proportions. All are suffering from an acute shortage of native personnel who have the proper training and experience for higher positions in the civil service and armed forces—for mayors, judges and police chiefs, and for lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business administrators.

These deficiencies are an accumulation of centuries and can't be corrected overnight. It takes years to construct schools, train sufficient teachers to staff them, and produce large numbers of well-educated people. It takes years to restore fertility to soil which has been depleted by centuries of improper use. It takes years to build the roads, railroads, harbors, power plants, and irrigation projects needed to raise the standard of living of the people in these areas. From this it is clear that the underdeveloped areas of the world need more than technical and economic assistance. They need time in which to work out their problems. It is this time which the Kremlin is attempting to deny them.

The Communists in these countries seek to build up false hopes for a dramatic rise in the standard of living. They lead the people to believe that construction work on new schools, new roads, new factories, new hospitals, and new houses ought to start the morning after the independence ceremonies. When the people find that this doesn't happen, the Communists tell them that the fault lies in their economic and political system. They drum it into the people that the only way to achieve rapid economic progress is to adopt the Communist system.

#### Contest Shifts from Military

Along with attempts to build up false hopes in the minds of the people, the Communists seek in any way they can to block economic progress by creating almost continuous crises in these countries. They foment one strike after another. They sabotage industrial projects. They do their best to create an unfavorable climate for the attraction of western investment.

It is widely believed today that in the Cold War the contest is shifting from the military to the economic. Those who hold this view assert that if we step up our economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries we can thereby reduce our military posture and our military assistance programs. This is a dangerous fallacy.

The newly emerging nations certainly require economic assistance to develop their human and natural resources. But they also need assurance of a peaceful climate in which to develop these resources. This is

precisely what the Kremlin is attempting to deny them. The Communist strategy is to keep these countries in such constant turmoil that they will never be able to gain impressive results from their economic programs.

Economic aid is therefore not a substitute for military strength. We need both if we are to successfully combat Communist influence in the backward areas of the world.

We must bear in mind that it took both economic assistance and military aid to save Greece in 1946 and 1947. It took both the Marshall Plan and NATO to preserve Western Europe in the early postwar years.

Admiral Mahan pointed out many years ago that the purpose of our military power is to provide time for moral ideas to take root. Of all the things we can give the underdeveloped countries today, the most important is time in which the democratic forces can gain strength and in which the economic assistance programs can develop. Unless we can give them this, nothing else we do will matter very much.

#### Victory in Jordan

In those instances when we have appreciated the importance of proper timing we have been able to block Communist designs. Our experience in Jordan in 1957 is a dramatic example of this.

In the spring of 1957 a serious crisis was brewing in Jordan. There was danger not only that Jordan might be lost to the Free World, but that it might disintegrate altogether and start a scramble for territory which could easily touch off wider hostilities in the Middle East.

The pro-Soviet Premier, Nabulsi, had taken office in the fall of 1956. With his ascension to power came a rapid growth of pro-Communist influence in the Jordanian civil service and in the armed forces. When King Hussein ordered Nabulsi to clamp down on Communist activity he refused. Instead, Nabulsi denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine. He stated that Jordan intended to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, would accept Soviet aid if offered, and would refuse American aid as incompatible with the country's independence.

During the early months of 1957 King Hussein became severely worried over the trend of events. He issued a personal warning to his nation against the dangers of Communism. On 10 April 1957 he dismissed Nabulsi as Premier. In mid-April, Bedouin troops loyal to King Hussein beat off an attempted military coup and forced the leftist Chief of Staff, General Nuwar, to depart in haste for Syria.

The issue remained in doubt, however. With Syrian and Egyptian encouragement, Nabulsi was preparing to arouse the mob against King Hussein. Early on the morning of 24 April well-organized mobs poured through the streets of the capital city of Amman, hurling stones and screaming curses of "American imperialism." Arab Legionnaires and the local police were barely able to contain the mobs and restore order.

That evening a calm prevailed in Amman as in the eye of a hurricane. Everyone waited tensely to see what would happen next. Then came the sensational news that the US Sixth Fleet and 1,800 Marines had suddenly been ordered to the eastern Mediterranean. Pres-

ident Eisenhower issued a statement to the press that he regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital.

Thus reinforced, King Hussein moved rapidly to assert his power. A new cabinet of unquestioned loyalty to the King was formed. Hussein set to work to weed out subversive influences. The Communists were put to rout. The flames of freedom which had flickered so low in Jordan began to burn brighter again.

In the kind of a world in which we live today it will be increasingly necessary for the US to make calculated and timely displays of force such as was made in Jordan, and, more recently, in Lebanon and Guatemala. There has probably never been a period in our history when the ability to project our military forces rapidly to the far corners of the world was so important as it is today. The anti-Communist leaders in the underdeveloped areas of the world need assurance that should they require help to re-establish order, such help is available and can get there fast.

Some have asserted that the answer to this problem is a UN police force such as has been used in the Middle East and the Congo. Certainly the UN has a significant role to play in this regard. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the UN can only be effective in combating disorder if the Kremlin is convinced that should it begin to send in forces on its own, the US will move fast and in greater strength.

Economic and technical assistance are of vital importance to the future of the underdeveloped countries of the world. But in rendering this assistance we must constantly bear in mind that difficult programs of economic reform designed to modernize agriculture, develop new industries, and raise standards of living require lengthy periods of law and order. Hence, the ability to project our military power to the emerging areas of the world is of transcendent importance today. Only in that way can we provide these areas with time—and in the struggle against Communism time is of the essence.

US  MC

### A Modern Fable

## The Bears and the Eagles

By Capt R. C. Schulze

ONCE upon a time a large apartment house burned to the ground. A little boy was the only survivor. It was reported that the fire had been caused by a carelessly thrown match. After he had recovered from severe burns, the boy was questioned at length by investigators. He readily told this story:

His family had lived on the top floor of the apartment house. Most of the tenants had many children, who eventually formed clubs. The two largest groups lived on the bottom and top floors and called themselves "The Bears" and "The Eagles," respectively. They became rather evenly matched and eventually their competition centered on a struggle for new members from middle floor families.

The Bears were adept at sneaking about. They stayed out after bedtime, and appealed to middle floor boys by such daring. They preached revolt against parental authority, and predicted that one day they would control the whole building. They advised their middle floor listeners that they would suffer if they did not join the Bears.

To combat this approach the Eagles attempted to strike back, although they were more restricted by their parents and busy with television and toys. They did, however, have extra money from their allowances to buy candy for the middle floor boys.

The Bears made gains and succeeded in dividing the children of several families. Tempers in the two groups became frayed though warfare between them was limited to pushing, shoving, and name calling. Both clubs had massive arsenals of slingshots, stink bombs, and baseball bats. Some enterprising Eagle had even concocted a "book match bomb," which temporarily unhinged the Bears. They soon recruited a junior chemist of

their own, however, and accumulated a pile of their own bombs.


The trend against the Eagles, continued until they became irritable and noticeably short tempered. Their jelly beans and licorice sticks seemed to do little good; now even their match book threat was nullified.

One Eagle finally suggested that if they could only see the Bears whenever they sneaked around at night on the middle floors, maybe they could stop them. He advocated using some of their little "match book bombs" to burn holes in the floor over certain dark passageways and stair wells the Bears were known to use. A long argument ensued. Some of the Eagles maintained that such a plan was folly.


They asked for more faith in their individual abilities. Had not, they asked, a good record in past skirmishes, and even though outnumbered, they had some mighty good bat swingers. They concluded heatedly that they had more to offer the middle floor kids than candy, and felt that the Eagles should stick with water bags and bats and work a little harder.

The little boy who survived the fire lost faith in such face to face approaches. That night after he had gone to bed he heard a noise in the hallway beneath him. He became afraid. He pulled a small match bomb out of his toy chest and lighted it to burn a peep-hole in the floor to see if the Bears were downstairs in the darkness.

He told the investigators that he never did see who was in the hall, but he heard a lot of screaming so he guessed they were "Bears" all right. Later the firemen found remains of other "match book bombs" that had been on almost every floor of the gutted building, but it was impossible to tell when, or even if, they had been set off by someone.

US  MC

# Let's Shoot To Win



By Capt W. W. McMillan  
and 1stLt R. M. Woods

## • MARINES SWEEP CAMP PERRY MATCHES, SET NEW RECORD.

It's been many years since this type of headline has been seen after the National Matches. The last vintage year of shooting for the Marine Corps was 1956 and it may be the last such year unless we take stock of our competitive shooting system and make some vital changes.

Any number of reasons can be given for the decline of the Marine Corps in shooting prominence. Statements that we're only a fraction the size of the other services may be true in fact, but they're by no means valid excuses. Such attitudes are our own worst enemy. We don't need resignation to our fate. We need a planned, positive approach to the problem by Marines at all levels who have anything to do with the shooting program.

What can we do to improve the situation? The first step is to realize that we haven't really been getting worse the last five years. Rather, we haven't been getting better at a fast enough pace. Our current competitive marksmen are easily capable of beating those of half a decade ago. Our equipment, training, and shooters are better than ever before. For that matter, our individual shooters are second to none. Two Marines beat the entire Army—in fact, the whole world—at the last Olympics. At Camp Perry, Pietroforte snatched a record from the other services, going clean for the first time over the National Individual Trophy Rifle Course at Perry.

These were only a few Marines, however. We have others who are just as good, just as able to top our sister services, but they haven't had the opportunity or the necessary training.

Shooting is skill, though, not opportunity. So just where does chance enter into this story? It plays a part

## Memorandum

MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

It takes difference of opinion to make a horse race--and a worthwhile professional magazine. On five pages starting here, the Gazette presents two opposing views on an important question: Does the Marine Corps need a big-time team shooting program or doesn't it? Sounding off loud and clear on the "yea" side of the issue is one of the most distinguished rifle and pistol shots the Corps has ever produced, Capt W.W. McMillan (left). He and Lt R.M. Woods say there's something badly wrong with our competitive marksmanship program, and spell out what they think needs to be done to correct the situation. Outranked but not outgunned, GySgt W. C. Hickey takes another view. He thinks match shooting is a waste of time, money, and Marines--and says so. What does the Gazette think? It doesn't. It's a forum.

in the most vulnerable and formative stage of our competitive program—in the training phase. Men like Hill and Pietroforte were fortunate enough to rise through the morass of our training system without becoming discouraged or dissuaded on their way to the top. Many capable Marines have not received the same opportunity to win. This is curious in the light of the fact that, traditionally, the Marine Corps fosters excellence in all phases of marksmanship competition.

What's happened? Shooting hasn't changed. It's still a highly skilled specialty with an important role to play in service life. But shooting was for many years a haven for shirkers who shied away from work and responsibility in their units. Men went out for the post team out of boredom or laziness.

Unfortunately, there's still a stigma attached to being a "dinger," although the days of sandbagging are gone. Shooters at the lower levels of competition, such as post and station teams, work long hours regardless of weather, have few free weekends, and put in as many hours of concentrated effort as other Marines. Even more important, their contribution to the unit is just as worthwhile.

But there is something lacking. What's needed is an adequate education program to explain the advantages of the competitive marksmanship program. COs and small unit leaders should be aware that their shooters are not lost men who don't put out but rather are producing members of the Corps. Also, and equally important, the shooter's too-little heralded work should be recognized. The word should be spread when the team's efforts pay off in competition. There must be a realization that there is a vital need for an active, vigorously supported marksmanship program devoted to competitive excellence.

Why should there be a competitive program? Obvi-

ously, it ought to tie in with the overall mission of the Marine Corps. This the program can best do by training Marines in the use of their basic and most important weapon—the rifle. In these times, small wars are likely to break out momentarily. Our units are likely to find themselves in isolated combat situations in which the individual rifleman must be skilled in order to survive.

The President himself only a short time ago stressed the need for greater individual self-reliance and competence to cope with the guerrilla-type warfare we must be ready for. Trained competitive shooters are intensely skilled riflemen. They are also an invaluable nucleus about which to build sniper units and marksmanship training sections.

Another reason for fostering competitive marksmanship is maintenance of the Marine tradition. We have to justify ourselves as still being of use to our nation. The best way to do that is to show that we stand for nothing short of the highest degree of skill and proficiency, and that we are always re-evaluating our programs and procedures in an effort to remain on top. The most dramatic way to keep this tradition and policy alive in the public eye is through competition with the other services and other nations in basic military skills.

Let's take a critical look at what the Army has done toward this end, and see why they have had such success. Their competition in arms program goes deep. Every company must supply its finest shots to battalion matches. The winners of those matches go on to regimental competition. It's not a hit-or-miss proposition left up to the discretion of individual subordinate commanders. The Army system provides a disciplined flow of talent to the top, where it is sorted through successive stages of competitive pressure. Shooters are more closely watched and better trained at each higher echelon.

Just as important, the Army has developed a comprehensive system of high-level training to take care of the new talent uncovered in initial screening efforts. Every base has a team, and every Army Area has an Advanced Marksmanship Unit. The entire set-up is overseen by the all-Army AMU at Fort Benning.

And this well-regulated system is at work not only in the continental US but in Europe as well. Anywhere there are soldiers there are shooters straining to make their way to the top with the guidance and incentive of a well-coordinated program. At the AMU's there is

and

We Don't Need  
Team Shots

P.31

By GySgt. W. C. HICKEY

pure competitive training on a year-round basis. These units are fed by the "farm" teams which operate with the same vigor and the same patronage granted other specialists.

In volume, the Marine Corps is overwhelmed by the number of men and the time the Army can afford to expend to win. Even so, we can field a team just as good as their best.

The Air Force recently began a competitive shooting program which has just started to pay off in terms of victories. They started with nothing, and now have teams which rank with the finest. Their teams answer only for results within their specialty. A winning team is left intact and doesn't have to answer to arbitrary demands on its time or personnel. The field is regarded as a specialized skill within which the really excellent may make their career with no fear of endangering their promotion status. And the whole system is under the guidance and control of experienced staff officers who are thoroughly familiar with the problems and requirements of the work.

Returning to the Marine Corps—what have we to offer? Really quite a lot. Most of it, though, is in need of revision. Our system was intended to do the same job as the Army's and Air Force's, but falls far short of the ideal.

We start with an outmoded intramural program open to all comers. Many of these shooters care little for the effort other than as a diversion or escape from normal duty. The winners receive little or no further training or direction.

What's needed is a detailed and uniform set of instructions imposing the same requirements on all commands to establish a genuine flow toward the higher levels of competitive training. These instructions should start with requalification and control each step upward through the intramural stages to the post team. They should encourage new talent and stop the wasteful and harmful toleration of passive mediocrity. Most important of all, the instructions should be issued from the top, establishing a Corps-wide system with uniform standards extending even to the lowest levels of competition.

Large commands should regard their station or post teams in a more professional manner. They should rec-

ognize that teams exist for the purpose of winning. Without victory they lose much of their worth. Team shooters should not be saddled with any primary duties other than to win. They should not be required to test or develop new theory or doctrine, to train unproven shooters, or to invent or evaluate new equipment. These tasks will, of course, devolve upon them in the natural course of events, but they should by no means be regarded as anything but important adjuncts to the one primary goal—match victory.

In the Marine Corps competitive abilities are regarded by some people as incidental. Over-specialization in a supposedly non-military field can be detrimental to a career. In reality, monitors and boards should regard competitive marksmanship ability as a highly military skill and a very important specialty within the military profession. Thought should be given to the replacement of withdrawn skills when transfers are effected, and continuity should be maintained within the specialty.

Harking back to our earlier mention of excuses, it's possible now to see that though they may all be true, they paint too bleak a picture. It's all too easy to talk ourselves out of a chance to win. If we pass up our opportunity now we may not have it again. The Air Force, and to a lesser degree the Army, are in position to absorb into their systems the best of our shooters. And unless we recognize the value of these men and the need to adapt the system to the requirements of the intensely competitive shooting game, they may justifiably leave the Marine shooting program.

Competitive marksmen should be regarded as specialists subject to career monitors who are aware of the situation. They should not be subject to arbitrary and unnecessary transfer without replacement in kind. When at all possible, teams should be permitted to train uninterruptedly, with no purpose other than to garner victory, regardless of the level of competition or training.

Most important of all, those in position to influence the competitive shooting program should be made to understand its value. Marines should be more closely associated with supremacy in their traditional role as marksmen.

USMC



**Capt McMillan** speaks on shooting from the "head of the class." Commissioned in '53, he this year became the first triple winner of the coveted Lauchheimer Trophy. His shooting honors also include the following: World Shooting Champion, Host Pistol Match, Caracas, Venezuela, '54; National Trophy Match (Pistol), '56; National Pistol Champion, '57; World Shooting Champion, .38 cal pistol, Moscow, Russia, '58; Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Champion, '59; and Olympic Gold Medal Winner, Rome, Italy, '60. He is now Ordnance and Range Officer, MCS, Quantico.



**Lt Woods**, a Princeton University graduate, was commissioned via NROTC in 1959. After Basic School (2-59), he served as a platoon commander in Schools Demonstration Troops, MCS, Quantico. Subsequently, he spent a year as a team shooter and rifle range officer at Quantico. The Lieutenant, a native of San Francisco, rates two hobbies as his chief interests: competitive marksmanship and collecting shoulder weapons. He is now the Platoon Leader of K/3/2, 2dMarDiv, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

# We Don't Need



## Team Shots

By GySgt William C. Hickey

"Proponents of competitive shooting will counter with the argument that the . . . professional shooter can contribute valuable advice to . . . other Marines. If he does . . . it'll be a rather new development"

NOT TOO MANY YEARS AGO THE MARINE CORPS HAD the best marksmanship match competitors in the business. This naturally was a source of pride to all Marines and to boosters of the Corps.

Recently, however, the Army has been winning consistently in interservice competition. The Navy and Air Force also have been making a fine showing. Civilians (many ex-servicemen) and reservists of all services have been taking home their fair share of laurels on the national level. In big matches, it is sometimes necessary to dig deep into the results to find the name of the "high Marine."

This raises the question: "Why the decline in Marine marksmanship proficiency?"

In an effort to regain its former supremacy, the Marine Corps decided to place more emphasis on competitive shooting and marksmanship training. Results of the effort in this direction have appeared in various shapes and forms. Directives emanating from all echelons of command demand increased interest. Each Friday, commanding officers are required to take the long ride to the range and pass out requalification badges at the rear of the 500-yard line. Some units offer 96-hour passes to all troops firing expert.

We now even have a special method of submitting

fitness reports on match shooters while they're "on tour." A recent order indicates that a winner in national competition becomes a prime prospect for meritorious promotion. This despite the fact that in such competition the difference between first and 50th place can depend upon a fraction of an inch difference in the strike of one bullet!

Amid all the furor, has anyone considered the possibility that Marine Corps marksmanship proficiency hasn't gone to the dogs? Competitive shooting—the contest among individuals who assume various bodily positions at predetermined distances from large pieces of paper and attempt to shoot holes in the middle of the paper—is after all *only a sport*. Only a sport—and one which in the past few years has increased tremendously in popularity. The Corps hasn't declined—the rest of the world has simply become interested and has now caught up with us. This is no more than could have been ex-





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pected. The Marine Corps has become proportionately smaller on the scene, and can therefore expect to realize a smaller share of the awards.

Had it not been for our previous domination, we would not now find it necessary to "view with alarm" our marksmanship decline. No one seems really concerned if the Marine Corps fails to win the interservice swimming championship or boxing title, or even reach the handball finals.

There is a tendency to confuse competitive shooting with marksmanship in combat, just as one would erroneously compare prizefighting with back-alley brawling.

#### Little Time on the Job?

To clarify, let's take a look at a hypothetical team shooter. He's a rather senior NCO who fills a billet in a unit but spends relatively little time on his job. Outside of marksmanship instruction, he participates in practically no military subjects training.

How did he become a "team shot?" Chances are he fired well in recruit training, thereby earning an assignment connected with marksmanship, and took a real interest in shooting. He'll be the first to point out that there is no such animal as a "born shooter"—that it takes time, patience, practice, and concentration. (With these ingredients, anyone can become a shooter).

Much of the team shooter's own time, as well as that of the Marine Corps, has been devoted to becoming proficient with his weapon and in competitively exhibiting this proficiency. He'll tell you he follows the rules, but that within these limits he'll do anything to add one point to his score.

One look at his shooting impedimenta will convince you he's right. He owns a chamois shooting jacket with foam rubber padding and a leather strip around the left bicep. He has a rifle and sling the likes of which could never be found in a unit armory. He's got a kid-skin shooting glove, and a large box with such fascinating contents as carbide lamp, beeswax, scope, tailor-made ear plugs, numerous bottles of liquid labelled "Hoppe's something-or-other," and three shades of shooting glasses for varying degrees of brightness. And last but not least, he's got a canvas folding stool the exact height of his knee joint. The whole business is topped off with an immaculately blocked campaign hat.

Impressive? Yes, and each item of equipment may assist the shooter in attaining a good score. But in combat, it will be the raggedy-tailed lads who shot 200 last year who will turn the tide of battle—despite never having owned a carbide lamp.

Proponents of competitive shooting will counter with the argument that the hard core professional shooter can contribute valuable advice to other, less endowed, Marines. This may be so, but if he does, it'll be a rather new development. Top-notch shooters are too often notoriously poor instructors. This, coupled with the natural hesitation to divulge "trade secrets," results in the average Marine learning from the team shooter only what he could glean from FM 23-5 anyway.

#### The Sight Picture Hassle

A good example of this is the sight picture absurdity of a few years ago. Throughout recruit marksmanship training, and for two weeks each year thereafter, the young Marine was told that the sight picture was everything. This was hammered into his head to a point far beyond complete saturation.

"Boy," they said, "if you don't have a good sight picture, you may as well turn in this M-1 and save the Government's ammunition."

The cardinal sin was to have the front sight blade anywhere but at six o'clock on the bulls-eye. Only the experienced shooter knew that sight picture, while important, was relatively minor when compared to sight alignment, and for some reason he wasn't talking. Then suddenly, almost overnight, the endless hours of instruction on the sight picture disappeared from the school range. The void was filled by extra instruction on sight alignment. Today, instruction on the proper sight picture consumes a little less than five minutes per range detail. The most amazing thing of all is that the truth about sight alignment versus sight picture could be found in FM 23-5 all the time, available to anyone caring to read it.


Every Marine Corps post and station of any size has a rifle and pistol team. This adds up to a large number of Marines who spend a lot of time practicing for or actually participating in the competition-in-arms program. Is it worth it?

#### Run It Like the Band

If there is a need for a Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Team to compete for prestige purposes, then by all means let's have one. But why not run it like the Marine Band? This would save considerable money—and would fill some billet vacancies with Marines who can devote most of their time to their primary duties.

The recent trend in Marine Corps athletics has been to deemphasize all-Marine, interservice, and collegiate competition in favor of good intramural programs. As competitive shooting is a sport, and only a sport, why not start the same trend for marksmanship, with strong stress on combat-type firing for all Marines? In the long run, the real prestige of the Corps will depend on our marksmanship proficiency in battle, not in the Olympics.

USMC



*Drop Joe Marine off in the wilderness without food, water, tools, or weapons. Will he survive or won't he? He will if he knows how—and he ought to know*

By Maj James R. Johnson

A POPULAR MISCONCEPTION ABOUT MILITARY MEN IS that the man most distant from the city sidewalk gets along best under adverse conditions in the field. One Virginia cavalryman of the Civil War discovered this error for himself. He attributed it to "gentle upbringing" that men from the city could sometimes out-rough the roughest frontiersman.

The cavalryman's conclusion was right. He was considerably in error, however, as to why the city man seemed to have a mysterious ability to adapt more readily to life in the raw than his country cousin. How could this be? The boy who rode a trolley to school certainly should be out of his element on the battlefield.

The answer lay in one word: "knowledge." An unacceptable number of Civil War casualties resulted from disease. Only the men who knew how to take care of themselves during frequent camp epidemics survived. But men who had no concept of field sanitation, first aid, or such details as proper care of foot blisters, had extreme casualty rates.

To suggest that a similar shortcoming may affect today's Marine Corps is to raise the ire of the troop leader who has led his men through unending cycles of field training. But if the average Pfc were plucked from a "crack" outfit and dropped off alone in the Mohave Desert, the Sierras, or the Everglades and given

the simple order, "survive," would he?

The Korean War brought to light a situation which still fails to disturb many infantry leaders. Pilots of all military services undergo intensive training in survival and living off the land. Yet, Korean operations showed that for every pilot stranded on foot in hostile territory, ten foot soldiers found themselves in this predicament. Many reports indicate they were whipped by their environment—that they simply blundered into ambush or capture.

There is a vital need that the average rifleman be well versed in survival procedures. It comes as a surprise to the boot camp recruit to find himself training in boxing and Judo. He knows he will not wander over the battlefield with boxing gloves on his hands. Sooner or later, though, he sees the point—that this training is designed to build self-confidence and that it does the job nicely.

A knowledge of survival procedures may be of much more importance to the trainee. The environment that will really test his self-confidence is the rainy winter night, the steaming, mosquito-ridden swamp, or the sun-baked desert. These environments are the settings for patrols, bivouacs, and maneuvers.

The Boer War British Army found critical areas of overlooked training. One officer was so disgusted with the inability of many soldiers to take care of themselves

under campaign conditions that he determined to correct the situation himself. This officer, R. S. S. Baden Powell, considered that the key to correction lay in early training. He shortly founded an organization called the Boy Scouts. Its aim was to build maturity and self-confidence by showing a boy how to take care of himself outdoors.

#### A Sad Example

The problem is still with us. The writer attended an inter-service survival class during the Korean War which included a middle-aged officer who was a service academy graduate. Live rabbits—to be killed, dressed, and cooked—were issued to the trainees. The officer looked at the animal, gulped, and said, "I can't kill the poor thing." Someone killed it for him. "I can't skin it," was his next plea. Yet this officer claimed qualification for commanding men in battle.

Should we extend present recruit training to include survival knowledge for any environment in which the FMF may operate next week? No. This is a scatter-



**Some useful items—if you can recognize them**

shot method. The real need is for intensive training in techniques and tips which apply to all environments.

The old timer may snort, "You don't have to practice to be miserable." But puncture his air mat on a winter bivouac and order him to rest at night. Chances are he won't be able to do it. After a few nights of little sleep his usefulness will leave something to be desired.

The rifleman should know how to stay warm during sleep in rain or snow. He should understand how to insulate himself from the ground, how to improvise beds, how to scrape hip and shoulder holes in the ground to fit his contours, and the value of ration and other paper wrappings as additional clothing or blankets. He must know how to find north when the overcast obscures the sun, and he has no compass except a thumbnail.

The rifleman loses his fear of the desert when he can force it to provide water: from cactus, from mesquite or oak tree roots, from depressions, or from dew collections on rock piles. He is at home in a wilderness when he knows he can fill his canteen with pure water from a grapevine if he has to.

It comes as a surprise to most people to learn what the average wilderness can provide. A man with a few day's survival training can live in Quantico's maneuver areas with no imported food, water, or tools—and stay in good health for weeks. He can do this in winter or summer.

If he has to, he can live off cattail roots. They are 50% starch. Pounding acorns for meal is a forgotten art. Yet the most bitter acorns can be made edible in an hour by boiling in changes of water. They can even be made palatable by crushing between rocks, tying the meal in a handkerchief, and immersing in a running stream for a day. The roots of the nuisance catbriar are filled with starch. The writer has made palatable breads from all three of the above items.

Inner barks, dried and crushed, of these trees serve as emergency flour: birch, pine, fir, maple, and hemlock. The lowly lichen is still used by some Canadian Indians as a flour substitute.

#### For Medicinal Purposes

Wilderness first aid is akin to witch doctoring in the minds of some. Yet an effective antiseptic can be made by boiling off the tannic acid in oak bark or chestnut. A sore throat can be eased with wild cherries or cherry bark. A toothache can be stopped by a rolled bark sliver from Hercules club, pressed against the offending nerve. Poison ivy contacts can be neutralized—even more effectively than by some commercial products—with the juices of the common elder, or of jewelweed. Crushed elder leaves smeared on the skin soon after contact will prevent even the preliminary redness of ivy poisoning. Crushed horsechestnut or chinaberry leaves, or mud, are effective insect repellents.

The carrot-like root of yucca (common from New Jersey to the Pacific) can be pounded flat and used as a soap-impregnated washrag. The fibers in its leaves can be twisted into fishline or grenade trip wires, as can the inner barks of hickory, linden, elm, and leatherwood, or the roots of hemlock, spruce, tamarack, and mulberry.

Probably most American fishermen have envied the tropical native who takes an armful of leaves from a nearby tree, tosses them into a stream, and soon picks up the fish which float to the surface. However, the technique holds no mystery for many rural boys in temperate zones. They use crushed black walnuts and leaves, or the bark and leaves of horsechestnut or chinaberry, to achieve the same result. The warmer and slower the stream, the more effective are the poisons.

Perhaps the most important wilderness trick for a stranded Marine is an ability to produce fire without matches, and without a complicated set of bows and spindles and the like. Fire means staying warm, cooking food, and signalling. With fire a man has any environment 90% conquered. A hard rock—flint, quartz,

granite—no larger than a twenty-five cent piece will produce sparks when struck a glancing blow against hard metal such as a knife blade, gun barrel, or mortar plate. If these sparks are caught in charred cloth or very fine bark fibers such as red cedar, they will last long enough to be gently blown into flame.

Marines in Korea found many familiar plant and animal foods: pine (inner bark for emergency flour), water lilies and arrowhead whose roots furnish starches, domestic grains (rice, wheat, rye, corn), and chestnuts. The edible minnows and wading birds of Korean rice fields are little different than those of Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton ponds.

## **What to Look For**

A winter hiker moving in any direction on the Quantico reservation for two hours will find enough plant foods to feed himself and a squad of Marines. A spring hiker will find plentiful sprouts for greens or salads. A Quantico summer produces quantities of fruits and berries.



## **Here's an old trick—but how many can do it?**

In any area an abandoned farm or village is apt to furnish plentiful foods from domestic orchards and gardens which have been forgotten. The old farm yards on the Quantico training areas still contain producing apple, pear, peach, plum, mulberry, and rare fig trees, as well as grape vines and perennial strawberry plants.

A Marine with a general knowledge of survival practices in the environments of present Marine bases should have no great difficulty adapting easily to any area in the world. Few countries produce environments not found on the US mainland.

There is no need to train all Marines to survive in the tundra, the jungle, the desert and the high mountain country. This would be a scattershot method, wasting the time of the individual and the Marine Corps. The requirement for intensive training lies in techniques and methods which apply to all conditions: staying warm, staying healthy, finding foods, determining edibility of foods, making them palatable, staying oriented, and wilderness improvisation.

## **Training Should Begin as Boot**

How can this training be accomplished? A start has already been made. Exploratory and special programs have been conducted at East and West coast bases, and at the small unit level. However, initial training should begin when the recruit opens his *Guidebook* at boot camp. The *Guidebook* has been revised in recent years

to include some aspects of survival such as finding the north star and practical sanitation hints. Consideration should also be given, however, to adding a survival chapter in future revisions.

And Continue in ITR

Two approaches to formal survival training seem practical. The boot camp graduate undergoing advanced infantry training before joining an FMF unit should be particularly receptive to several day's survival training. Two days and one night of intensive, on-the-scene training should suffice. The next survival training period should come at the small unit level. A division three-day course for platoon leaders and platoon NCOs would equip these leaders for training their men during routine field exercises and hikes. One officer, an NCO, and a clerk typist should meet the personnel requirements of a Division school which could soon qualify the Division's entire "cutting edge" leadership.



#### **Without air mats, most Marines wouldn't sleep much**

What will be the result? We will have Marines who are not perturbed by unusual environments. They will know how to use surroundings rather than be exhausted by them. They will stay healthy and alert when separated from their commands, and will be better prepared to avoid capture or ambush. They will eventually return to their units under their own power. In effect, we will have added manpower, morale—and Marines.

USA MC



A black and white portrait photograph of a man with short, dark hair, looking slightly to his left. He appears to be wearing a military-style uniform jacket over a collared shirt.

# AREA FIRE

## A report on small unit weapons and combat

By Jac Weller

FROM NORWAY TO SPAIN OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE their infantry practicing small unit fighting. Powerful young Danes spend hours with their Madsen automatic rifles near the Baltic. Ponderous Spanish companies work hard amid rocks and dust under a blazing sun. Mobile, lightly armed Germans ride in trucks through the Black Forests towards old walled villages. The whump, whump, whump of mortars and the blinding flashes of recoilless rifles are much the same in all demonstrations. The bullets, however, are sent on their lethal journeys according to different principles from army to army. These variations are not just classroom theory. Even a civilian observer can tell the difference between spraying and careful aiming.

From classical times to Korea, ground has been taken and permanently held only by men fighting on foot with weapons they carry into action. Armor, artillery, and air power are of vast importance, but only infantry can occupy positions and eventually impose one country's will on another. Corps, divisions, and regiments are organization terms. Companies and platoons do the actual fighting. Infantry combat of even the largest size is basically a combination of small unit fights.

All modern infantry depends on firepower. Edged weapons have only a psychological role. Muscle-thrown grenades, while sometimes effective, are of limited range. The firearms in West Europe today are similar. The same weapons are issued in several different armies. More than 90% of all NATO rifles, automatic rifles (AR's) and machineguns (MG's), are chambered either with the 7.62 mm NATO round or the US .30-'06.

Theories of fire, however, can hardly be more opposed. There are two extreme positions. The first group says, "Let's squirt as many bullets as possible all over

the landscape. There are rarely any visible enemies to aim at anyway. Even if we don't hit them, we'll keep them down!" The second group says, "Only hits count. Let's use our weapons so as to score a maximum of hits!" The third group compromises and says, "Both types of fire have advantages. Let's have some of each in our army!"

It's easy to shrug off the two points of view with which your personally don't agree. You may even consider that proponents of such views are uninformed, or mentally handicapped. However, our European allies are neither; some of their regiments are older than our nation. Their small arms officers know at first hand all the major infantry weapons of the world. They have personally fought long and hard in many different situations. The Germans were beating the Russians until strategic bombing took its toll. The British have used cartridge small arms in more widely separated combat areas and in more different wars than any other two nations in the world. That these armies should arrive finally at diametrically opposed concepts of fire should cause anyone to pause and reconsider his own decision.


Let's look first at the armies which believe in spraying bullets. Germany is the foremost exponent of this theory. Spain accepts it completely within its capacity for replacing obsolete weapons. The Danes have adapted the theory to fit the rather unusual condition under which their army may have to fight.

In WWII and since, squad firepower has depended in large measure on a special type of machinegun which is light enough to be carried by one man and can be brought into action, using a bipod, almost as easily as a rifle. This weapon has become known as an automatic rifle. It should not be confused with a standard infantry

This is the first of three articles by Mr. Weller on company and platoon level combat thinking in Western Europe. Coming up next month: "Combined Fire," which covers France, Belgium, and Portugal. Scheduled for November: "Aimed Fire" (Britain, Norway, Netherlands).

at tactics in:

## West Germany



All three nations have adopted weapons which fit their "area fire" doctrine. West Germany and Spain both use fast-firing CETME rifles (left and center). The Danes use US M-1 but have two SMGs (right) in each squad. Other small arms? Consult Mr. Weller. He's an expert and visited all three countries before he wrote the article.



**German MG-42-59 can deliver more firepower than any other ground automatic weapon in the world**



**German FN rifle (firing): It "just squirts bullets." CETME rifle (on the deck) has replaced it**



**German anti-tank rocket and launcher demonstrated by Chief, Small Arms Training Div, Hammelburg**

arm able to deliver burst fire.

The new German army when it was formed in 1957, chose first its AR. This type of weapon had been the backbone of infantry fighting in the old army. After trying out all those available, they preferred their old MG-42. This decision was based essentially on high cyclic rate, simplicity, reliability, and a quick barrel change capability not matched by any other AR. They re-designed the weapon slightly and converted it to fire the NATO round. The Ordnance Department even made the cyclic rate subject to armorer adjustment. The WWII models fired at about 1,300 rounds per minute. The using services haven't wanted to reduce this rate of fire even though it's roughly double that of any other NATO AR.

The MG-42-59 can deliver many more bullets over any period of time than any other ground automatic weapon in the world. The Germans find nothing wrong with its "cone of fire" which is roughly 30 feet in diameter at 50 yards. This is about five times the size of a similar group from our BAR or the British Bren.

The Germans at first selected the FN as their standard infantry rifle. Every one delivered was capable of full automatic fire. Some of the early German FN's weighed less than eight pounds and had no bipods. Only the first shot of a burst could be kept on a silhouette target at 25 meters. Some minor adjustments were made but the FN, firing full automatic, still just squirts bullets almost at random. The CETME is now being issued along with the FN and will eventually replace it. The change was made essentially because the CETME is simpler and cheaper. However, it is superior in burst fire because of its greater weight, lower cyclic rate, and greater distance between line of sight and center of bore.

The Germans finally chose the Uzi sub-machine gun (SMG) because of its compactness; it's the shortest in NATO. A SMG is not considered an important infantry weapon in the new German army since their rifles are now capable of bursts.

Spanish association with the Germans in small arms thinking, development, and tactics is of long standing. The Nationalists finally beat their Communist opponents in the Spanish Civil War largely because of German weapons and advisory personnel. The Spanish arms industry, as well as the army, benefited greatly from association with Germany. The CETME rifle was invented and perfected in Spain, but by a joint team of Spanish and displaced German ordnance engineers. It's not surprising that the Spanish theory of fire should follow closely that of the Germans.

Until recent months Spanish infantrymen sprayed bullets mainly from AR's and platoon HMG's. Their rifles were bolt Mausers not capable of really rapid fire. When the CETME's replace bolt rifles, firepower will be enormously increased. This change is about 25% complete.

The Spanish infantry was at one time very fond of its SMG's. Presently, however, the Spanish feel that the extra power of the rifle cartridge more than makes up for the greater accuracy of bursts from SMG's. Only personnel not primarily assigned to combat duties now receive SMG's.

The Danes were limited somewhat in their choice of weapons after 1945 because the high cost of a new

family of small arms is not easily borne by a small nation. Eventually, however, they replaced the motley collection of WWII types they had obtained from various sources with a carefully thought-out team. They retained their favorite Danish Madsen AR but re-chambered it for the .30-'06 cartridge. At the same time, they chose the US M-1 as the best infantry rifle they could get without a large outlay of cash.

The Danes are presently considering a project to modernize our M-1's. They can be converted in North Italy to the NATO cartridge, equipped with detachable 20-round magazines, and fitted with selector switches which will allow burst fire. Until they have a full automatic shoulder rifle, however, the Danes will continue to issue a relatively large number of SMG's in each company. There are two in each rifle squad.

Pistols are issued as shown on the next page.. They are for personal defense and psychological assurance but add little to fighting potential. All three armies use medium weight automatics (semi-automatic really) firing the 9mm Luger (Parabellum) cartridge.

#### Organization and Support Weapons

The German infantry company contains no heavy weapons platoon, nor do the three identical rifle platoons have heavy weapons squads. The company has compact rocket launchers but these are generally carried on vehicles and are removed only when likely to be needed. All other supporting arms are organic to battalions. The Germans feel these can be employed more efficiently in concentrations and by specialists. Company officers and NCO's concentrate on rifles and AR's. The Spanish and Danish infantry companies have mortars as well as rocket launchers. A Spanish company has, in addition, two US 106mm recoilless rifles. The Danes have five extra Madsen's equipped with tripod mounts, making them LMG's. Each Spanish rifle platoon has two HMG's (Cal 30, 90-pound Alfas) in its heavy weapons squad.

#### German Company Tactics

German infantry companies can attack unsupported. It wouldn't do to let infantry feel that they did not have an independent offensive potential. However, the Germans don't want to do much attacking with infantry alone. German offensive success has been based on combinations of infantry with artillery, armor, and tactical air support.

The Germans emphasize that in combined attacks foot soldiers must be well to the front, not only for taking certain types of positions, but also to hold all territory won and to form a base for further offensive action. However, they want unprotected infantry to do as little advancing in the open as possible. Their new APC's have a fighting potential with the full complement still aboard.

Occasionally, an infantry company must attack practically unsupported, either alone, as part of a larger offensive effort, or even in an overall defensive situation. In a standard attack, two platoons would be in line with the third in close support. Depending on terrain, a single squad from each of the leading platoons might be deployed in front for reconnaissance and security. Once launched, an attack would be made in such a way



CETME rifle was perfected in Spain and here are two Spanish models. Both are still in production



Spanish Alfa HMG. It's .30 cal, has a low cyclic rate of 450 rounds per minute, weighs 90 pounds



This 3.5" rocket launcher was designed and built in Spain. It can fire US or other NATO rounds

# Marine Corps Gazette

August • 1961

## INFANTRY SMALL ARMS (AR'S DOWN)

| COUNTRY | PISTOL  | SMG               | RIFLE                  | AR       | AMMO REQUIREMENT                  |
|---------|---------|-------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------|
| Denmark | SIG     | Swedish M45       | US M-1                 | Madsen   | .30-'06, 9mm Luger                |
| Germany | P-38    | Uzi               | FN (75%) - CETME (25%) | MG-42-59 | 7.62 NATO, 9mm Luger              |
| Spain   | Several | Parinco III (20%) | CETME (30%)            | FAO      | 7.92 Mauser, 7.62 NATO, 9mm Luger |
|         |         | Star Z45 (70%)    | Bolt Mauser (70%)      |          |                                   |

## SMALL ARMS (AR'S DOWN) IN COMPANIES

| COUNTRY | PERSONNEL | PISTOLS | SMG'S | RIFLES | AR'S | TOTAL WEAPONS |
|---------|-----------|---------|-------|--------|------|---------------|
| Denmark | 123       | 4       | 42    | 72     | 9    | 127           |
| Germany | 137       | 12      | 8     | 117    | 12   | 149           |
| Spain   | 247       | 42      | 57    | 148    | 14   | 261           |

## COMPARISON OF SMG'S (ALL 9mm LUGER)

| COUNTRY | WEAPON      | WT. LOADED | CYCLIC. RATE | LENGTH    | MAGAZINE | FINISH |
|---------|-------------|------------|--------------|-----------|----------|--------|
| Denmark | Swedish M45 | 9.25 lbs.  | 550 rpm      | 20.8 ins. | 36 rds.  | Medium |
| Germany | Uzi         | 8.9 lbs.   | 650 rpm      | 17.9 ins. | 25 rds.  | Good   |
| Spain   | Parinco 111 | 7.2 lbs.   | 600 rpm      | 25.0 ins. | 32 rds.  | Good   |
|         | Star Z45    | 9.25 lbs.  | 515 rpm      | 23.2 ins. | 30 rds.  | Medium |

## COMPARISON OF RIFLES

| COUNTRY | WEAPON        | WT. LOADED | CYCLIC. RATE | LENGTH    | ACTION           | MAGAZINE      |
|---------|---------------|------------|--------------|-----------|------------------|---------------|
| Denmark | US M-1        | 9.9 lbs.   | Single Shot  | 43.0 ins. | Gas              | 8 rds.        |
| Germany | FN            | 9.8 lbs.   | 650-700 rpm  | 39.0 ins. | Gas              | 20 rds.       |
|         | CETME         | 11.5 lbs.  | 550 rpm      | 38.1 ins. | Delayed Blowback | 20 rds.       |
| Spain   | CETME         | 11.5 lbs.  | 550 rpm      | 38.1 ins. | Delayed Blowback | 20 or 32 rds. |
|         | M98-37 Mauser | 9.2 lbs.   | Single Shot  | 43.5 ins. | Bolt             | 5 rds.        |

## COMPARISON OF AR'S

| COUNTRY | WEAPON   | WT. LOADED | CYCLIC. RATE | LENGTH    | ACTION | FEED                    | AMMO                     |
|---------|----------|------------|--------------|-----------|--------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Denmark | Madsen   | 23.1 lbs.  | 450 rpm      | 45.0 ins. | Recoil | 25 or 40 rd. box on top | .30-'06                  |
| Germany | MG-42-59 | 25.0 lbs.  | 1,200 rpm    | 48.0 ins. | Gas    | Belt of 50              | 7.62 NATO                |
| Spain   | FAO      | 21.6 lbs.  | 600 rpm      | 45.5 ins. | Gas    | 20 rd. box on top       | 7.92 Mauser or 7.62 NATO |

as to have covering fire available from one half of each unit while the other went forward. This would be true even at squad level under some circumstances.

There is considerable flexibility in regard to AR's on offense. These weapons are the heaviest of their type in NATO and can consume enormous weights of ammunition. The AR gunners can be added to the support platoon and the actual attack made with riflemen only. Because of the burst firing potential of all German FN's and CETME's, there are still plenty of bullets. Standard procedure calls for full automatic fire below 300 meters down to about 75 meters. The charge home is made with rifles blazing fast single shots from the hip. The idea is not to have infantry arrive at close quarters with empty rifles. The Germans practice this a good deal. Two platoons doing it together at the double are most impressive.

Now about company tactics on the defense. When we started to discuss these at the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, I sensed an immediate change of attitude. Here was something familiar to them all; they had handled these situations in combat many times. They want a weakly held security line backed up by interlocking MG-42-59's in considerable depth. Each rifle squad has the primary defensive duty of protecting the AR; riflemen won't normally fire until a real attack begins. The Germans believe the continuous, efficient fighting potential of a company is best achieved by using cones of fire from AR's. Rifles aren't effective beyond 400 meters, they say.

#### Six to Aim

In defensive situations, the MG-42-59 can use a medium weight tripod, increasing effective range (according to the Germans) from 800 to 1,200 meters. The AR's actually become LMG's. Extra MG-42-59's may be employed where circumstances warrant. During WWII, German squads frequently had more than one MG-42.

We have not considered battalion support weapons in the above discussions. Actually, the Germans have the most complicated heavy weapons company in NATO. The company's five platoons have, respectively, 81mm mortars, 120mm mortars, 20mm automatic cannon, 90mm self-propelled guns, and Cobra-type guided missiles. These would be used in both offense and defense as circumstances and terrain might dictate. The fine German rocket launchers would also be available.

There is another factor which should be mentioned, even though the Germans themselves aren't sure of its future significance. A total of 131 out of the 137 men in a company will deliver essentially area fire. The remaining six, according to present plans, will aim. Each rifle platoon will have a two-man sniper team equipped with telescope-sighted CETME's. Normally, a team will function with one man spotting with binoculars and the other firing. They are not to be a part of any squad, but will be given complete freedom to move around



**Favorite Danish weapon is this Madsen automatic rifle. It's been re-chambered for .30-'06 round**



**Danish soldiers firing Energa grenades with US M-1s. Danes may modify M-1 to fire NATO round**



**Jac Weller**, noted firearms consultant, Princeton, N. J., graduated from Princeton University in 1936. Majoring in mechanical engineering, Mr. Weller spent many extra hours studying interior and exterior ballistics, firearms design, and ordnance in general. A licensed engineer, he holds the distinguished title of

Honorary Curator, West Point Museum, and is classified as an infantry weapons specialist. At present, Mr. Weller conducts firearms investigations and is recognized as a court qualified expert witness.

anywhere in the battalion area. Their training will be specialized; they are to have hunting privileges in the German forests. Their primary function is to gain the ascendancy in static situations.

#### Spanish Company Tactics

The Spanish infantry company is the largest in West Europe today. It is commanded by a major. Because of its organic heavy weapons and its numerous small arms, the company's combat potential is considerable. Until recently, Spain thought mainly of fighting at home. Her terrain is frequently such that only infantry can be used to real advantage. Though confident now in their US and other NATO friendships, and ready to go any place, the Spaniards are still thinking in terms of their own terrain and their Civil War.

Let's examine briefly their infantry company. The weapons platoon has three 81mm mortars and two 106mm recoilless rifles. Each of the four rifle platoons has a heavy weapons squad provided with two HMG's and two rocket launchers which in Spain are used also for anti-personnel purposes. These heavy weapons give a company CO an integrated weapons team valuable in rugged country and where communications and cooperation with other units are difficult.

The change from the bolt Mauser to the CETME complicates small unit tactics. The Spanish officers I talked to felt that firepower—meaning a lot of bullets—was important in their Civil War. They achieved this with SMG's, squad AR's, and platoon HMG's. They sometimes used a one-to-one ratio of bolt rifles to SMG's. Now that they have CETME's with full automatic capacity, they are tentatively planning to reduce SMG's drastically and perhaps eliminate squad AR's. Their final decision has not yet been made.

In offense, a Spanish company would advance to contact in dispersed formation. It would feel out the enemy with a skirmish screen, set up its mortar and recoilless rifles, probably on the flanks, then attack with two platoons abreast. The company's heavy weapons squad HMG's and rocket launchers normally stay right with the rifle platoons. In difficult terrain where mobility is limited anyway, they do not impede progress and are available immediately for use against strong points. In the final charge home, Spanish soldiers are extremely formidable. They throw many grenades in practice and believe their bayonets are for actual use.

Defensively, the Spanish bolt rifle company was and is dependent upon its AR's and HMG's, normally placed in well-protected strong points. Mortars, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles give the equivalent of immediate artillery support. The rifles and SMG's are mainly for close in protection. The defense would not normally be so deep as that of the Germans but would be more massive. The cloud of bullets would be even thicker. A company has eight HMG's and 14 AR.

A CETME-armed company has even more firepower, regardless of whether each squad has 11 of these fine rifles or ten of them and an AR. It will be necessary to adjust defensive tactics somewhat if the AR is eliminated. The platoon CO will probably change his strong point arrangement into something more approaching a line, or designate certain CETME riflemen to take over the functions of the old AR gunners.

The Danish army comprises only six battle groups, it would be lost on the great northern plain of Europe. However, it has a very specialized task. The Danes are responsible for one of the most vital areas in the Western World—the US missile base in Jutland. Nuclear retaliation to Communist aggression could be on its way in minutes.

The imponderables of modern war, however, are such that this powerful base might not be used immediately. It may have to be held against ground attack. This is the primary job of the Danish army, particularly if the attack should come through Scandinavia and the Baltic. The approaches to Jutland from the east and north-east are across islands and smaller peninsulas. The whole is a mass of arms of the sea, lakes, rivers, and canals. NATO naval units composed of small vessels will help, but the land areas must be held too. Fortification beforehand isn't possible. The Danes will have to fight innumerable small actions. Company CO's may well be operating semi-independently. They are ready.

#### Danish Company Tactics


A Danish infantry company has a mortar section with three 60mm mortars. There are also the inevitable rocket launchers. The real punch of this relatively small company comes, as it does elsewhere, from its small arms. The Danish theory of fire leans heavily towards area saturation; there are more SMG's proportionately than in any other NATO company. The backbone of the company is the 14 Madsens. They may be receiving full automatic M-1's by the time you read this. Their cones of fire will be more accurate than those of the German MG-42-59's, and comprise fewer bullets, but the thought is the same.

Offensively, the Danish company is unusually flexible. Denmark's terrain isn't rugged like the Pyrenees but it's even more cut up. Fighting will be for relatively small strong points, hard to attack with sophisticated weapons. The Danes are practicing bringing their full company power to bear quickly against extemporized, fairly inaccessible defenses. Their countryside is lush and beautiful but often militarily blind. Some small combats will be unexpected and at close range. That's one reason for two SMG's in each rifle squad.

On an overall basis, the Danes, along with the rest of NATO, will be on the defensive. The possible points of attack are so numerous that specific anticipation is impossible. But the route chosen by an aggressor is sure to run afoul of Danes fighting with storms of bullets for their homeland. They will make the best of their superior knowledge of the country and give ground grudgingly. If numbers are even close, their own strong points and covering fires will exact a heavy price from their enemies.

#### Conclusions

These three armies, after mature and careful thought, have decided to bet their continued national existence in part on area fire. Others besides ourselves don't agree with them. But they certainly have a right to an opinion. Their reasoning is worthy of careful consideration. Aiming may be difficult or impossible, but a hail of bullets has proven valuable in combat. USMC



### CHAPTER III: Organization of the Guerrilla Movement

AT FIRST, AS GUERRILLAS BEGIN THEIR FIGHT IN RURAL areas, they must live off the land. This isn't too hard since natives nearly everywhere have some basic sustenance product. In Eastern Cuba it was the malanga plant. In highland Mexico, Central America, and Peru it's corn and potatoes; in Argentina, cattle; in others, wheat.

As guerrillas take over an area, they may help work the fields if necessary. Later they can collect all the farm output for redistribution to local residents after meeting guerrilla needs. Taxes can be imposed to assist the guerrilla treasury.

As wider cooperation is enlisted for the cause, supply lines are extended outside guerrilla territory. Goods are paid for in cash, barter, or later by IOU's. For movement, veritable armies of mules can be used at night. Figure 220 pounds per animal. If conditions are right, even trucks can be employed at night.

Within guerrilla territory, civil affairs can and must

be administered to make the greatest possible contribution to the revolution. In Cuba, propaganda and public health, including hospitals, were under rebel army control. But other civil functions were regulated and institutionalized by a Judge Advocate. This included treasury, taxation, accounting, warehouses, civil laws, and farmer organizations. We actually established our own penal code, civil code, regulations for supplying farmers, and an agrarian reform law.

But a word of caution: use a flexible, well-explained approach and don't impoverish the zone lest adverse propaganda result. Outside guerrilla territory, civil functions were organized by region. This included co-ordinating sabotage, obtaining financial support, and disseminating propaganda.

Those with colonial mentality typically underestimate and discriminate against women. But for us in Cuba, women were most helpful and created no sexual conflicts. Many successful marriages were made within guerrilla life. Although physically weaker, women are no less able than men and a number fought along side



UPI

**Guevara, Chapter III:** "Those with colonial mentality typically underestimate and discriminate against women." **Guevara, Chapter IV:** "Trust no one . . . especially women." These are marching in Havana parade

men in combat. But most women took on more conventional supporting roles such as message carrying, food services, uniform manufacture, nursing, teaching, etc.

#### Medical Care

Guerrilla medical care evolves from the simple doctor accompanying the troops in the field, often bearing arms with them, to the doctor enjoying staff and hospital facilities in the advance phases of the revolution. In all phases, the doctor must have a keen appreciation of revolutionary aims because correct moral support is often a vital part of successful medicine. The greatest need is for full-time surgeons and orthopedics. For specialists, the best we did in Cuba was to list them by name and location. When we needed their services, we either brought the casualty to the specialist, or the specialist to the casualty.

#### Sabotage

On a national scale, sabotage aims at interdicting enemy communications. Businesses owned by enemy leaders also are good targets but indiscriminate destruction of industry is out. Obey coordination policies and specific orders of the guerrilla high command. Terrorism can invoke too much reprisal, so don't try it. For combat zone sabotage, strike boldly and often, using guerrilla flying squads to beef up civil action. Again, stress interdiction. Also knock out enemy supply sources. Give him no rest. Constant nagging and harrassing will sidetrack much valuable enemy strength.

#### Guerrilla Industry

Once semi-permanent encampments can safely be established, crude workshops are set up to meet guerrilla needs. Man them with practical, "can-do" people. The most important single product is shoes. Other products which we made ourselves in Cuba included cartridge belts, packs, improvised weapons, explosives, fuses, grenades, canteens, cigars and cigarettes, and leather.

#### Propaganda

The importance of disseminating the revolutionary spirit requires two staffs, one for the nation as a whole, the other for the guerrilla forces, both coordinated by a common Director. Reach the nation with radio, newspapers, and leaflets, including special leaflets for farmers, workers, and enemy soldiers. Tell the truth about the guerrilla situation, explain aims, announce aid received, sabotage desired, revolutionary slogans, enemy crimes and criminals. Set a feverish pace. Give fresh news with inspiring language that will inflame the national conscience. Within guerrilla territory, supplement radio and leaflets with word of mouth. Explain to the natives mutual problems, air raid defense, enemy locations, etc. For foreign press releases, stress the facts.

#### Intelligence

Nothing helps combat forces more than correct intelligence. You can expect a spontaneous generation of information by the local residents, the vast majority of whom will be pro-guerrilla. But you'll have to take spe-

cial pains to sort fact from fiction and pass the information quickly to guerrilla leaders. To spy on the enemy's rear, infiltrate astute men and women, especially women. Use these people also to plant rumors that will confuse and frighten the enemy.

#### **Indoctrination and Training**

At the beginning, the guerrilla must teach himself. Later, when a sizable area has been liberated, recruit schools are set up. Recruits get their own supplies and do their own housekeeping. They are toughened by commando courses and long, hard marches. Our Cuban school was spotted by the enemy and we had something unique: real air raids twice daily!

Since recruits join up with fuzzy concepts of liberty, freedom of the press, etc., they need indoctrination on guerrilla aims, the motivation and economics behind national history, national heroes, the proper reaction to injustice, analysis of the current situation. Above all, inculcate a reasoning, not mechanical, self discipline. This is the best assurance of success when the chips are down in combat. Gradually, standards are raised in the schools and hence throughout the whole guerrilla force.

#### **Overall Leadership**

Any guerrilla revolutionary army must depend on an overall leadership. In Cuba we had a commander in chief, who appointed regional chiefs, who in turn named majors in charge of columns. Discipline was based on reason and personal conviction. When broken, drastic punishment was handed out. Deprivation of liberty is just a free rest and doesn't work. Deprivation of the right to carry arms will work, however, if the individual is highly motivated for the guerrilla cause. For example, we caught a chap snoozing in an easy chair when he shouldn't have. We took his rifle away and told him to get another in combat. A few days later we found him dying in a hospital—but he told us proudly how he had won back his right to bear arms. Aim at developing this type of morale!

#### **CHAPTER IV: Supplementary Remarks**

If given a spontaneous, popular reaction to enemy coercion, guerrilla warfare can begin immediately. But, in general, the guerrilla conspiracy begins abroad or in a remote part of the country. It centers around some respected leader working for the salvation of his people. Absolute secrecy is crucial. Trust no one beyond the nucleus, especially females. Work and live in teams, never individually. Guard every piece of paper. Brook no breach of security.

A hard core of 30 to 50 men is, in my opinion, enough to initiate armed revolution in any Latin American country, given suitable operating terrain, land hunger, enemy injustices. In Cuba, 12 men—plus Fidel Castro—did the trick. As the nucleus grows, split it into different groups to facilitate security so that the loss of any one group won't mean the loss of the entire revolution. In selecting fellow conspirators, be absolutely sure of ideology. Then be assured of complete psychological and physical preparation to endure the extreme hardships and near disasters certain to stand between you and victory.

#### **Defending What's Been Won**

Final liberation comes only with the systematic, total breaking up of the enemy army and all institutions which supported the old regime. At this point, the US and other monopolistic countries will be sure to counter-attack with a hostile press.

In Cuba, we additionally have real fears of an invasion. Therefore, rededicate revolutionary action to forge a new army with technical skill, unshakeable ideology, and great combat power. Use inspired senior veterans of the revolution for ideological leadership, the only true basis of lasting security. Train late arrivals to make them into good soldiers. Use the best survivors of the enemy army to improve professional and technical standards, once these men see the light and adopt guerrilla ideology.

#### **Outlook for Cuba**

After we put the dictator to flight, everyone expected things to revert to normal. They underestimated the strength of our ideology. Supported by farmers, workers, middle class, and even industrialists, we've forged ahead with our Agrarian Reform Law, doing it more completely and quickly than ever was done in Mexico, Guatemala, or Bolivia.

We spared no large landowner, foreign or Cuban. We've made mining companies now leave us a 25% export tax, instead of just a hole in the ground. We've chopped off the profits of foreign capitalists. And we've broken the news barrier so that the truth of what we've done in Cuba is spreading like wildfire throughout the Americas and the world. Quite a victory for a little nation of 6.5 million people! We've succeeded where others failed. Guatemala lost by colonialist aggression. Bolivia even got as far as suppressing the army, installing agrarian reform, and nationalizing the mines—but it couldn't quite complete the job.

Meanwhile, throughout the world, the pillars of colonialism are crumbling. The people are united, not by religion, race, customs, or hunger, but by common economic and social misery and common zeal to do something about their lot. Bandung joined Asia and Africa. Now, Havana brings in colonial America.

The US eagle isn't going to sit still while we file down his claws, especially in his own back yard! He's probably right now calculating with his IBM machines all the risks involved. But what can he do?

He can wage economic warfare against us, stop selling us oil and buying our sugar; but we can trade with others. He can provoke some little Caribbean country to make war on us so he can intervene; but this won't work any more with the United Nations. He can assassinate our leader, but the Cuban people will rise in righteous wrath all the stronger. He can finance soldiers of fortune to launch a counter revolution, but we'll crush it quickly. We're in the 1960's and the tides of history are running with us. If he tries to land, we'll fight to the very last man.

Meanwhile, we are strengthening our revolutionary movement, keeping it clean of any deviations for personal gain, and developing collective work for collective ends. Thus relying on the Cuban people themselves, we'll emerge invincible!

US MC

# **planning**

# **a combined reserve**

## **exercise**

**By Maj P. E. Godfrey, USMCR**

IN THE SPRING OF 1955, AN ORGANIZED MARINE CORPS Reserve officer developed a training idea based on week-end drills at Camp Pendleton. This he presented to his company commander.

The major reviewed it thoughtfully for a few moments. "No chance for something like this," he finally replied. "District wouldn't buy the idea."

Without exploring the possibility further, a decision was made that resulted in four years of inferior training. It wasn't until the Commandant issued a directive on 1 October 1959, directing all units to conduct only multiple drills, that the old two-hour session was completely abandoned and real Marine-type training began.

Now another moment of decision is at hand for Organized Reservists. Should they continue to go it alone or band together with contiguous companies for field exercises? The 6th District is on record as favoring such training. Says the Assistant Director, LtCol C. E. Moore: "Because joint field exercises by organized units provide competition and association with other units plus a higher level of unit training, we encourage joint exercises involving three or more units. Four such exercises during the past year increased readiness, individual interest, competitive spirit, and unit and individual morale."

The 12th District also has made a giant stride in the same direction, granting permission for a combined field problem at Camp Pendleton. Designated Operation SCORE (Southern California Organized Reserve Exercise), it was conducted 5-6 November 1960. Participating were six companies, two gun batteries, and a staff group—approximately 85 officers and 950 men.

Such training is vital for mobilization readiness. Other units must include similar activities in their schedules. One word of caution, however. Tactical exercises of this nature represent advanced training. Individuals, units, and staffs should take part in them only after they have attained a reasonable degree of proficiency in smaller unit tactics.

The first obstacle to overcome in planning complex training is inertia. Someone must provide the initial nudge of activity. In the case of Operation SCORE, the idea originated with LtCol A. E. Isensee, Operations Officer of the 12th Staff Group (Los Angeles), LtCol Robert Walter, CO of the 15th Infantry Battalion (Santa Monica), and LtCol Vincent Harris, CO of the 8th 105mm Howitzer Battalion (Los Angeles). They presented the concept to Col Harry Traffert Jr., then commanding the 12th Staff Group, and Col J. A. Hefti, his ExecO. (Shortly thereafter Col Traffert completed his tour of duty and Col Hefti assumed command.)

### **Regimental Staff Organized**

All preliminaries and guidelines were established by these officers. Once in the formative stage, the 12th Staff Group organized a regimental staff for final problem planning.

The success of the exercise indicates a workable solution was developed. The following 10 steps were followed in coordinating details of Operation SCORE. While not fitting every situation, the basic stages and ideas provide an outline to properly direct the activity.



**LtCols J. S. Hightower (left) and B. K. Schwarz played key roles in Reserve Operation SCORE**

**(1). Develop a basic idea.** Since the combined problem will involve several units, ideas are pooled to point future action in the right direction. This calls for a preliminary planning conference, the purpose of which is to sound out group interest and develop specific guidelines. It is obvious you can't please everyone. Therefore, the conference should be select and not include all who will participate. Develop an agenda, select tentative dates and sites, determine the problem's scope, and make a decision on units to be invited.

**(2). Request authorization for execution.** A training device concerning more than one unit rightfully falls under jurisdiction of the interested MCR&RD. Acquaint the District with the basic idea and request permission to execute. The 12th District Director, Col M. M. Magruder, not only granted approval but enthusiastically endorsed the idea. He said: "Such combined exercises, properly planned and executed, provide an opportunity to apply field and simulated combat conditions to the units' training in order to raise the combat readiness of the individuals in the specialty involved, and to provide experience for the officers and non-commissioned officer in the employment of troops and material organic to the unit."

Another vital reason for obtaining District approval is the assistance it renders in liaison with possible participants, local reserve headquarters, and regular establishments, should the problem be conducted on a military base.

**(3). Select participating units.** Geographical factors present major limitations to selection. In some cases

units are so isolated that participation away from the home armory is impossible. In metropolitan areas, numbers sometimes exceed workable limits. A determination must be made early on the type of problem and training objectives. Once this analysis is completed, certain limitations are obvious. If augmented communications are vital, a communications company should be solicited. The same holds true for infantry, artillery, and all other specialized units.

A letter to COs stating the general nature of the problem, date and place of execution, and invitation to attend a conference is dispatched as early as practicable. Don't count on 100 percent participation, how-

**Instead of conducting separate training, Southern California Organized Reserve units last year teamed up for a joint exercise at CamPen. They learned a lot—and here's what**

## The first obstacle to overcome in planning a combined reserve exercise, the author says, is inertia. Once that's whipped, detailed planning is required. Here are 10 steps to follow

ever. For a variety of unknown reasons some COs are reluctant to commit themselves. One reply extolled the virtues of a home training area and said: ". . . under the circumstances it is felt that the training benefits derived (at home) would be much greater than joining in the combined exercise at Camp Pendleton."

From this it is evident all Marine officers do not share the same opinion as to value received from joint exercises.

(4). **Initiate liaison with regular establishment.** This presupposes the ideal situation where the field problem is conducted at a military base. If planned for county or state-owned property, signed clearance authorizing use should be sufficient.

The 12th Staff Group requested permission for direct liaison with Camp Pendleton. Once in receipt of authorization, short cuts became possible in all planning phases. The Commanding General, then MajGen Alan Shapley, was most cooperative, even to the extent of providing names and telephone numbers of Reserve Liaison and Training Section officers.

Some items requiring consultation were: selection of training area; communications call signs and frequencies; gasoline issue during problem; medical support; water supply; billeting key advance party personnel; and loan of miscellaneous organizational equipment.

All requests should be kept to absolute minimum. The regular establishment is ready and willing to give a hand. It is an imposition to expect them to smooth out minute details.

(5). **Organize planning conferences.** "The conference," says the Marine Corps Staff Manual, "is an important means of transacting staff business, as it provides an opportunity for the exchange of information and views among all parties interested in a problem." Through this medium, then, many worthwhile contributions become available to the commander which opens new avenues of approach.

If any one factor can be singled out as the most necessary, frequent consultation between major elements of command would be so designated. Time and space are supreme obstacles to unity among dispersed reserve units.

Every means of communications must be utilized—correspondence, telephone, staff conferences, commanding officers' conferences, inter-drill visits, staff briefings, and general sharing of information.

Four distinct types of conferences evolved during the course of Operation SCORE. These were:

*Exercise Development.* The original select planning group thrashed out details previously mentioned plus problem objectives, and initial date to begin preparations. The basic determination at this time was agreement on conducting the exercise and its type.

*Orientation.* All commanders whose units would

profit from such training assembled at the request of the planning echelon. The basic idea was explained, comments solicited. Finally a declaration of intent to participate was requested—to be followed later by confirming letter. Formalities are necessary to minimize future breakdowns in operating strength.

*Operational planning.* Unit commanders were encouraged to contact the general or special staff members directly in seeking information or resolving problems. In turn, the staff members planned their phase of the Operation Plan under direction of the S-3 and control of the CO. When significant information became available, it was dispersed orally or in written fragmentary form to interested parties. The success here depends a great deal on the ambition of individuals.

*Briefing.* The 12th Staff Group held seven briefing conferences during September and October 1960. These were either internal, with supporting units, the major infantry command, or the major Aggressor command. In some cases staff officers traveled 60 miles on a round trip to present essential information.

Where possible, graphical means are included in the conference material. This is especially true of maps and overlays, mimeographed charts, and photographs. The greater the sensory perception, the better the understanding.

The street doesn't travel in only one direction, however. Unit commanders are obligated to seek information they need, even if it means traveling to get such data. Success of the problem is paramount. LtCol Walter, previously mentioned as CO of the 15th Infantry Battalion, contributed a great deal to the planning for Operation SCORE by following this principle. He maintained close contact with the 12th Staff Group's S-3, LtCol Isensee. Many of the ideas ultimately incor-



Cols J. A. Hefti (left) and M. M. Magruder, 12th District Director, both favor combined training

porated into the problem originated from their association.

(6). **Prepare the operation plan.** The tactical planning that insures coordinated action is the operation plan. For any exercise the ideal situation will find a level of command above that of the participating units constructing such a document. By so doing, a necessary degree of reality is added.

Operation SCORE was primarily designed for a reinforced battalion. Consequently, the basic plan was constructed at regimental level. The participating elements were given live roles. Other elements needed to round out a regimental attack were constructive.

Operation SCORE could be repeated with the live battalion switching roles and carrying out the mission of units previously constructive. Thus one plan might provide a variety of experiences—a battalion attack as part of a larger force, a helicopter assault, or a mechanized sweep ahead of front line elements.

The combined reserve exercise follows standard staff procedures in operation development. They are:

*Initiate planning early.* Writing the plan will be a training exercise for the senior unit, just as its execution will be a training vehicle for participating units. All are hampered by time gaps between drill sessions. Three months for a staff group constitutes 24 drill hours; for a multiple drill battalion, 48 hours. Much must be squeezed into this time when all plans materialize.

*Reach basic decisions early and stick with them.* Among these are: type of exercise, general and special situations, execution dates, place, concept of operation, logistic and communication support, the uses of Aggressor forces.

*Disseminate fragmentary information.* With concurrent planning a necessity, firm items should be immediately passed on to subordinate units. This promotes a steady flow of data to all levels; none ever lags too far behind. Unconfirmed plans are withheld until approved. Enough problems exist without clouding the issue with ideas that may prove unacceptable to the CO.

*Publish a planning schedule.* With scattered participating units creating coordinating difficulties, a means of keeping pace with the developing situation is necessary. A simple outline listing check dates for completed planning serves the purpose. Once established, it is strictly followed.

*Make map and ground reconnaissance studies of the problem area.* Suitability of the plan is largely dependent upon appropriate terrain in which to operate within the scope of the problem. Once a general location is determined, the planning officer selects from the map the terminating point of the exercise. From here he works backwards, through various situation developments, to the starting point. By working back to front, better use is made of time-space factors. Now included are determinations on movement to and from the exercise area. Everything tentatively selected during the map study is ultimately confirmed by a physical reconnaissance.

*Prepare the general and special situations and the requirements for action.* This document places the problem in a tactical situation consistent with an overall strategic situation. It relates the need for action and

develops the initial battle scene facing combat units.

*Prepare the operation plan with appropriate annexes.* The results of all planning stages are found in the detailed five paragraph operation plan. Success or failure depends upon the care with which it is prepared. An omission, however slight, may disrupt the ultimate conduct of action. It must be published early enough for each level of command to develop its own succeeding plan.

(7). **Coordinate communications problems.** Equipment organic to companies and battalions meets the basic communications requirements for a combined reserve exercise. If Regimental Control, Problem Control, or Aggressor Headquarters are included, additional radios are needed. The participation of a communications company provides some assistance in solving this requirement.

Four coordinating problems must be solved in order to develop a sound communication plan. These are: preparation of the annex to the operation plan; procurement of proper equipment; effective distribution of the equipment; and assignment of call signs and frequencies.

A comprehensive annex does much to eliminate critical breakdowns. The officer responsible for its preparation works closely with all units, taking into consideration their operating limitations, level of training, and position in the problem. Frequent conferences unfold special situations to clarify before execution date. Upon this segment of the total plan rests a great deal of responsibility for successful action.

Procuring additional equipment proved to be a relatively simple matter for the 12th Staff Group in Operation SCORE. The 5th Communication Company (Long Beach) participated. What they couldn't supply Reserve Liaison and Training, Camp Pendleton, procured. Thus one more mark was chalked up in favor of holding the exercise at a regular base. For units outside the range of travel to such a facility, assistance of District Headquarters should be solicited.

Call signs and frequency assignments are coordinating items worth noting. Organizational equipment and identification is geared for local use. This does not coincide with combining the sets in another location. Some radios (AN/PRC-6) require different crystals for different frequencies. On the whole, early contact with



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the assigning agency eliminates later confusion.

(8). **Coordinate transportation and supply.** The 12th District established definitive lines for logistic support of the problem. They stated: "(1) Each unit Commanding Officers will arrange for transportation and logistic support for his unit; and (2) Hiring of commercial transportation, where required, will be within the individual unit planning limitation authorization. Units requiring increases must make appropriate requests to this Headquarters."

This falls in line with the total concept of problem participation. While designed to give combined tactical experience, it is also constructed for unit training in matters important to their existence. Consequently, each organization furnished rations and heat tabs, sleeping bags, and organizational supplies and equipment.

The coordinating echelon assumes responsibility for procurement over and above the capabilities of unit provision. The 12th Staff Group arranged through Reserve Liaison and Training, Camp Pendleton, for the issue of regimental headquarters tents, additional communications equipment, flashlights, whistles for umpires, message books, ambulance and utility trucks, blank ammunition and pyrotechnics, water trailers, and gasoline for use during the conduct of the problem.

(9). **Develop a plan for conduct and control of problem.** Three ingredients are essential to any tactical exercise: realistic situations, enemy representation, and adequate control. Omitting any of these items lessens total effectiveness.

Realistic situations are encouraged by having a sound tactical structure, developed through the general and special situations, the task organization, and the operation order. The training area will stimulate or minimize realism, depending upon its adequacy. All are dwarfed in importance, however, by the attitude of the participants. They will project vitality into the play of the problem only in proportion to their interest and enthusiasm. This is especially true of officers and NCOs. As they go, so go the troops.

Artificial aids to realism also play an important part. Blank ammunition, smoke, pyrotechnics, sirens, whistles, and atomic simulators more nearly imitate battle conditions than utter silence. While adding to the planning burden, they pay dividends in creating a worthwhile training activity.

With a war situation at hand (but minus the bullets) certain control procedures are necessary. Means of assessing casualties, slowing or speeding the play, maintaining separation between Aggressor and friendly units, and evaluating results are important aspects of the problem. For such a task an umpire group is formed.

Operation SCORE contained a regimental problem

control headquarters to coordinate all umpire activities. These activities included preliminary training, assignment to subordinate units, preparing the problem control order, serving as the senior umpire echelon, and maintaining an up to the minute plotting board.

In order to maintain a time-space constant for problem length, a sequence of events is also developed. This is a script outlining major activities and their time of occurrence. Without such a control device objectives may never be reached or may be overrun so early in the exercise that termination would be necessary. While an important measure, it is well to realize that absolute adherence takes away spontaneous action by unit leaders. The primary aim is to pace the action, not stifle ingenuity.

The remaining control naturally falls upon various levels of command, from regimental headquarters down to fire team. Their techniques follow standard command post procedures, command relationships, and troop leading steps.

(10). **Evaluation and critique.** Instructional value of a problem is lost if means are not initiated to critically analyze its conduct. Major responsibility here rests with the senior control echelon. Lower units also contribute, however, in order to improve future planning.

The areas covered are related to objectives originally established. Common to all would be: fire and movement technique; assault aggressiveness; conduct of offense and defense; prisoner handling; patrol action; collection of intelligence information; terrain coverage; effective use of all communications; response to orders; observing safety regulations; control by troop leaders; and use of supporting arms.

A mass critique following the problem is of questionable value, especially if the action has continued overnight. Minds will be less responsive to evaluation than at a later date when COs, control officers, and the senior echelon discuss salient points with fresh, retrospective thinking.

These ten planning steps produce a logical approach to a combined reserve exercise. They are presented, however, more as a springboard to original thinking than as an all-inclusive guide to follow. No exercise provides all answers to every combat training problem.

The real hope is that reserve officers everywhere will see the necessity for field training away from the home armory. We need well-trained Marines. Nowhere can training be more effectively achieved than in combined unit action.

The situation can be summed up by quoting Col J. A. Hefti, CO of the 12th Staff Group, who said, "You don't function together as a group until you work together as a group." USMC

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★ ★ ★  
**Put Up Your Dukes**

The redheaded staff sergeant ended his earnest and somewhat profane instructions on uniform regulations by showing the proper way to wear the tie. Hardly had he finished when one of the PLC students got to his feet. "Sergeant," he asked, "Are we allowed Windsor knots?" The noncom's glare was geared to wilt his brash and hapless questioner. "You guys," he snapped, "won't wear nothin' you ain't issued."

\$15.00 to Capt D. C. MacMichael

**From the Director**



BGen W. T. Fairbourn

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Here's a "moment of truth" for the Regulars as well as the Reserves. There's no time for paper-bound procrastination. Once the balloon goes up, you fight side by side.

THE OLD AXIOM THAT BEGINS, "FOR WANT OF A NAIL . . ." holds just as much truth today as ever. For want of support for Marine Corps Reserve units at summer training, for example, much could be lost. Perhaps even the battle, as cited in the original maxim.

We have always received outstanding support for our reservists at annual field training. In fact, we have found that local activities, whether FMF, Force Troops, Base or Barracks, always do more than is expected of them to make this training the success it has become.

As the current session of annual field training draws to a close this month, it is apparent that support provided our Organized Reserve units in 1961 is better than ever.

This support takes many forms. It may be the extra hours of instruction to assure that each reservist leaves for home with the knowledge he received the maximum amount of training for his particular assignment. It may be the personal interest shown by regulars training side-by-side with a Reserve rifle company, recon battalion, or howitzer battery.

By lending their equipment and personnel, time and talents, to Reserve training, these regulars are demonstrating the same attitude of "oneness" that is more and more epitomizing the relationship between USMC and USMCR. At the same time, they are investing in some long term insurance. For, if and when mobilization comes, thousands of well-trained, ready reservists will be on line, augmenting and supporting the regulars. The dividends from the policy are always payable on demand.

The training reservists receive each summer is di-

rected toward instruction that ordinarily cannot be acquired at home armories. The firing of crew served weapons and vertical assault tactics are examples. At the same time, summer training is oriented with home armory training, in order that each may dovetail with the other. There is no room for hours of preliminary instruction which can be absorbed beforehand.

To fully appreciate the formula used to achieve this goal, take a quick glance at the number of hours spent in vital subjects which are unobtainable on the local level. Here's the schedule for a Reserve rifle company, training this year at Little Creek, Va.:

Rubber boat handling, water survival—11 hrs  
Night amphibious raid—11 hrs  
Heliteam drill—6 hrs  
Boat team/net training—6 hrs  
Landing exercises—30 hrs

In addition to the "special" training above, units spent the remainder of the two weeks on (1) perfecting communications techniques; (2) bayonet and grenade courses; (3) parades and reviews; (4) ship's tour; (5) LVT drills; (6) equipment maintenance; (7) critiques of training.

Anyone who thinks the training schedule is for appearances sake alone need only to spend some time with a Reserve unit. With just two weeks in which to burnish off any rough edges, there's no time for paper-bound procrastination.

Our regular units, by providing the means, are achieving their own end in turning out a force they have helped to mold.

USMC

# Combat Supply:



# WATER

By Col J. A. Donovan, Jr.

ALTHOUGH NOT A CLASS I SUPPLY ITEM, WATER IS usually delivered to combat units along with rations. It is naturally a most important and often critical item. Water is also heavy and bulky, requiring time-consuming processing and handling. Our water supply system hasn't changed much in years, but there are possibilities for improvement in equipment, procedures, and efficiency.

The basis of the Marine Corps' water supply system in the amphibious landing is the prescribed load of water carried in the individual's canteen and in each unit's five-gallon water cans.

Water resupply stems initially from the 400-gallon water trailers organic to the Marine division. The Service Battalion has 26 of these water trailers in its Light Support Companies. Subsequently, 12 water purification and supply points established by the division's Service Battalion provide a continuous resupply capability.

Although it appears on the surface that our water supply system is simple and satisfactory, the fact is that current Marine Corps procedures violate certain logistic principles and modern supply concepts.

The first violation is the principle that "the individual should be relieved of his combat load and his basic needs should be provided by an adequate logistic system." For some years, the Marine Corps has prescribed that *two* canteens be carried in the field. Thus we add two additional pounds of water to the individual's load

instead of developing means of resupplying his needs with a satisfactory system.

The two-canteen policy grew out of Marine experience in the tropic campaigns of WWII and the frantic July battles in the Pusan perimeter in 1950. Before that, Marines, like all other ground troops in the world, had for decades carried only one canteen. That, plus some water discipline, seemed to meet their needs. No other combat force today burdens its men with a second quart of water. Are Marines thirstier, or less rugged? Or are we making the men in a rifle company carry 201 additional quarts of water because we haven't solved the water supply system at the combat unit level? If the addition of two pounds to the individual's load is considered acceptable, it would be better taken up by ammunition.

#### One Canteen Per Man

Only in extreme heat is more than one canteen even desirable. Modern resupply capabilities don't justify the present allowance of a second canteen to each individual.

With the new 1/2-ton cargo carrier available for front line resupply, with helicopters available for emergency or fast unit resupply, and with proper employment of water cans and water trailers, the individual should be able to get along on one canteen.

Another logistic principle being violated is "minimum intermediate supply installations and man-han-

**Close readers of the Gazette's July logistics issue will have noticed omission of a combat supply item that no Marine can do without—water. We correct the situation here with a two-page article by the same author who wrote the introduction to last month's special issue**

dling of supplies." The Marine division carries a total of 9,464 five-gallon water cans. The infantry regiment has 1,867, of which each infantry battalion rates 594. These totals are far in excess of what can be mobile loaded in the prescribed load of organic vehicles. This means that at every echelon water cans in ground "dumps" will constitute water points. What could be more immobile? How are these cans to be moved without excessive manhandling?

For planning purposes, one gallon of water per day is required for individual Marines. In other words each man needs four canteens per day. One five-gallon can will resupply six men.

If an infantry battalion starts an operation with 1,184 quarts of water, or 296 gallons on its hips (one canteen each), and it needs an additional 888 gallons resupply during the first 24 hours, 177 five-gallon cans will be needed. This assumes no bulk resupply. It appears that the 594 cans now authorized an infantry battalion are more than are really required.

Considering the additional needs of approximately 26 water-cooled vehicles, a battalion's total water allowance should be in the neighborhood of no more than 200 cans. At two or three cans per  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer, 38 to 57 water cans can be mobile loaded in organic trailers. The rest of the battalion's packaged water will have to be manhandled and displaced in other supporting trucks.

Each forward unit needs a few five-gallon cans on

position. Available vehicles are used to transport empty cans to the water supply point. Empty cans are returned for full ones.

In helicopter movements and maneuvers, water supply will have to be via air transportable five-gallon cans to the landing zone. Subsequently the cans must be moved by individual carrier,  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck, or  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton carrier within the zone. Collapsible bulk containers and the expendable five-gallon containers of the future will help simplify this system.

During normal ground combat operations, the most efficient and mobile water carrier will continue to be the 400-gallon water trailer pulled by a  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck. These water trailers are no longer organic to infantry units.

#### **Trailers Most Efficient**

There are 74 trailer tanks in the division, most of them (26) concentrated in the Service Battalion whose Light Support Companies are responsible for water supply to the infantry regiments. It is certain that five to eight water trailers will be required to support each regiment in normal operations. This will be a continuous requirement. Should not water trailers be organic to the infantry units that need them, as in the rest of the division?

Certainly during occasional helicopter movements the heavy trailers can be left with the infantry rear echelon service and support group for subsequent link-up. However, most of the time, an infantry unit in the field will have a constant need for water trailers. Water trailers of course, are, the most efficient means of transporting water from supply points direct to forward units.

It appears then that a modern Marine amphibious water supply system should:

- Require that individuals carry only one canteen.
- Provide initial resupply from five-gallon containers carried in organic vehicles and transport helicopters, minimizing the use of packaged water in unit supply points; reduce present unit allowances of five-gallon cans.
- Use the latest developments in expendable or collapsible containers for both ground and air resupply.
- Employ a mobile unit resupply system with organic water tank trailers—each with a designated organic prime mover.


USMC



**Col. Donovan**, commissioned in '39 via the PLC Program from Dartmouth College, served with the 6th Marines during WWII. In '44 he instructed at Basic School, Quantico, and later attended Junior School. The Colonel commenced a three year tour as an Operations instructor at Senior School in '53. Other tours include: Asst G-3, 3dMarDiv; Industrial College, Armed Forces; and Hd, Plans Sect, Plans & Operations Br, G-4, HQMC. The author of numerous GAZETTE articles, he was transferred last month to 2dMarDiv.

# FMF 1965

## Proposed Organization and Major Equipment



## INFANTRY BATTALION

**CONCEPT**—Consists of a headquarters and service company and four rifle companies; is basic tactical unit of ground combat power, nucleus of BLT. When combined with other combat support and combat service units, it will form a battalion task group. Rifle companies are the basic units with which battalion accomplishes its mission.

**MISSION**—Same as Infantry Regiment, GAZETTE: Jul '61.

**COMMAND AND STAFF**—Same as Infantry Regiment, GAZETTE: Jul '61.

**COMMUNICATIONS**—Primary means is by voice radio down to squad level. Alternate communications via messenger (helicopter, vehicle, foot), wire and visual.

**INTELLIGENCE**—Organized to provide surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition on par with battalion firepower and its ability to maneuver. Information is collected by subordinate units as by-product of normal operations, translated into intelligence for use in making routine command decisions.


**FIREPOWER**—Organic battalion firepower includes medium mortars, 106mm recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and air defense weapons (Redeye). D/S artillery battery normally supports battalion.

**MOBILITY**—Same as Infantry Regiment, GAZETTE: Jul '61.

**LOGISTICS**—Compatible with mobility/combat power of battalion as nucleus for battalion task group. Rifle company carries basic load, makes internal supply distribution. H&S company provides other organic logistics.

**ADMINISTRATION**—Self-administration within battalion command group. In combat, battalion headquarters supports division administrative center for centralized control of personnel accounting and paperwork.

**SUPPLY**—Supply unit carries limited resupply for companies preloaded on Mechanical Mules.



**EDITOR'S NOTE**—Second in a series of articles designed to keep Marines up on proposed changes in FMF structure. These are recommendations by MCLFDC as a result of Troop Tests; HQMC has made no decision yet. Next month: Field Artillery.

## HQ CO INFANTRY REGIMENT

**CONCEPT**—Consists of regimental headquarters which directs/coordinates entire regiment; a communications platoon; company headquarters, employed mainly to provide internal administration, logistics, security and working space facilities for company.

**MISSION**—To provide regimental commander with facilities for effective command and control.

**COMMAND AND STAFF**—Company commander and small staff direct and control matters of administration, logistics and security.

**COMMUNICATIONS**—Internal communications limited to telephone and messenger service.



**FIREPOWER**—Small security section (19 Marines), armed with light infantry weapons, is capable of defending regimental CP against infiltration. No fire support at regimental level.

**MOBILITY**—Basic means of ground mobility is by foot. Quarter ton trucks, amphibian trailers, and Mechanical Mules provide transportation for electronics gear, limited number of regimental headquarters group, limited amounts of internal supplies. Vehicles are helicopter transportable, compatible with LVT, trucks, fixed wing aircraft and ships.



**LOGISTICS**—Internal supply distribution. Service platoon carries only authorized allowances. Other supplies, maintenance, medical support and transportation provided by division.

**MEDICAL**—Provides emergency treatment, prepares for evacuation by external means company casualties requiring hospitalization. Capable of operating field dispensary, exercises technical supervision of measures for prevention and control of disease.

**ADMINISTRATION**—Regimental headquarters monitors paperwork from subordinate elements to division, interjects when necessary for efficiency or tactical necessity.



# FMF 1965



## RIFLE COMPANY

**CONCEPT** — Consists of company headquarters, weapons platoon, three rifle platoons. Company normally operates as maneuver element of infantry battalion. It can work alone for short periods; with supporting elements may form task unit for special operations.

In the attack, frontage assigned company varies from 300 to 500 meters.

In the defense, frontage assigned company varies from 1,000 to 2,000 meters.

**MISSION**—Same as Infantry Regiment, GAZETTE: Jul '61.

**COMMAND AND STAFF** — When company forms basic unit of task groupment, supporting unit commanders will have additional functions as advisers to company commander. FAC/AA team is attached for control of supporting aircraft and battalion local air defense weapons.

**COMMUNICATIONS** — Company voice radio net links with rifle and weapons platoon headquarters. Rifle platoon has organic tactical voice radio net linking platoon commander with subordinate and attached units.

**INTELLIGENCE** — Combat intelligence at company level linked to combat operations; processing limited to expediting information to battalion CP. No organic specialized reconnaissance or surveillance capability within rifle company.

**FIREPOWER**—Platoons have family of individual point-of-fire weapons and individual area type weapon system, assault and antitank capability. Weapons platoon has MGs for supporting fires in offense, hasty and deliberate defenses.

18 LAW provide assault fires against fortified areas and close-in antitank fires. Attached FAC/AA team provides local air defense weapons.

**MOBILITY** — Helicopter transportable but organically limited to foot mobility; small GP vehicles assist in moving basic combat load.

**LOGISTICS**—Based on unit distribution of supplies, simple supply procedures, pooled transportation, limited maintenance. Small supply section carries basic load, distributes supplies for company. Other supplies, maintenance, medical support and transportation provided by battalion or other external sources.

**ADMINISTRATION** — Self-administration in garrison; in combat supports battalion administrative center.

**TRANSPORTATION** — Seven Mechanical Mules for moving essential items.

## H&S COMPANY

### INFANTRY BATTALION

**CONCEPT** — Consists of battalion headquarters which directs/coordinates entire battalion; communications platoon; fire support units, service support units; company headquarters.

Communications, firepower, medical and service units play operational roles within battalion, are normally used in support of rifle companies.

**MISSION**—To provide battalion CO with facilities for command control. To provide limited fire and service support for subordinate units.

**COMMAND AND STAFF**—Same as Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment.

**FIREPOWER**—Light infantry weapons for defense of battalion CP against infiltration. Flame throwers are available from pool in CoHq to support other elements of battalion.

**MOBILITY**—Same as Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment.

**LOGISTICS**—Provided by battalion level service support elements.

**ADMINISTRATION**—S-1/Adjutant section does personnel accounting, paperwork for entire battalion (see Administration, Infantry Battalion).



**MEDICAL**—Battalion medical platoon provides emergency treatment, prepares for evacuation by external means all battalion casualties requiring hospitalization. Capable of operating field dispensary, exercises technical supervision of measures for prevention and control of disease.

**MAINTENANCE**—Capable of providing 1st echelon maintenance on assigned equipment; 2d echelon maintenance provided by service platoon on vehicles and ordnance (less fire control instruments); by communications platoon on CE gear; by S-2 section on AN/TPS-21 sets.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Provided from pool of small GP vehicles in service platoon. Vehicles are allocated within company for transportation of command, staff and liaison personnel, CE gear, crew-served weapons and their basic load of ammunition, flame throwers and fuel.

**SUPPLY**—Service platoon gets supplies from division, provides for distribution within battalion.

**MESSING**—Service platoon operates mess for entire battalion; when required, provides gear and cooks for limited company messes.





# OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment: \$30.

## CO/I&I Setup: Anomaly or Good Sense?

By Col W. W. Barron, USMCR

### WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE RESERVE unit CO/I&I relationship?

Changes are often suggested. One is to make the I&I CO. Another is for the I&I to be officially designated XO of the unit. Still another is to place the reserve officer CO on extended active duty. There have been and will continue to be other ideas on the subject. This is as it should be, if it is kept in mind that there is no magic in the form of organization adopted for any activity or endeavor.

It is people who get things done. People can do a fine job in spite of poor organization; but the best organization chart that the mind can devise cannot accomplish a task unless people make it work.

Boiled down, there are three threads of argument that support making a change.

- Most frequent is that there is at present a split responsibility between the CO and the I&I.
- Second, more often hinted at than expressed, is that the I&I, now usually a Regular officer, is better qualified to be the commanding officer.

• Third is that the Reserve officer CO must "live in the community" where the unit is located. Hence his forcefulness in dealing with poor performance, and with such problems as non-attendance at drills or Annual Field Training, is inhibited. Since the regular officer will be transferred elsewhere in a comparatively short time, he can be more positive in dealing with such matters.

There are persuasive counter-arguments.

First, there is no question as to who is responsible for the discipline, training, morale, and performance of the unit. The CO is. He is responsible for his unit to the same extent as is the CO of a unit in the Regular establishment. He *commands* the reserve unit and has all of the authority and responsibility that the term denotes.

The I&I advises, assists, instructs, and

inspects the unit. The fact that his "inspection" activities are usually in the form of suggestions to the unit CO makes them no less real. This technique of inspection is a normal and desirable relationship between two mature-minded officers engaged in a difficult joint endeavor who have a mutual respect each for the other and a desire to succeed.


A formal approach to "inspecting" the unit can be impressive, but there aren't enough hours in the day for the exchange of formal findings of fault and formal replies.

The I&I has no problem of "command by persuasion." In fact, he has no responsibility to *command* the unit. He commands the I&I staff. If at times the unit and I&I staff members seem to forget the distinction, that could be considered as evidence of a healthy attitude of cooperation.

It is no wonder then that LtCol Edward's unit CO was sulking in his tent at Annual Field Training (*One CO for Organized Reserved Units, OBSERVATION POST: June '61*) if the I&I had taken over his unit and was running it—although the CO might have found a better way to cope with the situation than childish pouting in seclusion.

The I&I assuming command (in practice if not in form) to prevent a debacle can be viewed as commendable initiative and foresight. But it's not complimentary to the common superior of both, the District Director (in the case of a ground unit), whose responsibility it is to relieve from their duties both unit CO's and I&I's when and if necessary.

The I&I may well be better qualified to command a military organization in a strictly military environment. But whoever commands a reserve unit promptly and frustratingly encounters the need for "command by persuasion." Effective command depends more upon "persuasion" than upon coercion and the ability to punish for infractions.



The "lines of authority" from higher authority to the Reserve Unit and I&I Staff are clear and simple.

Because of their civilian pursuits, reserve officers often are more accustomed to supervising—or commanding—with a minimum of real coercive powers than is the I&I, especially if the latter has had little or no staff experience where patience and the ability to compromise are essential virtues.

This leads to the third argument—the equivocation of the unit CO when positive and immediate action is indicated. It is not always "politics" that deters him from "lowering the boom."

Reservists are subject to the UCMJ only while on active duty (including active duty for training) and inactive duty training. It is no simple matter to "hold over" a reservist beyond the regularly scheduled training period in order to take action involving him under Article 15 or for action by court martial. The chronic offender knows this as well

as his counterpart in the regular establishment knows the many answers that affect him.

Except for "obligors," there is little the CO can do about non-attendance at training except remove the offender from the unit. When "the pressure is on" to maintain manning level strength, the CO soon adopts the philosophy of "salvaging" rather than one of summary firing of the border-line individual. For these reasons, the competent, old-time NCO is worth his weight in gold. His fierceness can be effective.

Some few units have achieved the happy situation of having a waiting list of people who want to join. They are

fortunate indeed—to have such fine leadership.

The CO-I&I apposition is not the anomaly it might seem at first glance. In fact, it bears a striking resemblance to the Navy/Marine Corps command relationship in an amphibious task force. In the latter subordination of one commander to the command of his "counterpart," except to a very limited extent as embarked passengers, is at a very high level. Perhaps a part of the genius of the success of the Marine Corps/Navy doctrine can be credited to a system which utilizes as much as it does the respective training, capabilities, and viewpoints of the landing force and naval commanders at lower echelons.

The reserve unit CO and the I&I might well use these principles as guides and as inspiration.

The present Reserve unit CO/I&I relationship does make sense. It introduces the professional Marine to an order of organization that he is bound to encounter if he goes very far up the promotion ladder. It gives the unit CO, and members of the unit, a constant reminder of the high standard of professional competence for which they should strive. And it places the effort to improve even more what is probably the finest non-professional military organization of them all on the basis of loyalty to the Corps and its missions.

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## One CO, One Staff—A Better Reserve

By Maj E. F. Penico

BRIEFLY STATED, the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide a trained force of qualified officers and men to be available in time of war or national emergency.

I second LtCol H. W. Edwards' motion *One CO for Organized Reserve Units* (OBSERVATION POST: Jun '61) but carry it a little farther.

The plan first and later the justification.

The I&I would be the CO of the reserve unit and his entire staff of regular Marines would hold the necessary key billets, i.e., 1stSgt, GySgt, Chief Clerk.

Major objection to having the I&I for CO seems to be that this is training for the officer acting as CO. I submit that a regular officer never gets an opportunity to train to be a CO. He is merely assigned and does the best he can by emulating the performance of duty of those officers under whom he has served. What better training could a reserve officer have than watching the qualified professional in action?

Another objection has been that the CO is a member of the civilian community whereas the I&I is not. The I&I, properly performing his duty, is a member of the community for his normal three year tour, available 24 hours a day as a Marine Corps representative. With the exception of the really small town, the I&I is better known than the CO.

The requirements during mobilization would be for an increased number of combat or combat support troops. In this connection the return in manpower would be greater if there were no attempt made to train clerks or supply

personnel. Under wartime conditions, in all probability, the move would be to battalion administration therefore obviating the need for more clerks. The I&I staff can and does handle these jobs adequately.

In conclusion, then, the single CO

and staff would provide a greater continuity of command with the best qualified people, both for training and performance in the key positions. Result: a better trained Reserve. USMC

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Articles Desired \_\_\_\_\_

Special Fitting Problems \_\_\_\_\_

Height \_\_\_\_\_ Pants Inseam \_\_\_\_\_ Seat \_\_\_\_\_ Cap \_\_\_\_\_

Weight \_\_\_\_\_ Neck \_\_\_\_\_ Sleeve \_\_\_\_\_ Glove \_\_\_\_\_

Waist \_\_\_\_\_ Chest \_\_\_\_\_ (outseam) Shoe \_\_\_\_\_

SHOE REPAIRING, USING O'SULLIVAN, AMERICA'S NO. 1 HEEL  
(ORTHOPEDIC WORK DONE)

MCG-8



## Why Aren't Drivers Good Mechanics?

By GySgt D. J. McManus

MOTOR TRANSPORT MAINTENANCE HAS always been a sore spot in the Corps. Lack of it affects our combat readiness and runs up our operating costs.

Let's take a look at some of the factors which adversely affect our maintenance effort. The amount of TE equipment on hand usually outnumbers actual working strength of a unit. There is a continuing lack of trained mechanics. I think the biggest factor though is a lack of mechanical knowhow on the part of the operator or driver.

Another factor is current FMF deployment with the fleet. The BLT is the basic element for this. Infantry battalion has quite a few platoons from separate battalions attached to it. Readiness inspections show these platoons have the necessary men, vehicles, and "mount out" spare parts to maintain them. Here is where the rub comes in. The vehicle operator in most instances isn't capable of installing the "mount out" spare parts on his machine. Even if he knew how, he doesn't possess the tools to do the job.

The United States is a mechanically minded country. Most people today

drive cars and generally do a little mechanical work. We aren't really expecting too much of a jeep driver then who just drives and cleans his vehicle.

Major breakdowns are caused in most cases because the operator doesn't know the functioning of his machine. He doesn't know what a slipping clutch is or what improperly adjusted brakes will cause. Until we expect and assign more responsibility to the man who operates the machine, we will continue to have maintenance problems.

Deadlines pile up because a driver can drop a vehicle off at a shop and then be assigned to drive another. It's a vicious circle. Make him do his own maintenance. If he isn't around to operate or repair his vehicle there would soon be a noticeable lack of available vehicles. No man, no machine. Put the vehicle in live storage.

I think the operator or driver should be responsible for all organizational maintenance on his vehicle. This includes all 1st and 2d echelon maintenance. This would include care, cleaning, lubrication, adjustment and minor parts replacement. He should be able

to keep it running unless it needs major repairs.

A machine gunner is responsible for keeping his weapon firing. He doesn't call an armorer to adjust the head space on his gun. A clutch or a brake adjustment on a vehicle is just as important to keeping it operating.

The present echelon of maintenance responsibility was designed by the Army. It may be okay for them and their large support type units. The Marine Corps needs more for its money. Training is the keynote. Train and expect more of the men and they'll take care of the machines.

With the operator performing 1st and 2d echelon maintenance, mechanics could be assigned to 3d and 4th echelon shops. This would help relieve the chronic shortage of mechanics and make better use of their skills.

The Marine Corps must continue to improve on its performance and give the most value for the money invested in it. This is one way of doing it. USMC

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## Why Truck Teams?

By GySgt F. E. Bousquet

I HAVE READ MANY ARTICLES IN THE GAZETTE which I felt were very beneficial and constructive to our Marine Corps way of thinking. But the article by Capt R. W. Badeker *Why Not Truck Teams?* (GAZETTE: Apr '61) doesn't qualify.

First, the unrealistic GySgt loading one truck at a time. If this is so, the immediate correction should be here. A realistic GySgt finds out from the company commander the number of trucks assigned. Next, it is common knowledge how many men are allowed per truck (the driver always supervises this) and a company gunny knows how many men are in his platoon. If, for any reason, this information is not known, call the platoon sergeants together and get the figures. Tell your platoon sergeants where the trucks are, how many each gets and you will have the trucks loading up at platoon levels, controlled,

supervised and hustled by the platoon sergeants.

What ever happened to the delegating of responsibility and authority? Why must a company commander make truck teams for a prompt and efficient loading? He is busy enough with other duties. If SNCO's can't handle or correct this sort of thing in their own company, something is missing.

As for the other points mentioned, let's bring up the fact that when trucks return to pick up troops—very seldom are the trucks returned in the same order, in some cases not even same trucks are returned. The motor pool has many problems without adding this one. A little flexibility is needed for assignment of trucks to other jobs. The marking of trucks (chalk) is unreliable due to possible darkness, and weather conditions (rain would wash off chalk marks).

Worthy of mention is the very busy S4 being added the extra duty of marking the trucks when the battalion or a lone company is going to move out in them. He is busy enough under present duties assigned when his battalion is moving out.

To sum this up, let's get away from encouraging battalion commanders, company commanders, and "S" Sections to take over and supervise or do jobs which can and should be delegated out by the necessary chain of command to reach the appropriate unit leader for the job in mind. Truck loading is definitely a platoon sergeant's job in conjunction with the gunnery sergeant. The only real working problem is loading—and if you use your platoon sergeants, there is no problem. USMC

MAD, NABTC  
Pensacola, Fla.

# First Aid for Ailing Marines

Sgt P. E. Duffy

If our Marine Corps is to uphold its record in the "next one" we have some doctoring to do.

There is no cure-all for many ills that beset us; each needs its own special treatment—first aid that every Marine has a hand in giving.

Where to start?

First, we must fight complacency. You've seen examples of the typical "no sweat" attitude. Particularly sick is the Marine who sees mistakes and fails to correct them. He waits for the mysterious "they" to square things away. This usually develops into a form of blindness called "see no evil." He doesn't see mistakes anymore because years of toleration have blinded him. His sweat glands are clogged.

Character, conduct, performance, and appearance of every man in this lashup affects each one of us. Those who cast blame in generalities, saying "the Marine Corps is all fouled up," are actually putting the shoe on the right foot. We are the Marine Corps. If something is wrong, it's because we helped to make it wrong.

• We begin our treatment by developing a sincere concern for our Corps.

Closely akin to complacency is negativism. This is nothing more than the old "can't do" spirit. Give an order to a Marine that requires a little more than he's used to and, if he's a "can't doer," he'll try hard to convince you it can't be done. It's the "can't do" attitude that's responsible for a weak training program, snafu supply, motor transport that's never on time, poor chow, and low *esprit de Corps*. A negativist looks for loopholes.

Best way to treat negativism is to march on its back azimuth. Treat an obstacle as a challenge, not as a dead end.

The more you force yourself to go beyond what you think are your limitations, the more you become capable of doing. Toes standing still get stepped on by "can do" Marines who have the will and determination to do a job. If your complaint is sore feet, keep moving.

• Second treatment: develop a positive approach and the drive to "do."

How about the guy lost in the "big machine" who is sure his effort, or lack of it, won't affect operations one way or another? He feels he's putting in time at a second rate job. "After all," he says, "the rifleman is the most important Marine. It's been screamed in his ear often enough that every

## THE AILMENT

**COMPLACENCY**—Often referred to as "No sweat." A form of astigmatism which if allowed to grow can cause total blindness.

**NEGATIVISM**—Causes spirits to sag, manifested by a "can't do" attitude, poor discipline.

**INFERIORITY** Most common among messmen, technicians, and Remington Raiders. Riflemen and machine gunners are frequently immune.

**DISHONESTY** — Non-endemic Often treated with sugar-coated pills of many kinds, e.g., "midnight requisition," "little white lie," "joy riding," "borrowing," "juggling."

**DEDILCTION**—(Not in the dictionary). Coined from Latin *dedicatus* (to declare) and *derelictus* (to abandon). Disease is marked by shorttime fever and compulsive declarations of "getting out" or "getting all I can."

Marine is basically a rifleman, that you're a Marine first, a messman second.

If a man is made to feel that he's in a second class billet, he'll turn out second rate work. Every job is important. If you don't think so, let troops eat off dirty trays and see how effective they'll be in the field.

Let an insignificant supply clerk at Barstow muff an order for radio spare parts and see how far a deadline AN/PRC-10 will transmit.

Let a mechanic whose skill is only secondary to his marksmanship foul up an overhaul on a 6x6. See who loses his mobility.

• Third treatment: consider every job important and do yours well.

The DI who tells his recruit to produce a lost bucket like a hen lays an egg is setting the stage for a habit becoming widespread in recent years: dishonesty. It's good for a DI to require more from a recruit than the lad thinks he's capable of doing, but to produce lost items in so unorthodox manner can be harmful in more ways than one. Flexible recruit usually finds a more convenient way to come up with lost bucket: from under someone else's rack. At the same time he's infecting his fellow Marines with petty theft.

Padding the score is another form of dishonesty that has crept into our Corps. Training reports may look good

## THE CURE

Take action against any wrongs you see that are hurting the Corps. Sweat a little. Recognize mistakes and try hard to correct them.

Force yourself. Overload your muscles as well as your mind. Go, go, go! Sweat some more.

Consider every job important and do yours "better than the man who gave it to you thought it could be done."

Be completely honest in all things you do, particularly with yourself. Don't pad the score. A cover up may get you off the hook but into the pan.

Take a personal inventory. Are you "getting" rather than giving. Rededicate yourself. Work hard at being a better Marine. Keep yourself clean and you'll be surprised how soon the whole Corps is germ-free.

on paper but often conceal weaknesses. Readiness reports may be beefed up to pacify unit receiving report. Keep two things in mind: One, purpose of report is to give a true picture. Two, paper tigers don't win battles.

Last minute rush to square away for IG reflects trend toward cribbing. Eleven months of the year some Marines spend clothing allowances on beer. Come IG there's a frantic rush to cash sales to bring basic issue up to snuff. Inspections of this sort are worthless. Paint covers a lot of sins but won't hold the house up.

• Treatment number four: be honest with yourself and others.

Every Marine belongs in one of three general categories: transients, careerists, professionals. They differ only in direction and degree of their dedication. Transient wants to get out of the Marine Corps. Careerist wants to get something out of the Marine Corps. But the true professional is primarily concerned with what he can give to the Marine Corps.

A healthy Marine Corps needs Marines who selflessly dedicate time and talent, if necessary, their lives to carry on traditions of honor, devotion, sacrifice and superlative performance that have made the name *Marine* synonymous with *elite*.



H&SCo, 2/9, 3d MarDiv  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.



# BASEPLATE Mc GURK



## Cpl Freeman packs his seabag for Parris Island while storm clouds gather in the Ale & Quail Club

"WELL! I'VE REALLY BEEN HAD!" TEX GRUMBLED, flopping on a chair.

"DI quota?" Dusty guessed. He got a curt nod in agreement.

"I volunteered Freeman," Dusty said quietly, "and I'm sure going to miss him. There's one real Marine!"

"Well, why volunteer him then?" Tex asked hotly. "I didn't volunteer anyone, but the Skipper still took my best squad leader!"

"Why do those characters at the Recruit Depots rate only the best NCO's?" I asked. "There isn't a billet in the FMF that isn't tougher than just herding a bunch of recruits around."

"Well, I won't go quite that far with you," Tex said, in a calmer voice. "But I do think Depots should receive a cross section of relative abilities in their NCO's —just as we do. What harm can some mediocre types do to a bunch of recruits anyway?"

"Nothing, except knock your readiness into a cocked hat," Dusty smiled.

"Bull!" Tex growled. "They don't give recruits any field training in boot camp. Just a bunch of close order drill and a lot of physical exercise. As far as I'm concerned, it's really just stuff to keep these new people busy while various administrative necessities are being taken care of. Like opening their records and all that jazz."

"Your idea of what it takes to turn a civilian into a Marine is a little naive," Dusty laughed. You ever talked to anyone involved in training recruits?"

"No, I haven't," Tex flared, "but those characters in 'Smoky-the-bear' hats really have somebody snowed! I'll bet that's the softest tour anyone can pull!"

Johnny Johnson, who had his oars until now, spoke up.

"On the blinking contrary!" he said. "I visited a classmate at PI last summer. Those DI's put in about 90 hours per week regularly."

"Furthermore," Dusty added, "just recognize the great variety of types they put up with. In a platoon of 75 recruits, you'll find everybody from college graduates to men with a fifth grade education. Some are mama's boys and some are dead-end-kids. Rugged athletic types, like me, stand next to lounge-lizards like Baseplate. You name 'em, they've got 'em. A good DI needs the patience of a saint."

"I'm in cahoots with them, there," I pointed out. "Look what I have to put up with under the 'brother officer' mantle!"

"And their job is to make them into basic Marines?" Johnny asked, ignoring my sage remark. "Why aren't we more selective at the recruiting end?"

"Oh, recruiters do O.K.," Tex spoke up. "I can understand it's hard to tell how a horse will buck until you put some pressure on him. Maybe I was a little hasty in my remarks. I can see the harm, and lasting bad effect, a bum DI could have on a platoon of potentially good Marines."

"I guess you're right," Johnny said. "I can also see Dusty's original point. If DIs don't weed out the weak sisters and develop good basic Marines, we'll have to do it in the FMF. What with everything else we have to do, our combat readiness would take a nose dive for sure! It's to our own best interest that we furnish the right kind of NCO to the DI quota."

USMC

## TOOLS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES

# Looking Ahead

### Robots for 1965

It's an unhappy fact that combat-rigged Marines plus their necessary supplies make too big a package for manned helicopters. Two reasons why:

- Limited number of helicopters and pilots
- Time, distance and speed

Something has to give; whether it's Marines or gear the effect is the same: restricted tactical capabilities.

Alternatives? There are five:

- Reduce logistical load even more than presently planned.
- Increase pilot-to-seat ratio or permit single pilot operation for round-the-clock operations.
- Use smaller basic assault units.
- More helicopters (which means more platforms, more pilots, more support from Navy).
- Add a supplementary cargo vertical lift capability.

Last choice—robot helicopters—appears to be best bet. It solves problems of too few Marines and machines, time, distance and speed. Also, problem of money.

Table 1 is a comparison of robots and manned helicopters using two of the most critical measures of effectiveness over a 50-mile radius: lift time and cost.

Table 2 shows assault load based on optimum helicopter capabilities during next five years. Help is indicated, the main reason why planners are interested in robots to handle part of the logistic load.

Ten years ago ONR (Office of Naval Research) began a program with Kaman Aircraft to study radio-controlled helicopters. Kaman came up with one which proved stable in flight and at least three other aircraft companies are working on developmental projects in this field. In short, major components of a robot cargo helicopter system have been tested. Such a system works.

Robots capable of carrying three-ton payloads over a 50-mile radius can be built. Robot would have twin turbines, twin rotors, weigh about 4,100 pounds, carry a gross weight w/fuel of 11,165 pounds.

Ground control package is mounted on single tripod, weighs 60 pounds, is 29 inches in diameter, 10 inches deep.

A RH Squadron would have 17 robot cargo helicopters (see cut next page) employ them much like a conveyor belt between ship and shore, making an 11-plane operational cycle. This number produces a smoother flow of cargo than any other number over 50-mile radius.

Time interval between robots is 10 minutes. This means six landings per hour after first hour, a delivery of 18 short tons per hour. Four 17-plane squadrons with 65% utilization rate could deliver 72 short tons per

(See Robots, next page)

#### COMPARISON OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS

(Table 1)

| System | HUS   | Robot | HRL(X) | Lift Time | *Cost |
|--------|-------|-------|--------|-----------|-------|
| Single | 120   | —     | —      | 147 hours | —     |
| Single | **120 | —     | —      | 103 hours | 1.19  |
| Single | 160   | 68    | —      | 104 hours | 1.34  |
| Dual   | 120   | 68    | —      | 57 hours  | 1.46  |
| Dual   | 120   | 102   | —      | 45 hours  | 1.68  |
| Single | —     | —     | 120    | 80 hours  | 1.89  |
| Single | —     | —     | 100    | 106 hours | 1.57  |
| Dual   | —     | 68    | 120    | 44 hours  | 2.34  |

\*Cost is for aircraft and Marines only, expressed in millions of dollars.

\*\*Assumes round-the-clock operation with 1.92 pilots per seat.

#### ASSAULT LOAD, SHIPPING AND LIFT

(Table 2)

| Marines  | BLT   | BLT   | BLT   | MAG(HR) &     | Totals |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|--------|
|          |       |       |       | Brigade Staff |        |
| Gear     | 1,380 | 1,380 | 1,380 | 1,380         | 5,520  |
| Lift a/c | 30    | 30    | 30    | 30            | 120    |

\*Tons.

\*\*Most probably a mixture of HUS and HR2S but total sustained lift would not exceed that of 30 HUS.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

(Used in computing Tables 1 and 2)

- Order of unloading: Assault BLTs, their supplies and gear, brigade staff, MAG (HR), their supplies and gear.
- An 80 percent utilization of helicopters.
- Night operations are 75 percent as effective as daylight operations.
- 25 percent of helicopters are used tactically ashore after initial landing.
- Six HUS make up an LPH flight.
- Payloads: HUS—12 Marines or 3,000 lbs of cargo.  
HR2S—25 Marines or 5,800 lbs of cargo.  
HRLX—20 Marines or 4,500 lbs of cargo.
- Pilot-to-seat ratio: 1.25:1; two pilots are needed to operate each helicopter.
- Ship-to-shore radius: 50 nautical miles.

**EDITOR'S NOTE**—"Robots for 1965" is a condensation of a study made by Dr. A. L. Slafkosky, operations analyst, G-4 Development Branch, HQMC, which examined tactical/logistical problems connected with vertical assault.

HRL(X) referred to in Table 1 has since become HRB-1, newest Corps helicopter (by Vertol), slated to replace HUS. See "Looking Ahead" April '61.



**Kaman robot helicopter**

### **Robots, Contd**

hour. Knock off 25% for night operations and you would still have 1,452 tons of cargo on the beach in 24 hours.

Need more amphibious shipping? No. Both LSD and LPD have room on deck for 17 robots with space for 18-foot wide pathways for cargo movement to pickup spots.

By using space between structural members on hangar deck, LPH could carry 17 robots along with manned helicopters.

### **Hard Hats**

MCLFDC has recommended a replacement for tank helmet, MC-1. Proposed new headgear for tracked vehicle crewmen is made of compressed Nylon impregnated with plastic resin. In tests it provided protection against fragment penetration with a velocity of 1450 feet per second. Unit cost w/headset microphone is about \$100. Gentex Corporation makes.

### **Unmentionables**

Heavyweight knit cotton field underwear showed up well in troop tests (by 1stMarDiv during SNOWFEXs, Marines taking part in Operation Deep Freeze in Antarctica), may some day replace standard Long Johns for use in cold-dry, cold-wet climates.

Shirts are white, open-mesh knit cotton, with  $\frac{3}{4}$  length sleeves.

Drawers are of same fabric, ankle length w/all-around elastic waist band.

Cold weather tests determined that new type, lighter underwear is warmer, shrinks less, dries quicker; is easier hand-laundered, costs less than underwear now in use.

### **BLT Recon Drones**

Battalion commanders needing to know what's on the other side of the hill rely mostly on recon patrols. Situation may change. G-2 planners report progress toward getting a cheap, lightweight BLT reconnaissance drone. An ONR (Office of Naval Research) study contract with Republic Aviation expiring in June, has been renewed with contract to build two 35-lb prototype drones.

Also, a check of Ryan Aeronautical Company's "Flex-wing" concept has green light. Concept calls for mounting a V-shaped wing on top of drone (or aircraft), increase its lift capability. This means power plant for drone can be smaller, reducing weight without sacrificing range and speed.

Planners are intrigued with the idea, have contracted with Ryan to apply flex-wing concept to BLT-size drone.

### **Air Shelters**

Air-supported shelters for use as advance base storage, repair shops, protection for Radar Set AN/TPS-15 didn't make the grade during first tests by MCLFDC. Reasons: need for continual power source to keep inflated, and configuration which presented a high silhouette. Recommended: Keep looking since basic principle of air shelters is sound, closely monitor work being done in this field by US Army QM Research and Engineering Command, Natick, Mass.

### **Moving Tank Targets**

Testing of a "new" moving target system which simulates attacks by hostile troops and vehicles is going on at CamPen. (MCA NEWSLETTER: Mar '60).

Called "polydrive" the completely mobile system pulls small target sleds through firing areas at speeds ranging from 1 to 25mph.

1stAntiTkBn Marines are running tests, built their own sleds carrying two targets mounted at right angles so that target stays in full view of gunner during direction changes.

Polydrive, a product of West Germany, has a bonus feature: it's cheap, costs \$6,500 vs a quarter of a million for some permanent, moving target ranges.

### **Field Teletype Bought**

Marine Corps is buying \$2 million worth of portable teletypewriters from Mite Corporation, Paramus, N. J. MITE weighs 32 lbs, operates at speeds up to 100 words per minute; can be carried on a packboard (see MCA NEWSLETTER: Mar '60) ..

### **Saving a Ton**

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company is working on a plastic tank wheel that will reduce weight of M103A tank by more than a ton. A steel tank wheel weighs 155 lbs. New assembly, including wheel, steel rim for heat dispersion, solid rubber tire, will be only half as heavy.


### **'Copters in Canada**

Two Vertol 107 helicopters similar to HRB-1 being built for Marine Corps (LOOKING AHEAD: Apr '61) have been ordered for Royal Canadian Air Force. Mission: primarily search and rescue.

## **Underwater Helicopter**

A one-man "helicopter" that performs under water has the eye of MCLFDC planners for possible use by recon swimmers. They'll run field tests (in Potomac River) to see how well the device can tow a full-rigged combat swimmer under water.

The prop-driven sea tow is not new; several types already on the market are getting a big play from underwater sportsmen. USMC bought two models (Bludworth Marine "Power Divers"), for testing and evalua-



**Seagoing Marine**

tion as a recon tool. The device is cigar-shaped, measures 43x12 inches, small enough to fit submarine escape hatches. It's battery-powered, pulls a SCUBA-clad swimmer (190-lb man) up to 1.3mph. Speed, planners say, is not essential. These qualities are:

- extend range of recon swimmers
- conserve their strength for work ashore
- make for easier rendezvous with submarine

Commercial models need some modifications for recon use, i.e., they should have built-in sonar, improved batteries (for longer range).

MCEB has qualified SCUBA Marines to work out the bugs.

## **Fireless Heater**

A flameless, fuel "burning" heater shows promise as a warming device for individual Marines. CMC has asked MCLFDC to determine if the item is suitable for Marine Corps use. Thirty seven heaters, in three sizes, have been procured from Fannon Products, Division of Hupp Corporation, Detroit, shipped to MCEB for testing.

Fuel doesn't actually burn, it's oxidized below point of ignition by means of a catalytic asbestos mat, studded with platinum chips. Fumes from naptha, kerosene are absorbed by the platinized asbestos mat; resulting chemical reaction produces infra-red heat of about 660 degrees. Heat is transferred to any metal object placed in contact with the mat.

Catalytic heaters were used extensively by German Army in WWII, have these features:

- compact (any size or shape can be made; smallest test item resembles Aladdin's lamp, is 8"x6"x7", weighs six pounds. Largest test item weighs 30 pounds).
- economical (smallest test items holds one quart of fuel lasting 30 hours).
- safe (emits no carbon monoxide, is non-explosive, produces no glow).

Some possible uses:

- Keep hands warm for finger dexterity when performing maintenance on weapons, aircraft, vehicles, etc.).

- Warm shelters and foxholes
- Heat rations
- Warm engines for quick starts

## **LPD: Boon to BLT**

**Background:** First amphibious ship types were LST (Landing Ship, Tank) and LSD (Landing Ship Dock); merchant ships were converted to APA (Attack Transport) and AKA (Attack Cargo).

These were the carriers for Marines and gear in WWII; remained the backbone of amphibious operations until 1957 when LPH (Amphibious Assault Ship, Helicopter) was introduced. Then, as now, amphibious task forces were composed of a large number of specialized ships.

Now comes LPD (Amphibious Transport, Dock) which stows supplies, tanks, vehicles, landing craft, helicopters—and Marines—in one hull. BuShips' designer David J. Barry conceived the idea of LPD, patterned it on the underwater hull of LSD. Basic concept is centered around the "balanced force" or BLT.

Three LPD are being built (MCA NEWSLETTER: Feb '60). LPD-1, slated for launching in September, already has a name: *USS Raleigh* (OBSERVATION POST: Aug '60). Many more LPD are planned.

Here's a brief briefing on the ship that promises to play a big part in future amphibious operations

• Internal arrangement is completely different from LSD, accommodates comfortably many more Marines than LSD or LST. A significant item: Three afloat BLTs are now each split aboard one LSD, one APA.

• LPD off-loads 400 tons of palletized cargo an hour in four simple steps: via 1) fork lift to 2) vertical conveyor (similar to dumb-waiter) to 3) well deck where bi-railed overhead cranes lower it into boats or 4) to flight deck where more fork lifts put it aboard helicopters.

• Vehicles move from lower deck under their own power via a series of ramps.

## **Clearing Mine Fields**

Good news for landing parties:

A project to convert unserviceable LVTP-5s into minesweepers has the green light. BuShips is asking bids on converting 19 vehicles this fiscal year; planners hope eventually to have 55. The Corps' first bona fide mine clearance vehicle already has a name. It's LVTE-1.

Modified 44-ton LVT (conversion adds nearly 10 tons to weight of amtrac) serves as anchor for a line charge projected by rocket 300 feet in front of the vehicle. Line is nylon, contains chunks of C-2 linked like sausages along its entire length. EOD crewmen set off the charges by pushing a button, blowing a wide path through the mine field.

A sawtooth blade attached to front of the LVT cleans away debris, also harmlessly explodes anti-personnel mines. Flotation tanks prevent heavy blade from foundering in the water.

Vehicle will have air-cooled engine, extra armor, an elevator for positioning line charge for firing.

Plans call for a platoon of 12 vehicles to be attached to each AmphTracBn for use of EngBn.



|                              |         |                      |       |                      |         |                           |         |
|------------------------------|---------|----------------------|-------|----------------------|---------|---------------------------|---------|
| <b>Reber, J. J.</b>          | 2502    | Fiske, R. F.         | Jul   | Alexander, L. G.     | 0302    | Goldston, E. V.           | 7307    |
| Fr PacFit Pearl              | WDAug   | Foust, H. L.         | Jul   | Fr HQMC              | 0302    | Fr 1stMAW                 | WDAug   |
| To 3dMarDiv                  |         | Friend, C.           | Jul   | To Univ of Md        | By18Sep | To MAD NATTC MFS          |         |
| <b>Reece, J. I.</b>          | 1803    | Goodyear, Jr., H. J. | Jun   | Artinak, E. J.       | 7304    | Gover, Jr., R. L.         | 7335    |
| Fr 3dMarDiv                  | WDAug   | Hallquist, D. C.     | Jun   | Fr 2dMAW             | 0302    | Fr 2dMAW                  |         |
| To MCB CamPen                |         | Hoonan, R. S.        | Jun   | To 1stMAW            | By13Sep | To USS Iwo Jima           | By21Aug |
| <b>Regan, D. J.</b>          | 0302    | Hutchison, T. B.     | Jul   | Beverly, A. C.       | 3502    | Grant, H. L.              | 0130    |
| Fr Ft Knox Ky                | WDAug   | Jennings, W. E.      | Jul   | Fr ForTrps FMFPac    | WDAug   | Fr FMFPac                 |         |
| To 3dMarDiv                  |         | Johnson, G. M.       | Jul   | To UCLA LosA         |         | To HQMC                   | By1Sep  |
| <b>Riley, D.</b>             | 7333    | Jones, C. H.         | Jun   | Black, A. A.         | 7304    | Hall, W. C.               | 0802    |
| Fr 1stMAW                    | WDAug   | Jorgensen, R. L.     | Jul   | Fr MCAF New River    | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv               | WDAug   |
| To MCAF New River            |         | Kanusas, A. A.       | Jul   | To 1stMAW            |         | To 1stMarDiv              |         |
| <b>Robichaud, Jr., C. J.</b> | 0302    | Kew, T. J.           | Jul   | Blue, M. M.          | 0302    | Hall, W. L.               | 6302    |
| Fr MAAG Vietnam              | WDAug   | Kokenes, W. L.       | Jul   | Fr MB Miramar SDiego | WDAug   | Fr 2dMarDiv               |         |
| To MCB CamLej                |         | Kubal, G. F.         | Jul   | To 1stMarDiv         |         | To Harvard Univ           | By1Sep  |
| <b>Ross, T. J.</b>           | 7335    | Lawrence, W. J.      | Jun   | Bodley, C. H.        | 0302    | Halliday, M. G.           | 0302    |
| Fr Okla State Univ           | WDAug   | Lawson, D. G.        | Jun   | Fr 12thMCRD          | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv               | WDAug   |
| To 3dMAW                     |         | Little, R. W.        | Jun   | To Seal Beach Calif  |         | To 3dMAW                  |         |
| <b>Roth, M. C.</b>           | 0302    | Mattingly, J. F.     | Jun   | Campbell, W. W.      | 7305    | <b>Hamilton, R. W.</b>    | 2502    |
| Fr CincUSNavEur              | WDAug   | Mockil, F.           | Jun   | Fr 1stMAW            | WDAug   | Fr HqBn HQMC              | WDAug   |
| To MCS Quant                 |         | Murnane, J. P.       | Jul   | To CNAVANTRA CorpC   |         | To MCS Quant              |         |
| <b>Saunders, D. G.</b>       | 0302    | Murphy, Jr., J. A.   | Jul   | Chambers, C. B.      | 7335    | <b>Hargett, E. C.</b>     | 6302    |
| Fr 1stMarDiv                 | WDAug   | O'Neill, J.          | Jul   | Fr 1stMAW            | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv               | WDAug   |
| To ComFirstFlt               |         | Owen, Jr., C. B.     | Jul   | To 3dMAW             |         | To Ft Leavenworth         |         |
| <b>Sawyer, A. H.</b>         | 0302    | Parker, G. B.        | Jul   | Chapman, F. D.       | 1802    | <b>Henn, H. L.</b>        | 7333    |
| Fr FMFLant                   | By1Sep  | Patterson, R. E.     | Jul   | Fr HQMC              | 0302    | Fr 2dMAW                  | WDJun   |
| To Ohio State Univ           |         | Price, O. H.         | Jun   | To Univ of Omaha     | By15Sep | To MARTC NAS LosAlam      |         |
| <b>Schmidt, C. E.</b>        | 7333    | Quint, R. W.         | Jun   | Coffman, Jr., R. P.  | 0302    | <b>Holt, T. J.</b>        | 0802    |
| Fr 4thMarDiv                 | WDAug   | Rause, R.            | Jul   | Fr Univ of Omaha     | WDAug   | Fr War College Npt        |         |
| To 3dMarDiv                  |         | Reed, Jr., R. J.     | Jun   | To Univ of Wisc      |         | To Univ of Md             | By18Sep |
| <b>Shafer, W. T.</b>         | 1803    | Ross, K. S.          | Jun   | Condra, J. E.        | 3502    | <b>Hoover, Jr., M. M.</b> | 2502    |
| Fr 1stMarDiv                 | WDAug   | Schutter, A. R.      | Jul   | Fr 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr San Miguel             | WDJul   |
| To MCB CamPen                |         | Scripture, J. T.     | Jul   | To St College SDiego | By12Sep | To ForTrps FMFLant        |         |
| <b>Smyth, F. H.</b>          | 7307    | Sonorant, E. L.      | Jul   | Cook, W. L.          | 4130    | <b>Horner, B. E.</b>      | 2502    |
| Fr 1stMAW                    | WDJul   | Stone, R. T.         | Jun   | Fr MCS Quant         | WDAug   | Fr HQMC                   | WDAug   |
| To MCAS El Toro              |         | Stone, E. J.         | Jun   | To 1stMAW            |         | To 1stMAW                 |         |
| <b>Stampfli, F.</b>          | 0802    | Thompson, W. B.      | Jun   | Coplan, R. D.        | 7335    | <b>Huffstutter, H. V.</b> | 7333    |
| Fr NavPhib NorVa             | WDAug   | Tomes, L. A.         | Jun   | Fr 1stMAW            | WDAug   | Fr 4thMarDiv              | WDAug   |
| To FMFLant                   |         | Torgerson, R. E.     | Jul   | To 2dMAW             |         | To 1stMAW                 |         |
| <b>Tulipane, T. T.</b>       | 7333    | Wallace, G. M.       | Jun   | Cox, Jr., S. A.      | 0302    | <b>Hunter, C. W.</b>      | 1802    |
| Fr AirFMFPac                 | WDAug   | Webb, J. R.          | Jul   | Fr NAC Korea         | 0302    | Fr MCRC SDiego            |         |
| To 1stMAW                    |         | Whipp, J. H.         | Jun   | To MCS Quant         | By22Aug | To Univ of Omaha          | By15Sep |
| <b>Utz, J. W.</b>            | 0202    | Williamson, R. D.    | Jun   | Craig, J.            | 1803    | <b>Johnson, R. E.</b>     | 0302    |
| Fr Ft Holabird Md            | WDAug   | Williams, Jr., B. H. | Jul   | Fr 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr MAAG Korea             | WDJul   |
| To 3dMarDiv                  |         | Writer, C. P.        | Jun   | To MCS Quant         |         | To MCS Quant              |         |
| <b>Venn, R. H.</b>           | 0302    | Zygadlo, R. J.       | Jul   | Fr LFTUPac           | 0302    | <b>Johnson, T. N.</b>     | 7335    |
| Fr HQMC                      | WDAug   | <b>Retired</b>       |       |                      |         | Fr US Taiwan DefComd      |         |
| To 2dMarDiv                  |         | Adams, S. M.         | 0302  | To 1stMarDiv         | 0302    | To Univ of Omaha          | By14Sep |
| <b>Wilson, R. S.</b>         | 0802    | LFTUPac              | 31Jul | Fr FT Sill Okla      | 1802    | To NROTC Brown Univ       | WDAug   |
| Fr HQMC                      | By18Sep | Hogue, R. M.         | 0302  | To Univ of Omaha     | 0302    | Fr MAAG Rep of China      |         |
| To Univ of Md                |         | Offutt AFB Nebr      | 31Jul | Fr Ft Sill Okla      | 0302    | To 1stMarDiv              | By1Sep  |
| <b>Yerkes, R. W.</b>         | 0302    |                      |       | To Univ of Omaha     | 0302    | Kagan, J. J.              | 0802    |
| Fr 3dMarDiv                  | WDAug   |                      |       | Fr ForTrps FMFLant   | 0302    | Fr NROTC Brown Univ       |         |
| To MCS Quant                 |         |                      |       | To 1stMarDiv         |         |                           |         |

### **Permanent Promotions**

| <b>TERMINATED PROMOTIONS</b> | <b>Poindexter, J. W.</b> | <b>0301</b> |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| Adams, P.                    | Jul 3dMAW                | 30Jun       |
| Goare, H. G.                 | Jul Reid, W. G.          | 0130        |
| Haddock, J. C.               | Jul 1stMarDiv            | 30Jun       |
| Martin, V. R.                | Jul                      |             |
| Metz, A. A.                  | Jul Slappey, Jr., W. J.  | 7335        |
| Mearns, W. D.                | Jul Ofc CNO              | 30Jun       |
| Nolte, W. L.                 | Jul                      |             |
| Parham, B. L.                | Jul Thompson, Jr., R. B. | 0302        |
| Pines, G. L.                 | Jul HQMC                 | 30Jun       |
| Roscoe, A. J.                | Jul                      |             |
| Shawyer, D. J.               | Jul                      |             |

## **Temporary Promotions**

| Temporary Promotions   |     |
|--|-----|
| Austin, M. S.  | Jul |
| Barrineau, W. E.   | Jul |
| Cooper, M. B.  | Jul |
| Davis, Jr., G. L.  | Jul |
| Deasy, R. A.   | Jul |
| Fallion, E. B.   | Jul |
| Fellingham, R. J.  | Jul |
| Graham, P. G.  | Jul |
| Hill, A. T.  | Jul |
| Holzbauer, J. F.   | Jul |
| Huntington, K. E.  | Jun |
| Johnson, T. D.   | Jul |
| Kellogg, W. C.   | Jul |
| Knocke, J. K.  | Jul |
| Laspada, J. F.   | Jul |
| Mariades, J. P.  | Jul |
| Norton, L. C.  | Jul |
| Poor, E. E.  | Jul |
| Quay, Jr., J. E.   | Jul |
| Remington, E. F.   | Jul |
| Slay, R. D.  | Jul |
| Weidner, J. M.   | Jul |
| <b>Barnett, J. E., Legal Officer, MCAS, Beaufort</b>                         |     |
| <b>Barnum, A. R., CO, VMA-234, NAS, Minneapolis</b>                          |     |
| <b>Bauman, G. F., DivAv, HQMC</b>  |     |
| <b>Carrington, G. W., Jr., G-3 Div, HQMC</b>                                 |     |
| <b>Cox, D. M., G-4, MCB, 29 Palms</b>  |     |
| <b>Gray, G. E., ISO, MARTC, NAS, Glenview</b>                                |     |
| <b>Harris, D. R., Jr., DivAv, HQMC</b>                                       |     |
| <b>Malcolm, J. W., Jr., G-4, ForTrps, 2dMarDiv, MCB, CamLej</b>              |     |
| <b>Ostby, J. L., Ofc Judge Advocate General, Navy Dept, Washington, D.C.</b> |     |
| <b>Prestridge, J. G., CO, VMA-331, MCAS, Beaufort</b>                        |     |
| <b>Prichett, C. H., Asst. Director, Personnel Procurement, SthMCR&amp;RD</b> |     |
| <b>Ryder, B. S., Stf, AirFMFPac, El Toro</b>                                 |     |
| <b>Williamson, H. J., Asst CofS, G-1,</b>                                    |     |

## **Temporary Promotions, Reserve**

|                         |     |                        |         |
|-------------------------|-----|------------------------|---------|
| <b>Aramovich, F. S.</b> | Jul | <b>Phillips, J. A.</b> | 7304    |
| <b>Bear, Jr., J. A.</b> | Jun | Crossville Tenn        | 23Jun   |
| <b>Bell, G. T.</b>      | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Black, M. M.</b>     | Jun |                        |         |
| <b>Booth, J. A.</b>     | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Bruchman, E. J.</b>  | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Cabe, L. S.</b>      | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Cameron, E. D.</b>   | Jun |                        |         |
| <b>Capron, H. E.</b>    | Jun |                        |         |
| <b>Chapman, R. C.</b>   | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Christie, J. M.</b>  | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Christian, N. G.</b> | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Costos, G.</b>       | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>Daugherty, F. W.</b> | Jun |                        |         |
| <b>Donner, W. E.</b>    | Jul |                        |         |
| <b>File, J.</b>         | Jul |                        |         |
|                         |     | <b>Majors</b>          |         |
|                         |     | <b>Transfers</b>       |         |
|                         |     | <b>Adair, H. F.</b>    | 3002    |
|                         |     | Fr HQMC                |         |
|                         |     | To Coll of Idaho       | By17Sep |
|                         |     | <b>Albers, G. H.</b>   | 7332    |
|                         |     | Fr 1stMAW              |         |
|                         |     | To 2dMAW               | WDAug   |

Death

**Phillips, J. A.** 7304 Fr 1stMarDiv  
Crossville Tenn 23Jun To Colgate Univ  
**Fairchild, R. H.**



## **Majors**



### Transfers

|                      |         |                           |
|----------------------|---------|---------------------------|
| <b>Adair, H. F.</b>  | 3002    | To MCSC Albany            |
| Fr HQMC              |         | <b>Gibson, Jr., G. E.</b> |
| To Coll of Idaho     | By17Sep | Fr TACRON-12              |
|                      |         | To 3dMAW                  |
| <b>Albers, G. H.</b> | 7332    | <b>Goewey, B. A.</b>      |
| Fr 1stMAW            | WDAug   | Fr 3dMAW                  |
| To 2dMAW             |         | To 1stMAW                 |



|       |                                      |         |   |         |   |         |                                      |                        |
|-------|--------------------------------------|---------|---|---------|---|---------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 0802  | Fox, J. R.                           | 3502    | Marfa, S. J.                            | 0302    | Ryan, W. J.                                 | 6402    | Farman, E. E.                        | Jul                    |
| 55Sep | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr Camp S. D. Butler<br>To MCRD PISC    | WDAug   | Fr MAD NATTC<br>To 1stMAW                   | By5Sep  | Guibransen, J. G.                    | Jul                    |
| 7337  | Froncek, R. A.                       | 0802    | Marting, H. A.                          | 3010    | Salls, C. E.                                | 2502    | Hernandez, M.                        | Jul                    |
| 8Sep  | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr NABTC NAS Pncla<br>To Univ of Omaha  | By13Sep | Fr MCRS Portland Ore<br>To Portland St Coll | By25Sep | Leonard, B. L.                       | Jul                    |
| 0302  | Gallagher, J. T.                     | 7332    | McCluskey, C. A.                        | 0302    | Schmidlen, O. M.                            | 3130    | Mink, S. L.                          | Jul                    |
| Aug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To NABTC NAS Pncla      | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 3dMarDiv             | WDAug   | Fr 4thMarDiv<br>To ForTrps FMFLant          | WDAug   | O'Connor, M. F.                      | Jun                    |
| 3402  | Gibson, R. E.                        | 0802    | McDonald, O. G.                         | 7307    | Scott, W. M.                                | 3010    | Primeau, E. E.                       | Jul                    |
| SSep  | Fr USNA Anna<br>To USMA West Point   | WDAug   | Fr NAATC NAS CorpC<br>To 1stMarDiv      | By25Sep | Fr ForTrps FMFPac<br>To 1stMAW              | By18Sep | Rivera, C. S.                        | Jul                    |
| 0302  | Gidley, R. E.                        | 6302    | McCandless, J. R.                       | 1302    | Seller, D. F.                               | 0302    | <b>Retired</b>                       |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MD USS Boxer<br>To 2dMAW          | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 9thEngCo USMCR        | WDAug   | Fr MB NB Subic Bay<br>To Bowling Green Univ | By12Sep | Bond, W. K.                          |                        |
| 7307  | Gilbert, E. W.                       | 7335    | McCullough, J. D.                       | 0130    | Sexton, H. E.                               | 7335    | Bramel, R. E.                        | 31Jul                  |
| Aug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To CMAAS Yuma Ariz      | WDAug   | Fr 2dMarDiv<br>To 3dMarDiv              | By3Sep  | Fr 1stMAW<br>To MARTC NAS Bklyn             | WDAug   | Dryden, W. J.                        | 30Jun                  |
| 0802  | Gillis, Jr., J. A.                   | 0130    | Metz, J. G.                             | 0302    | Shepherd, J.                                | 1803    | Juba, G.                             | 1320                   |
| Aug   | Fr 4th MCRRD<br>To 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr 1st MCRRD<br>To MCB CamPen           | By3Sep  | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 3dMarDiv                 | WDAug   | MCRS Quant                           | 31Jul                  |
| 0302  | Gould, Jr., J. F.                    | 7302    | Metzko, J. J.                           | 7307    | Shirley, J. W.                              | 7335    | Justis, E. F.                        | 2010                   |
| Aug   | Fr 1st ANGLICO<br>To 4thMarDiv       | WDAug   | Fr PgScol Monterey<br>To Princeton Univ | By11Sep | Fr 1stMAW<br>To MCS Quant HMX-1             | WDAug   | Miller, M. A.                        | 0802                   |
| 3010  | Graney, T. E.                        | 0302    | Miller, Jr., C. B.                      | 7302    | Shuttleworth, J. E.                         | 3002    | Mills, G. R.                         | 31Jul                  |
| Aug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCS Quant          | WDAug   | Fr 12th MCRRD<br>To 1stMAW              | WDAug   | Fr 9thMAW<br>To Univ of Omaha               | By13Sep | MCSC Albany                          | 30Jun                  |
| 302   | Grayum, W. E.                        | 7333    | Miller, G. H.                           | 3502    | Simmons, J. B.                              | 3630    | Osimo, M. C.                         | 4602                   |
| Sep   | Fr Univ of Wash<br>To 3dMAW          | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To ForTrps FMFLant       | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW AirFMFPac<br>To MCSC Barstow      | WDAug   | Ofe SecDef                           | 30Jun                  |
| 010   | Grube, F. E.                         | 1802    | Miller, M. M.                           | 0130    | Smith, W. P.                                | 6802    | Sadler, L. J.                        | 0130                   |
| Sep   | Fr MCS Quant<br>To MAAG China        | WDAug   | Fr Ofc CNO<br>To HQMCM                  | By19Jul | Fr MCS Quant<br>To USS Boxer                | WDAug   | AirFMFPac                            | 30Jun                  |
| 305   | Hachel, R. E.                        | 1803    | Milligan, J. F.                         | 3002    | Solazzo, V. M.                              | 0802    | Wines, E. J.                         | 0130                   |
| Sep   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To ForTrps FMFLant    | WDAug   | Fr 2dMarDiv<br>To HQMCM                 | WDAug   | Fr NavActy Italy<br>To ForTrps FMFLant      | WDAug   | MCAS Beaufort                        | 30Jun                  |
| 335   | Hallett, Jr., J. G.                  | 0130    | Milone, D. E.                           | 0302    | Spencer, Jr., N. W.                         | 1802    | <b>Recent Command and</b>            |                        |
| Aug   | Fr ForTrps FMFLant<br>To 1stMAW      | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCB CamPen            | WDAug   | Fr NS WashDC<br>To Beirut Lebanon           | By28Aug | <b>Staff Assignments</b>             |                        |
| 302   | Hammond, Jr., J. W.                  | 0302    | Mitchell, D. L.                         | 2502    | Stowell, D. V.                              | 0702    | Capwell, G. L.                       | 1st                    |
| Aug   | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 2dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCS Quant             | WDAug   | Fr 12th MCRRD<br>To 3dMarDiv                | By3Sep  | MAAM, MCB, 29 Palms                  |                        |
| 333   | Harris, J. W.                        | 3302    | Morrison, G. E.                         | 0130    | Sudduth, D. E.                              | 0302    | Dunn, W. F.                          | S-4, 3dBn, 12th Ma-    |
| Aug   | Fr HQMC<br>To Univ of Md             | By17Sep | Fr 1stMAW AirFMFPac                     | WDAug   | Fr NS WashDC<br>To Beirut Lebanon           | By28Aug | Marines, 4thMarDiv                   |                        |
| 302   | Hartman, R. S.                       | 2502    | Morris, F. B.                           | 3090    | Tart, M. H.                                 | 3302    | Gray, D.                             | CO, Btry I, 3dBn, 12th |
| Aug   | Fr USS Estes<br>To COMFOURTEEN       | By1Aug  | Fr HQMCM                                | By17Aug | Fr 2dMarDiv<br>To HQMCM                     | By28Aug | Haviland, H. D., Director Recruiters |                        |
| 02    | Hawkins, H. E.                       | 0130    | Morrill, D. W.                          | 7333    | Taylor, L. A.                               | 1802    | Henley, R. J., OIC, MCRC, Albu-      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCAF Jacksonville  | WDAug   | Fr PgScol Monterey<br>To Princeton Univ | By18Sep | Fr NAAS Chase Field<br>To MCS Quant         | By1Aug  | querque, N. M.                       |                        |
| 10    | Hennelly, J. A.                      | 0802    | Mueller, C. E.                          | 0302    | Thompson, R. B.                             | 0302    | Montfort, R. A., Aide-de-Camp, CG,   |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To ForTrps FMFLant    | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MCB CamLej            | WDAug   | Fr MCRS LosA<br>To UCLA LosA                | By11Sep | MCRD, San Diego                      |                        |
| 02    | Hickle, A. R.                        | 7333    | Mullen, Jr., J. E.                      | 3010    | Tirk, E. R.                                 | 3002    | Reville, J. T., Personnel Dept, HQMC |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 2dMAW<br>To Airlant NAS NorVa     | By1Sep  | Fr MB WashDC                            | By17Sep | Fr MCB 29 Palms<br>To HQMCM                 | By19Sep | Stanton, D. R., HQMC Flight Sect,    |                        |
| 35    | Hite, H. W.                          | 1802    | Mullins, Jr., J. F.                     | 3010    | Turner, F. P.                               | 0302    | Willis, T. J., I&I, 92dRifCo, Ft.    |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MCRD SDiego<br>To Univ of Omaha   | By15Sep | Fr MCRD PISC                            | By18Sep | Fr MB Clarksville<br>To Univ of Omaha       | By19Sep | Smith, Ark.                          |                        |
| 02    | Hoestly, J. R.                       | 0130    | Murphy, D. J.                           | 0302    | Twining, D. S.                              | 0302    | Wolf, W. F., S-1, 3dBn, 12thMarines, |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 12th MCRRD<br>To 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   | Fr USS Bennington<br>To 4thMarDiv       | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To BUSHIPS                     | WDAug   | 4thMarDiv                            |                        |
| 35    | Hollingshead, J. S.                  | 0802    | Nutter, Jr., E. L.                      | 3302    | Vass, R. G.                                 | 7333    | <b>Deaths</b>                        |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 8th MCRRD<br>To 3dMarDiv          | By3Sep  | Fr MCAS Beaufort<br>To HQMCM WashDC     | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To NABTC NAS Pncla             | WDAug   | Meagher, D. E.                       | 0302                   |
| 35    | Holmberg, H. H.                      | 0302    | Pacioretti, M.                          | 3130    | Vobora, G. J.                               | 7335    | LFTUPac                              | 5Jun                   |
| Aug   | Fr 4thMarDiv<br>To I&I 68thRifCo     | By1Sep  | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MB NS SFran           | WDAug   | Fr MARTC NAS Glen                           | By22Aug | Shore, Jr., H. E.                    | 7331                   |
| 02    | Hopkins, J. E.                       | 0302    | Pafford, B. E.                          | 2501    | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    | MCB CamPen                           | 25Jun                  |
| Aug   | Fr Indian Head Md<br>To Univ of Md   | By18Sep | Fr MCS Quant                            | WDAug   | Fr MCRS LosA<br>To UCLA LosA                | By11Sep | <b>Death, Reserve</b>                |                        |
| 2     | Howard, D. E.                        | 0802    | Palmer, Jr., L. E.                      | 7335    | Walling, R. P.                              | 3002    | Hardin, S. A.                        | 7333                   |
| Aug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To FMFPac             | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW                               | WDAug   | Fr MCB CamPen<br>To HQMCM                   | By11Sep | New Orleans                          | 19Jun                  |
| 2     | Howarth, D. L.                       | 1803    | Pearson, P. E.                          | 1803    | Wass, R. G.                                 | 7333    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MB NB Subic Bay<br>To 1stMarDiv   | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                            | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To NABTC NAS Pncla             | WDAug   |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Jamison, R. E.                       | 1803    | Peterka, B. W.                          | 0302    | Vergang, C. R.                              | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MB WashDC<br>To Univ of Md        | By18Sep | Fr MCB CamPen                           | By18Sep | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Johnson, R. P.                       | 0802    | Pierce, E. R.                           | 2502    | Wells, G. T.                                | 6702    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MCS Quant<br>To 3dMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr ForTrps FMFLant                      | By3Sep  | Fr MCRD SDiego<br>To 3dMAW                  | WDJUN   |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Johns, F. E.                         | 0130    | Post, R. L.                             | 6602    | West, M. W.                                 | 0802    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MB WashDC<br>To MARTC Jax         | WDAug   | Fr MCRD SDiego<br>To 1stMAW             | By5Sep  | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 4th105MM HowBtry          | By20Sep |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Johnston, K. M.                      | 7331    | Prebihalo, R. G.                        | 0302    | Wicks, G. A.                                | 1802    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr NABTC NAS Pncla<br>To 2dMAW       | WDAug   | Fr 12th MCRRD<br>To Camp S. D. Butler   | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To MB NAS Jax                | WDAug   |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Jones, R. W.                         | 3310    | Prince, C. J.                           | 7333    | Wight, Jr., D. E.                           | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr HQMC<br>To MCRD PISC              | By29Sep | Fr 1stMAW                               | WDAug   | Fr MCRD PISC                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Kelly, T. J.                         | 7333    | Prudhomme, D.                           | 7333    | Wilson, Jr., P. A.                          | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr NABTC NAS Pncla<br>To 2dMAW       | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                            | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Kenyon, R. F.                        | 0802    | Proudfoot, R. M.                        | 0702    | Woodard, R. J.                              | 6602    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 3dMarDiv<br>To 1stMarDiv          | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                            | WDAug   | Fr London England                           | WDAug   |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Kern, R. J.                          | 7302    | Read, J. A.                             | 7332    | Woodward, R. W.                             | 7335    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 1stMAW<br>To 4thMarDiv            | WDAug   | Fr 2dMAW                                | By8Aug  | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Kerr, Jr., J. F.                     | 0210    | Redmond, J. E.                          | 3010    | Young, H. H.                                | 3060    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr HQBn 68thRifCo<br>To 3dMarDiv     | By7Sep  | Fr 4thMarDiv                            | WDAug   | Fr MAD NATTC MFS                            | WDAug   |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Kovach, Jr., J.                      | 0302    | To 3dMarDiv                             | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 1802    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr 8th MCRRD<br>To 1stMarDiv         | By1Sep  | Fr Coronado SDiego                      | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Lancaster, J. F.                     | 6402    | To 3dMAW                                | WDAug   | Fr PHIBGRU-4                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr MAD NATTC MFS<br>To 3dMAW         | WDAug   | Fr MCS Quant                            | WDAug   | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     | Lawrence, G. M.                      | 7333    | Ritter, O. W.                           | 3002    | Woodard, R. J.                              | 6602    |                                      |                        |
| Aug   | Fr NABTC NAC Pncla<br>To Maxwell AFB | By12Aug | Fr MCB CamLej                           | WDAug   | Fr 2dMAW                                    | WDAUG   |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         | To MCSA Phila                           | WDAug   | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         | Rush, W. M.                             | 0302    | Young, Jr., M. V.                           | 1802    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         | Fr Ft Holabird Md                       | By18Sep | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         | To Univ of Md                           |         | Fr ForTrps FMFLant                          | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr MAD NATTC Pncla                          | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr NAAS Chase Fld                           | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr Seal Beach                               | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To Knox Ky                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To MCB CamLej                               | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr MCS Quant                                | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To ForTrps FMFLant                          | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | To FMFLant                                  | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 1stMAW                                   | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 2dMAW                                    | 0302    |                                      |                        |
| 2     |                                      |         |   |         | Fr 3dMarDiv                                 | 0302    |                                      |                        |
|       |                                      |         |   |         |   |         |                                      |                        |

| Permanent Promotions  |                            |                                 |                     |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| Burns, M. J.          | 7305 Hatch, E. E.          | 7305 Quisenberry, D. J.         | 0130 WDJul          |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr 1stMAW                  | Fr HqBn HQMC                    | Adams, D. H.        |
| To Univ of Omaha      | To MCOSO WashDC            | To MCRD PISC                    | Adams, Jr., H. J.   |
| Burroughs, R. S.      | 3010 Hoynes, E. J.         | 2502 Radich, J. T.              | Alexander, J. R.    |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr MCS Quant               | 2502 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Alexander, R. H.    |
| To ForTrps FMFLant    | To MCRD PISC               | 2502 WDAug To NABTC NAS Pncla   | Allen, J. R.        |
| Busse, D. M.          | 0702 Buddy, N. W., Jr.     | 2502 WDAug Ramsay, C. J.        | Allinder, M. W.     |
| Fr MCS Quant          | Fr MCS Quant               | 2502 WDAug Fr 2dMarDiv          | Alogna, J. M.       |
| To 1stMAW             | To FMFPAC                  | 2502 WDAug To Camp S. D. Butler | Andersen, D. E.     |
| Byram, J. C.          | 7305 Huston, R. S.         | 3010 Rick, N. T.                | Anderson, J. W.     |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr ForTrps FMFPAC          | 3010 WDAug Fr 9thMCRRD          | Anthony, A. A.      |
| To Univ of Omaha      | To MCB CamLej              | 2502 WDAug To MCAS El Toro      | Austin, R. W.       |
| Carlton, R. L.        | 7302 Janssen, A. A.        | 2502 WDAug Rogers, J. J.        | Auten, D. E.        |
| Fr 4thMarDiv          | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 2502 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Baker, C. W.        |
| To FMFPAC             | To MCS Quant               | 2502 WDAug To MCS Quant HMX-1   | Baker, H. W.        |
| Cartwright, D. L.     | 0302 Johnson, S. A.        | 1302 WDAug Rohde, J. A.         | Barney, D. G.       |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr 2dMarDiv                | 1302 WDAug Fr 2dMarDiv          | Barrett, C. S.      |
| To Indian Head Md     | To I&I 8th EngrCo          | 1302 WDAug To MB NB Phila       | Bartol, H. J.       |
| Chase, W. E.          | 7305 Kalas, W. D.          | 7335 WDAug Saenz, R.            | Bauer, W. D.        |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7335 WDAug Fr MCS Quant         | Beckwith, W. H.     |
| To Univ of Colo       | To MCAAS Yuma Ariz         | 7335 WDAug To MCAF Santa Ana    | Behme, J. E.        |
| Chittick, A. B.       | 0240 Kasdorf, L. G.        | 7335 WDAug Sahaydak, E.         | Bergen, D. F.       |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7335 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Bohr, Jr., H. L.    |
| To 1stMarDiv          | To 3dMAW                   | 3402 WDAug To NABTC NAS Pncla   | Boman, B. B.        |
| Collins, B. D.        | 7335 Kazalunas, J.         | 3402 WDAug Santos, J. S., Jr.   | Bonthron, W. J.     |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 3402 WDAug Fr MCB CamLej        | Booth, F. D.        |
| To 2dMAW              | To Univ of Omaha           | 3402 WDAug To MCS Quant         | Borwn, L. K.        |
| Cortright, J. W., Jr. | 2502 Keathley, J. N.       | 7302 WDAug Schmidt, J. M.       | Bossert, J. M.      |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7302 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Bosworth, G. G.     |
| To ForTrps FMFLant    | To 3dMAW                   | By7Sep 0802 Schmidt, W. J., Jr. | Bowles, R. W.       |
| Dalton, L. G.         | 0302 Kennedy, C. A.        | By7Sep 0802 WDAug To 1stMarDiv  | Bowman, D. G.       |
| Fr USS Providence     | Fr MCS Quant               | 7335 WDAug Schuyler, J. A.      | Bown, R. L.         |
| To MCS Quant          | To ForTrps FMFLant         | 7335 WDAug Fr MB San Juan PR    | Brackman, J. T.     |
| Daniels, C.           | 0802 Kiersey, D. A.        | 7335 WDAug To Ft Knox Ky        | Breitenbach, R. G.  |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr 1stMAW                  | 0115 WDAug Seed, R. J., III     | Brennan, W. F.      |
| To MCRD SDiego        | To 2dMAW                   | 0115 WDAug Fr MCS Quant         | Brickett, C. M.     |
| Dauster, E. E.        | 0802 Kilday, J. A.         | 0302 WDAug To 3dMarDiv          | Brill, Jr., A. P.   |
| Fr MB NS Adak         | Fr MCB CamLej              | 0302 WDAug Sheehan, J. P.       | Bringear, R. L.     |
| To ForTrps FMFPAC     | To MCRD PISC               | 0302 WDAug Fr MD USS Bennington | Briol, N. C.        |
| Davis, W. G.          | 0302 Knapper, R. E.        | 0201 WDAug To 1stMarDiv         | Brock, D. A.        |
| Fr USS Galveston      | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 0201 WDAug Skelton, R. J.       | Bucknam, H. V.      |
| To MB Brunswick       | To MCRD SDiego             | 0201 WDAug Fr FMFLant           | Buerk, G. S.        |
| Derlieg, P. L.        | 7302 Larsen, H. P.         | 0201 WDAug To USS Taconic       | Burger, J. C.       |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr MCS Quant               | 2502 WDAug Skinner, B. F.       | Burke, J. P.        |
| To 3dMAW              | To 3dMAW                   | 2502 WDAug Fr NAATC NAS CorpC   | Buss, R. H.         |
| Dixon, C. A.          | 7331 LeMay, R. E., Jr.     | 0802 WDAug To 1stMarDiv         | Butchart, E. W.     |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 0802 WDAug To Ft Knox           | Butler, F. H.       |
| To 2dMAW              | To ForTrps FMFLant         | 0802 WDAug To 3dMarDiv          | Byrne, F. D.        |
| Douglas, D. M.        | 0802 Lee, D. C.            | 0802 WDAug Sheehan, J. P.       | Browne, E. R.       |
| Fr MCS Quant          | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 0802 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Brown, C. J.        |
| To ForTrps FMFLant    | To 1stMarDiv               | 0802 WDAug To 1stMarDiv         | Brownck, H. V.      |
| Doyle, C. M.          | 7331 Lemmons, J. B.        | 0802 WDAug To ForTrps FMFLant   | Buerk, G. S.        |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 0802 WDAug Sorensen, M. G.      | Burger, J. C.       |
| To 3dMAW              | To 1stMarDiv               | 0802 WDAug Fr 3dMarDiv          | Burke, R. H.        |
| Drake, J. R.          | 2710 Lemon, D. W.          | 0802 WDAug To MCRD PISC         | Miller, A. D.       |
| Fr MCRD SDiego        | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 0302 WDAug Stavinski, R.        | Miller, R. A.       |
| To 3dMarDiv           | To MB Pearl                | 0302 WDAug Fr 3dMarDiv          | Miluski, J. J.      |
| Driscoll, E. J., Jr.  | 1302 Lewis, D. E.          | By1Sep 0201 WDAug To 2dMAW      | Mixson, M. E.       |
| Fr ForTrps FMFLant    | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7304 Sullivan, M. P.            | Molineaux, J. F.    |
| To MB NavFor Iceland  | To 3dMAW                   | 7304 WDAug Fr London England    | Mooney, W. A.       |
| Dixie, C. M.          | By1Sep 0802 Lee, D. C.     | 7304 WDAug To 2dMAW             | Mosher, D. K.       |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Mulern, T. R.       |
| To 3dMAW              | To 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To NABTC NAS Pncla   | Mulkey, J. G.       |
| Drake, J. R.          | 7331 LeMay, R. E., Jr.     | 7304 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Murlphy, T. J.      |
| Fr MCRD SDiego        | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To NABTC NAS Pncla   | Murphy, Jr.         |
| To 3dMarDiv           | To 3dMAW                   | 7304 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Naugle, D. G.       |
| Driscoll, E. J., Jr.  | 1302 Lewis, D. E.          | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Navadel, G. D.      |
| Fr ForTrps FMFLant    | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Newman, G. L.       |
| To MB NavFor Iceland  | To 3dMAW                   | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Parks, H. L.        |
| Dixie, C. M.          | By1Sep 0802 Lee, D. C.     | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Pastrell, D. K.     |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Peterson, D. B.     |
| To 3dMAW              | To 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Phenegar, W. R.     |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 7331 Lemmons, J. B.        | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Pierce, J. S.       |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Polk, L. J.         |
| To 3dMAW              | To 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Pope, E. T.         |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2502 McCarthy, A. J., Jr.  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Pratt, T. M.        |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Prewitt, R. C.      |
| To 3dMAW              | To MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To ForTrps FMFLant   | Quanrud, R. B.      |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2502 McIntyre, D. S.       | 7304 WDAug Uhlenhake, D. J.     | Radcliffe, E. T.    |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug Fr 2dMAW             | Raines, R. C.       |
| To 3dMAW              | To I&I 1stCommCo           | 7304 WDAug To 1st ANGLICO       | Rasavage, J. R.     |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2501 MacEachin, D. J.      | 7304 WDAug Fr 1stMAW            | Ratzlaff, J. W.     |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug AirFMFPAC            | Rutherford, R. B.   |
| To 3dMAW              | To MCRD PISC               | 7304 WDAug To MCB CamPen        | Reeves, T. L.       |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 3502 Marr, D. G.           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Regan, C. D.        |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Renner, W. A.       |
| To 3dMAW              | To Monterey                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Rhinesmith, G. B.   |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 7335 Martinez, T. F.       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Roberson, J. C.     |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Roberts, A. M.      |
| To 3dMAW              | To MB NS Diego             | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Robinson, D. M.     |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 1802 McCarthy, A. J., Jr.  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Rodewald, W. O.     |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Rosenberg, J. F.    |
| To 3dMAW              | To MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Roudebush, T.       |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2502 McIntyre, D. S.       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Rushing, C. L.      |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Russo, A. R.        |
| To 3dMAW              | To I&I 1stCommCo           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Salmon, M. D.       |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2502 Morgan, L. L.         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Scamehorn, R. C.    |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Schenck, K. I.      |
| To 3dMAW              | To Monterey                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Schermerhorn, D.    |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 3010 Metscher, W. H.       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Schmidt, J. E.      |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Seaver, R. L.       |
| To 3dMAW              | To LFTUFpac                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Shroyer, D. K., Jr. |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 2502 Molineaux, J. F., Jr. | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Silver, T. J.       |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Simpson, J. F.      |
| To 3dMAW              | To Indian Head Md          | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Simpson, F. D.      |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 0302 Morgan, L. L.         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Sinnott, W. T.      |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr MD USS Boston           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Smaldone, R. A.     |
| To 3dMAW              | To MB WashDC               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Smith, R. E.        |
| Dixie, C. M.          | 1302 McGraw, W. A., Jr.    | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Stevenson, S. H.    |
| Fr NABTC NAS Pncla    | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Stewart, D. K.      |
| To 1&I 10thEngrCo     | To 3dMAW                   | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Steiner, A. J.      |
| Foss, T. C.           | 0802 Merrithew, R. E.      | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Stehr, P. W.        |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr 2dMAW                   | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Stevens, D. K.      |
| To MCAS El Toro       | To 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Taylor, J. C.       |
| Frank, A. H.          | 1802 McCarthy, A. J., Jr.  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Thompson, J. C.     |
| Fr MCB CamPen         | Fr 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Trapp, E. T.        |
| To 3dMarDiv           | To MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Turner, R. C.       |
| Gabel, R. L.          | 2502 McIntyre, D. S.       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Uhlmann, R. C.      |
| Fr MCS Quant          | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Van Leeuwen, N. R.  |
| To 2dMarDiv           | To I&I 1stCommCo           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Verma, R. K.        |
| Garbacz, G. G.        | 0302 Morgan, L. L.         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Wade, R. C.         |
| Fr HQBn HQMC          | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Walker, R. C.       |
| To MCRD PISC          | To MCRD PISC               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Walton, R. C.       |
| Gast, H. H.           | 7335 Motherway, R. T.      | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Ward, R. C.         |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr NAS Brunswick           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Watson, R. C.       |
| To MCS Quant HMX-1    | To 1stMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Webb, R. C.         |
| German, R. T.         | 0302 O'Connor, M. E.       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Wells, R. C.        |
| Fr Ft Holabird MD     | Fr USS Oklahoma City       | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | West, R. C.         |
| To 1stMarDiv          | To NavPhibBase Coronado    | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Whitney, R. C.      |
| Gilligan, A.          | 2502 Orey, R. B.           | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Wiley, R. C.        |
| Fr MCS Quant          | Fr 1stMAW                  | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| To ForTrps FMFLant    | To MCS Quant HMX-1         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Grazier, E. W., Jr.   | 3010 Pepper, J. R.         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Fr 3dMarDiv           | Fr 3dMarDiv                | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Hagerman, G. N.       | 0201 Perry, R. F.          | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Fr MCS Quant          | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| To 2dMAW              | To MCAS El Toro            | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Harbison, G. E.       | 7335 Porter, C. B.         | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| To 2dMAW              | To 4thMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Harwell, E. N.        | 7335 WDAug                 | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| Fr 1stMAW             | Fr MCS Quant               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |
| To NABTC NAS Eng      | To 4thMarDiv               | 7304 WDAug To 1stMAW            | Williams, L. R.     |

Stoloski, W. J.  
 Stremic, A. W.  
 Studer, E. A.  
 Sudmeyer, P. T.  
 Suedekum, N. F.  
 Sutherland, A. A.  
 Swenson, W. R.  
 Taylor, B. C.  
 Taylor, F. D.  
 Thibault, D. R.  
 Thomas, W. Y.  
 Thompson, A. D.  
 Thompson, C. B.  
 Tilton, R. C.  
 Tinker, A.  
 Toelle, A. D.  
 Toth, J. E.  
 Twidwell, G. E.  
 Uran, E. T.  
 Van Antwerp, W.  
 Van Niman, J. H.  
 Van Tassel, G. L.  
 Vasko, G. E.  
 Vowell, D. E.

#### Temporary Promotions

Abele, W. R.  
 Andrews, D. W.  
 Brown, M. T.  
 Cole, B. F.  
 Connelly, E. J.  
 Cooper, G. J.  
 Dowling, R. D.  
 Driskell, J. M.  
 Driver, R. J.  
 Fanning, D. E.  
 Fricker, J. T.  
 Gallery, V. R.  
 Gentry, H. R.  
 Grega, R. R.  
 Johnson, W. H.

King, P. F.  
 Lilley, M. G.  
 Marino, G.  
 Marshall, J. C.  
 McIver, W. W.  
 Nardo, J. F.  
 Price, R. K.  
 Rhodes, W. M.  
 Rowley, W. B.  
 Sewell, W. C.  
 Smith, G. W.  
 Sole, J. A.  
 Stoner, D. L.  
 Whittingham, D.  
 Wright, W. E.

#### Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Anthis, B. G.  
 Bigler, J. C., Jr.  
 Bittenhouse, R. G.  
 Buchanan, J. H.  
 Burch, G. P.  
 Burleson, E. B.  
 Bushey, J. F.  
 Capek, R. C.  
 Carr, R. L.  
 Chachere, D. J.  
 Clark, W. F., Jr.  
 Clites, D. D.  
 Cohen, L., Jr.  
 Coleman, D. A.  
 Collins, P. G.  
 Comer, D. R.  
 Cooper, H. D.  
 Crabtree, R. G.  
 Crook, C. L.  
 Daly, P. H.  
 Damuth, D. R.  
 Denithorne, W. J.  
 Deutsch, D. J.  
 Diefenbach, C. T.  
 Dilien, T. S.  
 Dooley, G. F.  
 Doughty, C. C.  
 Doyle, L. E.  
 Drew, L. G.  
 Dube, M. J.  
 Dunn, E. D.  
 Duplessie, A. T.  
 Eblen, W. D.  
 Elchelberger, J. M.  
 Evleth, W. R.  
 Field, L. D.  
 Forrester, R. H.  
 Foster, R. G.  
 Fuchs, L. M.  
 Golden, G.  
 Goutell, C. R.  
 Green, J. M., Jr.  
 Hafner, B. D.  
 Hafner, B. D.  
 Haible, J. A.  
 Hale, H. W.  
 Hale, W. H., Jr.  
 Haley, R. A.  
 Hanely, M. J.  
 Hanselman, A. C.  
 Hanson, R. A.  
 Hanthorn, R. L.  
 Hardgrove, W. R.  
 Harper, H. J.  
 Harris, J. E.  
 Hartley, H. G.  
 Harvey, A. N.  
 Harwood, A. E.  
 Hatton, G. A., Jr.  
 Haws, W. E., Jr.  
 Hayward, B. N.  
 Hebert, Y. M.  
 Hemingway, J. W.  
 Henry, J. W.  
 Herlocker, J. E.  
 Hewitt, R. D.

Higgs, J. R.  
 Himmerich, R. T.  
 Hodge, G. D.  
 Hodgen, D. A.  
 Hofland, R. M.  
 Hogaboam, P. L.  
 Horne, G. R., II  
 Horton, T. R.  
 Houseman, W. B.  
 House, E. L., Jr.  
 Howsley, W. C.  
 Huff, E. L.  
 Huffcut, W. H., II  
 Hulme, M. E.  
 Hunt, G. T.  
 Hurley, R. B.  
 Husdon, J. E.  
 Iles, J. E.  
 Imbus, R. J., Jr.  
 Jordan, L. W.  
 Kane, J. M.  
 Kazalunas, J.  
 Keane, M. F., Jr.  
 Klinkenberg, A. L.  
 Kopsinis, J. N.  
 Kosmo, F. W.  
 Krages, B. P.  
 Kramer, M. S.  
 Krisinski, R. J.  
 Krongard, A. B.  
 Kupper, G. T.  
 Kwak, R. A.  
 Labin, L. E.  
 Labran, R. M.  
 Lakes, J. B.  
 Lamberth, P. D.  
 Lamey, R. W.  
 Lampert, E. E., Jr.  
 Lindgraff, J. E.  
 Landrum, G. H.  
 Lane, J. A., Jr.  
 Lanigan, J. F.  
 Lattimore, G. J.  
 Lavin, J. F.  
 Lee, W. F.  
 Leedom, G. H.  
 Leftwich, R. F., Jr.  
 Lewis, E. J.  
 Leyden, M. R.  
 Liddell, P. R.  
 Light, L. L.  
 Lindgren, D. F.  
 Lindsrom, R. E.  
 Lisa, A. J.  
 Livengood, W. J., Jr.  
 Lloyd, J. S.  
 Loftus, W. E.  
 Logan, A. S.  
 Longdon, A. P.  
 Loper, J. H., Jr.  
 Loosee, W. H., Jr.

Lott, J. D.  
 Louvaris, A. C.  
 Walter, W. S.  
 Wanner, S. B.  
 Ward, C. L.  
 Warnicke, E. A.  
 Waslik, H. J.  
 Wells, J. W.  
 Weltin, W. L.  
 Whipple, O. M.  
 Whiting, E. R.  
 Wier, D. A.  
 Williams, W. L.  
 Willmarth, J. M.  
 Wilson, D. R.  
 Van Antwerp, W.  
 Wilson, R. B.  
 Van Niman, J. H.  
 Woodward, R. L.  
 Van Tassel, G. L.  
 Wright, R. W.  
 Yon, D. H.  
 York, G. A.

Overgard, G. D.  
 Owens, H. M.  
 Pailay, J. G., III  
 Pancione, P. R.  
 Parsons, W. A.  
 Partridge, G. R.  
 Pasquale, F. J.  
 Patrick, R. H.  
 Patton, C. R.  
 Payne, F. M., Jr.  
 Pease, C. J.  
 Peirson, E. L., II  
 Pettier, W. H.  
 Penland, R. B.  
 Perry, R. R.  
 Peterson, G. L.  
 Peterson, G. R.  
 Philbrick, E. H.  
 Phillips, P. J.  
 Phillips, B. G.  
 Philson, H. F.  
 Pisanchin, C. M.  
 Pliott, C. E.  
 Porter, L. M., Jr.  
 Poslusny, D. A.  
 Potter, R. L.  
 Powers, J. A.  
 Martin, C. F.  
 Martin, T. B., Jr.  
 Marvel, R. P.  
 Martin, A. C.  
 Martin, C. F.  
 Maxfield, R. H.  
 Maxwell, R. W.  
 Mayberry, W. B.  
 McCanney, A. R.  
 McCarthy, C. P.  
 McCrary, J. M.  
 McDaniel, G. D.  
 McDonald, J. F.  
 McGinnity, T. D.  
 McGovern, J. J.  
 McGowan, M. N.  
 McGrane, J. K.  
 McGuinn, J. M.  
 McGuire, G. F.  
 McIntire, D. J.  
 McKee, T. A.  
 McLean, F. R.  
 McMurrey, R. M.  
 McNally, F. T.  
 McNamara, W. J.  
 McRaney, C. D.  
 McCormick, R. L.  
 McCormick, R. C.  
 McEvoy, D. L.  
 McGuire, J. S.  
 McKinney, R. D.  
 Meinecke, D. N.  
 Melton, T. G.  
 Merkle, J. W.  
 Merricks, E. C.  
 Merryman, J. C.  
 Ronan, P. J.  
 Rose, E. V.  
 Rossana, R. H.  
 Rothenberger, J. R.  
 Migas, J. C.  
 Milkowski, A. H.  
 Milleman, S. E.  
 Miller, J. S.  
 Miller, J. E.  
 Milliron, W. A.  
 Mittrick, C. L.  
 Mitts, C. S.  
 Mizell, J. W.  
 Mobley, H. C., Jr.  
 Mock, G. D., Jr.  
 Mohler, R. E.  
 Moisbee, N.  
 Monson, J. A.  
 Montgomery, E. A.  
 Moore, R. H.  
 Morgan, R. W.  
 Morrow, C. R.  
 Muckler, W. B.  
 Muir, E. R.  
 Mullin, D. G., Jr.  
 Murphy, H. J.  
 Murphy, K. J., Jr.  
 Murphy, W. K.  
 Murray, R. C., Jr.  
 Muzii, V. A., Jr.  
 Nacrelli, H. T.  
 Neal, G.  
 Necco, A. D.  
 Nelson, D. A.  
 Nelson, J. E.  
 Nelson, M. W.  
 Netties, C. W.  
 Neunreiter, R. L.  
 Newlin, J. H.  
 Niblett, J. R.  
 Nickerson, S. C.  
 Nordberg, B. A.  
 Nordstrom, C. V., Jr.  
 Norman, P. E.  
 Norman, E. H.  
 Norrington, G. R.  
 O'Brien, J. F.  
 O'Bye, J. R.  
 Oelerich, R. V., Jr.  
 Ojerholm, D. S.  
 O'Malley, T. P., Jr.  
 Omrad, G. R.  
 Orr, D. E.  
 Orzech, J. E.  
 Ott, M. N., Jr.

Overgard, G. D.  
 Owens, H. M.  
 Pailay, J. G., III  
 Pancione, P. R.  
 Parsons, W. A.  
 Partridge, G. R.  
 Pasquale, F. J.  
 Patrick, R. H.  
 Patton, C. R.  
 Payne, F. M., Jr.  
 Pease, C. J.  
 Peirson, E. L., II  
 Pettier, W. H.  
 Penland, R. B.  
 Perry, R. R.  
 Peterson, G. L.  
 Peterson, G. R.  
 Philbrick, E. H.  
 Phillips, P. J.  
 Phillips, B. G.  
 Philson, H. F.  
 Pisanchin, C. M.  
 Pliott, C. E.  
 Porter, L. M., Jr.  
 Poslusny, D. A.  
 Potter, R. L.  
 Powers, J. A.  
 Prevatt, L. T.  
 Martin, A. C.  
 Marvel, R. P.  
 Martin, C. F.  
 Maxwell, R. W.  
 Purucker, G. W.  
 Purinton, W. C.  
 Quatrano, R. J.  
 Quigley, J. J.  
 Quinlan, W. J.  
 Quinones, B. J.  
 Quist, J. W.  
 Richardson, E.  
 Ramsey, J. W.  
 Rathborne, J. C.  
 Rea, P. H.  
 Reidy, J. M.  
 Reilly, J. W.  
 Reilly, W.  
 Reischuck, G. A.  
 Reisert, W. A.  
 Reno, R. J.  
 Reynolds, T. F.  
 Richardson, T. H.  
 Richter, C. E.  
 Riley, G. E.  
 Roberson, H. C.  
 Robinson, C. G.  
 Robinson, C. N.  
 Robison, W. J.  
 Roche, R. M.  
 Rogers, W. B.  
 Rolland, C. L., Jr.  
 Rollins, J. K.  
 Ronan, P. J.  
 Rose, E. V.  
 Rossana, R. H.  
 Rothenberger, J. R.  
 Rozman, J. J.  
 Rubsamen, T.  
 Russell, F. P., Jr.  
 Russell, R. M.  
 Rutley, R. R.  
 Ryan, D. V.  
 Ryder, J. R.  
 Sabin, J. N.  
 Sabin, F. H.  
 Sakarik, J. J.  
 Sammon, A. D.  
 Samuels, W. O.  
 Sanborn, W. E.  
 Sanchis, R. A.  
 Santaniello, A. A.  
 Schalk, J. D.  
 Schlotterback, R. J.  
 Schmidt, D. J.  
 Scheider, M. L.  
 Schopperle, W. G.  
 Schreiber, G. A.  
 Scotts, T. J.  
 Scott, J. W.  
 Scribner, R. O.  
 Seager, D. W.  
 Sehlke, C. J.  
 Seward, E. E.  
 Sharp, R. C.  
 Sharf, J. F.  
 Shaw, C. F., Jr.  
 Shaw, J. B.  
 Sheppard, M. J.  
 Sheridan, P. F.  
 Sherman, R. E.  
 Sherry, J. F., Jr.  
 Shinor, A. J., Jr.  
 Shipley, J. F.  
 Shoptaw, R. D.  
 Sikes, M. D.  
 Simms, J. Y., Jr.  
 Simone, J. B.  
 Simons, R. R.  
 Sinnott, G. C.  
 Siwinski, J.  
 Small, C. D.  
 Smiley, J. R.  
 Smith, A. H.  
 Smith, D. B.  
 Smith, E. D.  
 Smith, G. L.  
 Smith, T. H.

**Retired**  
 Negrotto, R. J.  
 MB NS SFran 0302  
 Trece, D. C.  
 MB NB Bklyn 30Jun  
 7333  
 29Jun

#### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Horne, G. R., II, CO, HQBtry, 3dBN,  
 12th Marines, 4thMarDiv  
 Long, W. H., Aide-de-Camp, CG,  
 MCSC, Albany  
 Lynn, V. B., S-2, 3dBN, 12th Ma-  
 rines, 4th MarDiv  
 Smalley, D. P., CO, Btry G, 3dBN,  
 12th Marines, 4thMarDiv

#### 2d Lieutenants

#### Transfers from MCS Quantico

Allee, V. L.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Armendariz, L. J.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Arndt, R. W.  
 To 3dMarDiv 3501  
 Basso, F. J.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Batcheller, G. D.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Bechtol, J. A.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla By19Jul  
 Behr, J. A.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Bellamy, J. C.  
 To 4thMarDiv 0301  
 Bennett, J. D.  
 To 4thMarDiv 0301  
 Blankinship, R. T.  
 To 4thMarDiv 3501  
 Boe, G. P.  
 To 2dMAW 0201  
 Bova, B.  
 To 2dMarDiv 3501  
 Bowden, H. J.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Boyle, J. J.  
 To 2dMAW 0201  
 Bradley, P. S.  
 To 3dMarDiv 3501  
 Bray, C. P.  
 To 1stMarDiv 3501  
 Brown, R. L.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla By19Jul  
 Bumbalo, Jr., T. S.  
 To 1stMarDiv 3501  
 Carlisle, R. P.  
 To 4thMarDiv 0301  
 Carroll, R. E.  
 To 3dMarDiv 0801  
 Carroll, R. D.  
 To 2dMarDiv 3501  
 Cloud, J. E.  
 To 3dMarDiv 3501  
 Condra, III, E. M.  
 To 4thMarDiv 1301  
 Cooper, J. W.  
 To 3dMarDiv 3501  
 Cronin, J. F.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla 7399  
 Daffen, R. I.  
 To MCRD SDiego 2501  
 Dimock, G. E.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla By19Jul  
 Ditchman, R. E.  
 To 2dMarDiv 0801  
 Dominick, D. D.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Dudley, J. D.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Eaves, C. A.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla By19Jul  
 Emberger, R. J.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0801  
 Fall, H. J.  
 To 4thMarDiv 0301  
 Ferris, R. E.  
 To 4thMarDiv 0301  
 Ferrier, W. I.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Fox, D. D.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Freeman, W. G.  
 To 1stMarDiv 3501  
 Gale, R. T.  
 To NABTC NAS Pncla By19Jul  
 Gardner, R. J.  
 To 1stMarDiv 0301  
 Garvey, L. F.  
 To 3dMarDiv 3501  
 WDJul


| Permanent Promotions          |        |                     |         |
|-------------------------------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| Greenspan, L.                 | 0201   | Boyd, O. A.         | 2010    |
| Jordan, R. H.                 | 2501   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Miller, G. H.                 | 6701   | To ForTrps FMFLant  |         |
| Morgan, L. H.                 | 0301   | Briker, R. D.       | 3015    |
| Okonek, M. V.                 | 0701   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Parker, N. E.                 | 0301   | To MCSA Phila       |         |
| Riebe, K. W.                  | 0301   | Brown, G. W.        | 0202    |
| Stutts, C.                    | 3501   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Zam, F. S.                    | 3501   | To 1stMarDiv        |         |
| Temporary Promotions          |        |                     |         |
| Anderson, F. A.               | 0301   | Givens, W. M.       | 2010    |
| Antoine, G. E.                | 0301   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Ballenger, Jr., A. G.         | 0201   | To MCSC Albany Ga   |         |
| Beattie, C. R.                | 3501   | Hays, G. C.         | 7304    |
| Birmingham, T. P.             | 3501   | Fr COMART           | WDJul   |
| Boston, K. C.                 | 3501   | To 1stMAW           |         |
| Brenton, P. S.                | 7301   | Hunter, R. D.       | 0130    |
| Burks, B.                     | 0301   | Fr HQMC             |         |
| Buron, J. J.                  | 0301   | To 3dMarDiv         | By3Sep  |
| Burrell, W. C.                | 0301   | Lynn, C. C.         | 0130    |
| Butler, H. L.                 | 0301   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Carter, Jr., E. W.            | 0301   | To 6th MCRRD        |         |
| Clapsadl, S. R.               | 0801   | O'Connor, D. J.     | 1502    |
| Cochran, Jr., A. C.           | 0801   | Fr MCS Quant        | WDAug   |
| Comeau, J. L.                 | 0301   | To 3dMarDiv         |         |
| Crawford, T. C.               | 0301   | Rogers, J. L.       | 3302    |
| Drennen, H. K.                | 0301   | Fr 3dMAW            |         |
| Fellows, R. C.                | 0301   | To MCB 29 Palms     | WDAug   |
| Fensler, R. K.                | 0301   | Shelton, Jr., J. G. | 3302    |
| Ferguson, T. V.               | 0301   | Fr MCRD PISC        | WDAug   |
| Fichlie, P. C.                | 0301   | To MCAS Beaufort    |         |
| Hartley, L. M.                | 0301   | Sprague, L. N.      | 3010    |
| Herrero, H. A.                | 0301   | Fr NAG Korea        | WDAug   |
| Hill, R. F.                   | 0301   | To MCB CamLej       |         |
| Hill, E. D.                   | 0301   | Teichmann, E.       | 1310    |
| Hollingsworth, J. R.          | 0301   | Fr 1stMarDiv        | WDAug   |
| Ireian, P. A.                 | 0301   | To 3dMarDiv         |         |
| Jackson, L. W.                | 0301   | Conant, R. M.       | 1310    |
| Jackson, R. K.                | 0301   | Fr MCB CamLej       | WDAug   |
| Judson, F. F.                 | 0301   | To 3dMarDiv         |         |
| Koontz, W. O.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Lachow, M.                    | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Lay, C. L.                    | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Long, Jr., W. B.              | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Lynn, C. C.                   | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Marks, Jr., R. E.             | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Martin, L. T.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| McLeod, S. L.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| McVeigh, J. J.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Meadows, E. I.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Mercer, W. R.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Morgan, M. M.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Murphy, C.                    | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Nahhas, G. A.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Naltsnik, A. J.               | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| New, J. E.                    | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Novobilski, J. A.             | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Pearman, F. L.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Peters, B. F.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Pollock, J. H.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Posey, F. F.                  | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Rae, E. J.                    | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Reynolds, L. E.               | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Rogers, J. L.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Ruhberg, G. T.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Ruskewitch, A. P.             | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Rypar, J.                     | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Shaw, Jr., S. J.              | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Shul, V.                      | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Stickle, E. L.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Sullivan, W. J.               | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Sutterley, J. H.              | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Tabb, J. C.                   | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Terry, A. F.                  | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Tyree, F. H.                  | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Vanover, T. C.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Waller, T. G.                 | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Waugh, C. C.                  | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Wickstrom, E. C.              | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Williams, J. C.               | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Williams, Jr., L. L.          | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Wood, R. L.                   | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Woodard, M. D.                | 0301   | WDAug               |         |
| Permanent Promotions          |        |                     |         |
| Reserve                       | 0130   | Crabtree, T. E.     | Jul     |
| Scarborough, J. A.            | 0130   | Hancock, J. W.      | Jul     |
| Retired                       | 0130   | Holman, H. E.       | Jul     |
| Schroeder, E. J.              | 0130   | Olivier, L.         | Jul     |
| WDAug                         | 0130   | Roll, K. J.         | Jul     |
| Temporary Promotions, Reserve |        |                     |         |
| W-3                           | 0130   | Shively, Jr., P. S. | Jul     |
| Transfers                     |        |                     |         |
| Bowen, M. J.                  | 6602   | W-1                 |         |
| Fr 4thMarDiv                  | WDJul  | Transfers           |         |
| To 1stMAW                     | WDJul  | Bunting, J. E.      | 1402    |
| Harry, L. E.                  | 6708   | Fr USNav Suitland   | WDAug   |
| Fr 4thMarDiv                  | WDAug  | To ForTrps FMFLant  |         |
| To 1stMAW                     | WDAug  | Cotten, C. R.       | 1502    |
| Junks, II, H. E.              | 0302   | Fr 3dMarDiv         | WDAug   |
| Fr MB NB Npt                  | WDAug  | To MCS Quant        |         |
| To 2dMarDiv                   | WDAug  | Flanagan, P. E.     | 3010    |
| Lewis, R. E.                  | 3510   | Fr HQMC             | WDAug   |
| Fr 1stMAW                     | WDAug  | To 3dMarDiv         |         |
| To 2dMAW FMFLant              | WDAug  | Ketrin, Jr., W. R.  | 2045    |
| Lorch, R. E.                  | 6730   | Fr 1stMAW           | WDAug   |
| Fr 2dMAW                      | WDAug  | To 3dMAW            |         |
| To Norfolk England            | By8Aug | Bayer, Jr., R.      | 3202    |
| Nagy, W.                      | 3010   | Fr MCSC Barstow     | By18Sep |
| Fr 3dMarDiv                   | WDAug  | To MB Pearl         |         |
| To MCS Quant                  | WDAug  | Boston, K. C.       | 3510    |
| Pollak, W. F.                 | 3025   | Fr 1stMAW           | WDAug   |
| Fr 3dMarDiv                   | WDAug  | To 2dMarDiv         |         |
| To MCRD SDiego                | WDAug  | Fr MCS Quant        |         |
| Shea, R. E.                   | 3510   | To 1stMAW           |         |
| Fr 3dMarDiv                   | WDAug  | To 2dMarDiv         |         |
| To 2dMAW FMFLant              | WDAug  | Fr MCS Quant        |         |
| Tallentire, G. A.             | 3202   | To 1stMAW           |         |
| Fr 2dMarDiv                   | WDAug  | To 2dMarDiv         |         |
| To MCSC Albany                | WDAug  | Fr MCS Quant        |         |
| Tidwell, E. D.                | 3010   | To 1stMAW           |         |
| Fr MB WashDC                  | WDAug  | To 2dMarDiv         |         |
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
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